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In 1959 Ed Masr.y (Class of 1960) concluded that Loyola Law School
needed a ,9tuden~"PIl~lication. With his usual persuasiveness he pressed
Mario Roberti, John Bambrick and others into service and the Loyola
Digest was born.
At first it was essentially a quarterly newspaper, which included a few
short articles. Gradually, as longer articles began to appear, it became ap-
parent that the Digest was undergoing .arievolutionary process, giving rise
to the frequently. expressed hope that it might someday become a legal
journal.i'Last yea'r' its development was accentuated by a substantial change
in physical appearance; The change was so notable that the Editors, in the
great tradition of law book publishers, numbered their first issue Vol. 1,
No. 1 (New Sedes}.L' .
This year the eclito:fiaf'staf£ i~hop~'fultlrat this current issue will prove
to be a very significant step in the' evolution of the Digest from student
newspaper to legal periodical.
Now the question will be askedmor:e insistently: "When will Loyola
have a Law Review?" In an effort to find an answer to this question, a
committee, composed of faculty' menibersand students under the chairman-
ship of Professor Martha Yerkes, has been appointed to investigate and
make recommendations. Should the Committee's report be favorable, a
great deal of planning will geed to be done since a law review is a major
undertaking both in terms of personnel and money. Thus we must look
forward to the continued sponsorship of the Loyola Digest by the Student
Bar Association for at least the immediate .future. I am confident that the
next editorial staff will build "Yell on the fine work of their predecessors.
LLOYD TEVIS, Dean
What lawyers' wives don't know will hurt them.
What lawyers' wives don't know is that too many lawyers are running around
intestate.
If you're one of them, your wife could end up a second class widow.
She'll know other widows whose husbands not only made Wills, they made a
Security Bank trust part of them.
She'll find out they don't worry about investment matters. Skilled investment
officers do that for them. .
She'll realize those widows have a Security Bank trust speclallst to depend
on. When they're sick, he even takes care of their household and medical bills.
That's when she'll decide widows with Security Bank trusts are living first
class. That's when she might be sorry she married a lawyer ....
If you haven't made a Will that includes a Security Bank trust" we won't tell
your wife.
But when you do, we'll want you to tell her.
II"'
i
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Bateman Eichler, Hill Richards
INCORPORATED
Main Office: 460 S. Spring Street, Los Angeles· 625-3545
MEMBERS NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE·
and other leading exchanges
WHAT EVERY YOUNG
LAWYER SHOULD
KNOW ABOUT
STOCKS AND BONDS
It's not what you know. It's who. Sometimes a lawyer's best friend
can be his Bateman Eichler, Hill Richards account executive.
He can help you set your personal investment goals ... and
help you reach them. Equally important, he'll help you help your
clients. On estate settlement matters, for example. When you
need prompt appraisals of securities for an estate or a trust, he
can have the latest quotations for you in minutes. He can also
arrange for the physical transfer of liquidation of any security,
listed or unlisted. You'll never know just how valuable a BEHR
man can be as a friend until youcall him. Call any time.
FOREIGN GOVERNMENT
'INVOLVEMENT' IN THE
EXTRAT~RRITORIAL.
APPLICATION OF
ANTITRUST LAW,~:,
Shortly after Congress passed the Trade
Expansion Act of 1962/ Attorney Gen-
eral Robert F. Kennedy announced the
formation of the Foreign Commerce Section
of the Justice Department's Antitrust Divi-
sion. Although the antitrust laws have al-
ways been applied extra-territorially, the
recent appearance of a special, section to
deal with foreign commerce underlines the
growing significance of antitrust problems
in this area."
The scope of extraterritorial 'application
of antitrust law is necessarily limited by the
requirement for jurisdiction over the per-
son':' and' for jurisdiction over subject mat-
ter. 4 But jurisdictional requirements have
proved to be no stumbling block to vigorous
enforcement of antitrust law" as is evi-
denced by foreign criticism of its applica-
tion."
The standards applied by courts to de-
termine domestic antitrust violations are
also applied to foreign commerce, although
perhaps less rigorously. 7 For example, re-
straints that are normally considered illegal
per se8 may require proof of intent to af-
fect, together with actual effect on Ameri-
can commerce," and the cases decided by
"rule of reason" might turn on the defense
of foreign business compulsion.:"
In addition to the remoteness of foreign
business activity as an element that will
affect' questions of jurisdiction and may
affect the application of traditional anti-
trust standards, there is an important in-
fluence on extraterritorial application of
antitrust law created by foreign govern-
ment involvement in commerce through (i)
public ownership of business enterprises
(ii) , acts of state affecting commerce and
(iii) laws compelling behavior proscribed
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by American antitrust law. The three kinds
of government involvement arc often treated
without distinction by c;;ur~sll and com-
mentators.P The purpose of this paper is
to examine separately the influence of the
different kinds of foreign government in-
volvement on court decisions in antitrust
situations.
SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY
"The immunity of a foreign state (some-
times called 'sovereign immunity') is a de-
fense available to a state when a claim is
brought against it in a court of another
state ... The defense bars consideration
of the merits of the claim, including ex-
amination of the act which gave rise to the
claim."13
The already considerable and increasing
involvement of foreign governments' in the
economic affairs of their countries through
public ownership of business enterprises
suggests that a defense of sovereign immuni-
ty has potentially wide application in the
antitrust field.:" However, in 1952 the
State Department in:dicated that it would
follow the restrictive' theory in deciding
whether to support pleas for sovereign im-
munity.J" ' Since the courts normally defer
to the wishes of the State Department in
these matters,"? and apparently will apply
the restrictive theory without prodding by
the executive,' 7 sovereign immunity should
not furnish a convenient vehicle' fOT escape
from antitrust laws by foreign public cor-
porations.l"
The distinction necessary to application
of the restrictive theory may be readilY'e'X-
pressed -in conceptual terms, l~ ._but_,~~,is dif-
ficult to anticipate in any givenc'ase'wheth-
er the State Department or' ~F,'~9~_rt_~M
characterize activity as "go\Pefhhigiil'al"~ aY'
"cornmercial." One antilihsl r~~h~~2-herd
that the Anglo-Iranian _,9IL9bfu'p~n~,"i'n
which the British Goverri'lrie~t had ,slightly
more than' one-third of the .capital invest-
ment, was "indistinguishable from the Gov-
ernment of Great Britain. "21 Accordingly,
the court extended s6vere~gnirhmli.nity al-
l
though the State Department had made no
comment on the oil company's status. The
court noted that the British Government had
acquired its interest in Anglo-Iranian in
order ','to insure a proper supply of petrole-
um, crude oil and other products for the
British Fleet. "22 and that the supplying of
oil to insure the maintenance of a naval
force "is certainly a fundamental function
serving a public purpose. ".23
In an earlier antitrust case, United States
v. Deutches Kalisyndicat Gessellschaft,24 a
New York district court denied a plea for
sovereign immunity entered by the French
ambassador on behalf of the largely govern-
ment-owned defendants who comprised a
syndicate for purposes of mining and sell-
ing potash. The French ambassador ad-
dressed a statement to the court which certi-
fied that .. eleven-fifteenths of defendants'
capital stock was owned by the French Gov-
ernment, and that the government's share
of the proceeds from the sale of potash
went into the public treasury and wasap-
plied to governmental.purposes.25 The am-
bassador communicated his plea to the
State Department, but the latter did not
transmit a suggestion of immunity to the
court.
Judge Kirkland, in World Arrangements,
distinguished Gesellschaftwith the comment
that' "there is a vast distinction between
a seafaring island-nation maintaining a con-
sistent supply of maritime fuel and a gov-
ernment' seeking additional revenue in the
American markets . . ."26 At least one
commentator has suggested that this is a
distinction without adifference.:" After all,
what is. the difference between an oil cartel
and a potash syndicate when both are prof-
,'table commercial ventures that include pri-
vate'investors ?28 The result in World Ar-
rangements may well have been occasioned
by .the unique circumstances under which
that case was decided. Judge Kirkland com-
mented at, the outset of his opinion that the
COUl;twas "keenly aware of present world
conditions.Y'" He noted counsel's emphasis
of the "delicate and sensitive" position oc-
cupied by the oil industry in many coun-
2
tries in which it was "under attack.i"? and
concluded that the "United States has a
present vital interest in the Middle East and
because of this the court will proceed for-
ward in an extremely cautious mannerF"
These were the days (1951-1954) during
which the British Government was hotly dis-
puting Iran's nationalization of Anglo-Iran-
ian interests in that country. NO' circum-
stances suggesting a need for judicial cau-
I tion were evident in Gesellschaft.
It is unfortunate; that World Arrange-
ments, decided as it was under such extra-
ordinary circumstances; should be regarded
as a guidepost in applying the restrictive
theory of immunity. The case should be con-
fined to its facts, but it is often contrasted
with Gesellschaft, as in In Re Grand Jury
Investigation of the Shipping Industry,32
an antitrust case also decided by the District
Court for the District of Columbia. In
Shipping Industry, a plea of sovereign im-
munity was entered on behalf of Philippine
National Lines, one of the defendant ship-
ping companies. The Philippine embassy
transmitted a note to the State Department
claiming that defendant was an instrumen-
tality of the Philippine Government. In its
reply the State Department cited the restric-
tive theory of sovereign immunity, expressed
its view that defendant was a commercial
enterprise, and refused to support the em-
bassy's claim, The district court, however,
did not feel compelled to decide the issue
on the basis of the State Department's
views. Rather, it noted one case in which
the Supreme Court equated government-
operated merchant ships with ships of
war33 and concluded that "the present case,
seems to' fall somewhere in between the
World 'Arrangements and Gesellschaft
cases. "34 What the court was really after
was more information about the nature of
Philippine National Lines' activities before
reaching a decision on the claim of im-
munity.I" It may be suggested that no
amount of additional information could res-
cue this issue from the area "sQmewhere in
between" opposite conclusions based on sim-
ilar facts. In any event, Shipping Industry
contributes little to a solution. of the prob-
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hlems of judicial application of the re-
strictive theory. Unfortunately, it is the
most recent treatment of that theory in an
antitrust situation.
Proposed solutions to the confusion sur--
rounding the restrictive theory are to ig-
nore the governmental-commercial distinc-
tion in antitrust cases,"? return to a theory
of absolute sovereignty for all types of
cases.V and to develop the restrictive theory
in the courts without deference to the exec-
utive.P"
Ignoring the governmental-commercial
distinction would extend the scope of sov-
ereign immunity and seems unwise in view
of likely increases in the commercial ac-
tivities of public corporations engaged in
international trade. Even though the orig-
inal PUFPOS@ in adepting the restrictive
theory was to permit individual recoveries
in tort and contract situations, the theory is
no less appropriate to antitrust cases;" par-
ticularly since § 4 of the Clayton Act40
permits treble damage recoveries by injured
private parties. Although the State Depart-
ment would probably prefer to be relieved
of the diplomatic pressures attendant upon
regularly making determinations about the
character of foreign enterprises, it is likely
too that the Department would wish to' con-
tinue to exercise its influence in certain
cases."! Moreover, there appears to be little
reason why courts cannot fashion govern-
mental-commercial distinctions even while
they defer to executive suggestions in indi-
vidual cases.
Despite the somewhat equivocal status
of the restrictive theory, its influence should
be expected to increase in proportion to any
increase in the activity of foreign public
corporations affecting American commerce.
ACTS OF STATE
The act of state doctrine .may be stated
as a rule that "the courts of one country
will not sit in judgment on the acts of the
government of another done within its own
territory. "42 The doctrine is apparently the
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offspring of the separate defense of sov-
ereign immunity, with which it is often
confused.t" Although the doctrine may not
apply where the executive has indicated a
desire that a court accept jurisdiction;" no
such exception should affect antitrust cases
since acts of government are generally out-
side the scope of the antitrust laws."
The doctrine is appl'icable in antitrust
cases where incidents complained of are
actually those of a foreign state and are not
acts of a defendant who may have bene-
fitted by them. Thus in American Banana
Co. v. United Fruit CO.,4G an early and
often cited case involving the act" of 'state
doctrine in an antitrust situation, the Su-
preme Court held that the seizure of plain-
tiff's business property in Costa Rica by the
Costa Rican Government, although insti-
gated by the defendant, an American Cor-
poration, could not be complained of as a
violation of. antitrust law.
Where a foreign sovereign is defendant
the act of state doctrine, as well as sov-
ereign immunity, may be relied on by a
court as grounds for refusing to consider
a claim on its rnerits.t" In cases where either
of these objections to jurisdiction would
apply, distinction between them may be of
little consequence, but in cases where the
restrictive theory would strip a foreign
public corporation. of sovereign immunity
the other doctrine could apply if the cor-
poration, .pursuant to law, is. acting as an
agent of its sovereign. Such a possibility is
suggeste1d by Continental Ore Co. v. Union
Carbide & Carbon Corp.,48 an antitrust case
in which plaintiff sought treble damages
under § 4 of the Clayton Act4D for com-
petitive harm suffered as a result of, among
other things, defendants' alleged conspiracy
to monoplize exports of ferrovanadium"? to
the Canadian market. The Canadian Gov-
ernment had established a regulation that
no Ierrovanadium could be imported into
Canada by anyone other than its agent, and
Electro Metallurgical Company of Canada,
Ltd. (Electro Met), a wholly-owned sub-
sidiary of defendant Union Carbide and
Carbon Corp., had been designated by that
3
Government to act as its agient. Electro Met
refused to purchase ferrovanadium from
plaintiffs. Electro Met was named as a de-
fendant but was not served. As a result,
Electro Met's liability was not in question.
The district court excluded all evidence re-
lating to Electro Met's actions on the
grounds that the sale of material in Canada
was a matter wholly within the control of
the Canadian Government. In affirming the
district court's action in this respect, the
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
stated:
Thus, even if we assume that Electro
Metallurgical Company of Canada, Ltd.,
acted for the purpose of entrenching the
monopoly position of the defendants in
the United states, it was acting as an arm
of the Canadian Government, and we do
not see how such efforts as appellants
claim defendants took to persuade and in-
fluence the Canadian Government through
its agent are withtn the purview of the
Sherman Act.e-
The Supreme Court reversed and remanded
for a new trial, holding that the excluded
offer of proof presented a question for the
jury as to whether loss of the Canadian
.business was attributable to the activities
of Union Carbide and the other American
co-oonspirators.P'' Since Electro Met itself
was not a party to the case the act of state
doctrine was never brought sharply into
focus; but it is apparent that Electro Met's
most appropriate objection to jurisdiction
. would be the act of state doctrine rather
than sovereign immunity which should not
be offered to purely commercial enterprises
under the restrictive theory.
Although the act of state doctrine pro-
tected the American conspirators in Ameri-
can Banana, it afforded no protection in
Continental Ore for the reason that plain
tiffs in the latter case alleged specific acts
of a conspiracy which were said to have
occurred in the United States, and for the
further reason that the available evidence
did not show that Electro Met was com-
pelled by the Canadian Government to make
all its purchases from defendants. 53 It is
not at all clear whether acts in furtherance
4
of a conspiracy to instigate government ac-
tion necessarily resulting in restraint of free
trade would be within the scope of the anti-
trust laws. One case, Eastern R. R. Presi-
dent's Conf. v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc.,54
held that q publicity campaign encouraging
adoption and enforcement of laws harmful
to plaintiff's business Was not within the
Sherman Act. Noerr involved a feud be-
tween the ~ailroad and trucking interests.
The Court was especially concerned with
the constitutional implications of any at-
tempt to regulate political activity and held
defendant's activities to be outside the Act
"at least insofar as those activities com-
prised mere solicitation of governmental
action with respect to the passage and en-
forcement of laws. "55 An earlier case, U.S.
v. Rock Royal Co-op., had established that
enacted legislation would be immune from
any antitrust attack grounded on the mo-
tives of its supporters. 56 But Noerr and
Rock Royal may be distinguished from
Continetnal Ore since they deal with legis-
lation rather than administrative action.
There are no cases, other than American
Banana, involving attempts to secure exec-
utive action that would itself amount to a
restraint of trade .
FOREIGN LEGAL COMPULSION
Foreign legal compulsion is a factor in
the extraterritorial application of antitrust
law that is not always distinguished from
the act of state doctrine.
Unlike sovereign immunity and the act
of state doctrine which operate to restrain
a court from exercising jurisdiction, a plea
of foreign legal compulsion may serve both·
as an objection to jurisdiction in the con-
flict of laws sense"? and as a defense on the
merits.P" Also, a plea of foreign legal com-
pulsion would be available to all defendants
in a compulsory case, while sovereign im-
munity and, to a great extent, the act of
state doctrine are useful only to the party
able to assert its public character. As a
result, it seems most likely that legal com-
pulsion would be the most significant l~ind
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of foreign government involvement In
American antitrust law.
A determination of the effect foreign ob-
ligations have in antitrust litigation should
consider the extent to which interference
with those obligations would create friction
abroad, or place defendants in jeopardy of
specific sanction by the foreign government.
Where the obligation is in the nature of a
private agreement enforceable in foreign
courts, an American court would be less
reluctant to require its terrnination+" than
it would be to insist that a defendant violate
a foreign criminal statute."? An additional
consideration is the nationality of the de-
Iendant.?' Proposed solutions to the en-
tanglements caused by conflicting state
policies are to resort to a strict territorial
rule, to apply conflicts rules for determina-
tien of jurisdiction, and to UHl a "preoa-
tory" approach which would recognize po-
tential conflicts at the remedial stage of
Iitigation.P''
In United States v. The Watchmakers of
Switzerland Information Center, Inc.,63 the
District Court for the Southern District of
New York held that American and Swiss
watch manufacturers, together with a Swiss
trade association and a Swiss holding com-
pany, all of whom were "found" within
the district, violated antitrust law although
their private activities originating in Swit-
zerland were approved and encouraged by
the Swiss Government. The case is espe-
cially interesting for its consideration of
the role of the Swiss Government in super-
vising the watch industry.
Trade practices in Switzerland's watch
industry are governed by a hierarchy of
voluntary associates which at the lowest lev-
el includes regional groups of manufactur-
ers and assemblers of watches. These re-
gional groups together comprise Swiss
Watch defendant Federation Suisse des As-
SOCIatIOns de Fabricants d'Horlogerie
(FH), which promulgates trade rules for its
members. Any rule is subject to review,
first by a board composed of one profes-
sional judge and two members of the watch
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industry, next by an arbitral- tribunal com-
posed of three professional judges and two
members of the watch industry, and finally
by the courts of the Canton of Bern. De-
fendant Ebauches S.A. (Ebauches) is a
holding company which owns or controls
stock of other Swiss corporations engaged
in the manufacture of a watch part known
as an ebauche, or chassis of the movement.
FH and Ebauches, together with others not
named as defendants but named as co-
conspirators, are members of La Chambre
Suisse de L'Horlogerie (Swiss Watch
Chamber), which performs "advisory and
administrative functions under the Swiss
Government's various regulatory statutes
. h h i d "64 T·h S .concerning t e watc In ustry. e WISS
Watch Chamber serves as the "link between
industry and federal authorities.?" Above
the Watch Chamber in the hierarchy is the
Department of Public Economy, an arm of
the Swiss executive.
FH, Ebauches and other named co-con-
spirators entered into a series of agreements
beginning in 1931. Those agreements were
replaced in 1936 by a single detailed joint
agreement known as the Collective Con-
vention of the Swiss Watch Industry. The
Collective Convention was renewed from
time to time, and the Convention executed
in 1949 was the basis of the complaint in
the case. Signatories of the Convention,
who comprised virtually all of the Swiss
watch industry, agreed that: they would not
manufacture or encourage the manufacture
of watch products outside Switzerland; they
would not sell or export watch making
machinery except under certain circum-
stances; they would use their manufactured
watch parts solely for manufacture and re-
pair of their own finished products (ex-
cept that those whose businesses were not
fully integrated could sell parts to other
signatories); and they would not deal with
or give aid of any kind to companies out-
side Switzerland that dealt in watches or
parts produced by persons not parties to the
Convention. The Convention provided for
no criminal sanctions.
The terms of the Convention are admin-
5
istered and enforced by the Delegations
Reuins whose decisions may be appealed
to a panel of the Arbitral Tribunal, a ju-
dicial organ created by the Convention and
composed of three professional judges se-
lected by the courts of three of the watch-
making cantons, together with two judges
from the industry selected by the profes-
sional judges. The decisions of the Tribunal
have the same legal effect as judgments of
the Swiss cantonal courts, and' are review-
able by the Supreme Court of the Canton
of Bern. Swiss legislation complements the
Convention by probihiting export of parts
and machinery without a permit. Permits
may be obtained through the Department
of Public Economy, which is authorized to
delegate its authority, subject to review, to
the Swiss Watch Chamber.
The American defendants, which are sub-
sidiaries or parent corporations of certain
Swiss defendants, were reluctant to submit
to the requirements of the Convention be-
cause they preferred to develop the Ameri-
can watch industry. However, these Ameri-
can manufacturers depend on access to
Swiss parts and machinery which cannot
be exported to nonsignatories except under
penalty of the private sanctions imposed by
.the Convention. Moreover, a nonsignatory
would have to obtain an export permit by
appealing directly to the Department of
Public Economy -since the Swiss Watch
Chamber could hardly be expected to en-
courage export by those who violated the
Convention. Judge Cashin remarked of de"
fendants' plea of foreign legal compulsion
that:
[T] he defendants' activities were not re-
quired by the laws of Switzerland. They
were agreements formulated privately
without compulsion on the part of the
Swiss Government. It is clear that these
private agreements were then recognized
as facts of economic and industrial life by
that nation's government Nonetheless the
fact that the Swiss Government may, as
a practical matter, approve of the effects
of this private activity cannot convert
what is essentially a vulnerable private
conspiracy into an unassailable system re-
sulting from foreign governmental man-
6
date. In the absence of direct foreign gov-
ernmental action compelling tlie defen-
dants' activities, a United States court
may exercise its jurisdiction as to acts
and contracts abroad, if, as in the case
at bar, such acts and contracts have a sub-
stantial and material effect upon our for-
eign and domestic commerce.se
The distinction between permissive and
mandatory legislation noted by Judge
Cashin is appropriate to analysis of a plea
of foreign legal compulsion.?" and appears
to have ,been correctly applied in Swiss
Watch. But it may be argued that the dis-
tinction should not apply to circumstances,
such as those in Swiss Watch, where co-
operation between foreign industry and gov-
ernment makes mandatory legislation com-
pletely unnecessary.:"
Judge Cashin was aware that a decree,
though aimed at the private agreements
themselves, might offend Swiss law. In
commenting on defendants' argument that
a judgment in the case would violate the
United States constitutional rights of Swiss
citizens, the treaty obligations of the United
States, and the sovereignty of the Swiss
Confederation, Judge Cashin stated:
All these claims are entirely premature,
and presuppose that this court intends to
permit the issuance of a decree of wide
scope which would have such a drastic ef-
fect.69
A final judgment enteredrin January
1964 was modified by the court a year later
on motion of the plaintiff. The modifica-
tions, which related to "peripheral areas
of the judgment which might have long been
construed to have a bearing upon the sov-
ereignty of the Swiss Confederation,"?"
were conditioned on one of the defendants
entering an order dismissing their joint
appeal.?"
Judge Cashin's approach seems very
much like the precatory approach, sua-
gested by Brewster.P which is more co~-
cerned ,with the scope of a decree than
with legislative jurisdiction to determine
liability. In cases where it may be inap-
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istered and enforced by the Delegations
Reuins whose decisions may be appealed
to a panel of the Arbitral Tribunal, a ju-
dicial organ created by the Convention and
composed of three professional judges se-
lected by the courts of three of the watch-
making cantoris, together with two judges
from the industry selected by the profes-
sional judges. The decisions of the Tribunal
have the same legal effect as judgments of
the Swiss cantonal courts, arid' are review-
able by the Supreme Court of the Canton
of Bern. Swiss legislation complements the
Convention by probihiting export of parts
and machinery without a permit. Permits
may be obtained through the Department
of Public Economy, which is authorized to
delegate its authority, subject to review, to
the Swiss Watch Chamber.
The American defendants, which are sub-
sidiaries or parent corporations of certain
Swiss defendants, were reluctant to submit
to the requirements of the Convention be-
cause they preferred to develop the Ameri-
can watch industry. However, these Ameri-
can manufacturers depend on access to
Swiss parts and machinery which cannot
be exported to nonsignatories except under
penalty of the private sanctions imposed by
,the Convention. Moreover, a nonsignatory
would have to obtain an export permit by
appealing directly -to the Department of
Public Economy since the Swiss Watch
,Chamber could hardly be expected to en-
courage export by those who violated the
Convention. Judge Cashin remarked of de-
fendants' plea of foreign legal compulsion
that: '
[T]he defendants' activities were not re-
quired by the laws of Switzerland. They
were agreements formulated privately
without compulsion on the part of the
Swiss Government. It is clear that these
private agreements were then recognized
, as facts of economic and industrial life by
that nation's government Nonetheless the
fact that the Swiss Gove'rnment may, as
a practical matter, approve of the effects
of this private activity cannot convert
what is essentially a vulnerable private
conspiracy into an unassailable system re-
sulting from roreign governmental man-
6
date. In the absence of direct foreigngov-
ernmental action compelling the defen-
dants' activities, a United States court
may exercise its jurlsdtction as to acts
and contracts abroad, if, as in the case
at bar, such acts and contracts have a sub-
stantial and material effect upon our for-
eign and domestic oommerce.cs
The distinction between permissive and
mandatory legislation noted by Judge
Cashin is appropriate to analysis of a plea'
of foreign legal compulsion,"? and appears
to have been correctly applied in Swiss
Watch. But it may be argued that the dis-
tinction should not apply to circumstances,
such as those in Swiss Watch, where co-
operation between foreign industry and gov-
ernment makes mandatory legislation com-
pletely unnecessary. 68
Judge Cashin was aware that a decree,
though aimed at the private agreements
themselves, might offend Swiss law. In
commenting on defendants' argument that
a judgment in the case would violate the
United States constitutional rights of Swiss
citizens, the treaty obligations of the United
States, and the sovereignty of the Swiss
Confederation, Judge Cashin stated:
All these claims are entdrely premature,
and presuppose that this court intends to
permit the issuance of a decree of wide
scope which would have such a drastic ef-
fect.6u
A final judgment entered vin January
1964 was modified by the court a year later
on ,motion, of the plaintiff: The modifica-
ti~ns, which related to "peripheral areas
of the judgment which might have long been
construed to have a bearing upon the sov-
erei.gnty of the Swiss Confederation,"?"
were conditioned on one of the defendants
entering an order dismissing their joint
appeal. 71
Judge Cashin's approach seems very
much like the precatory approach, sug-
gested by Brewster.?" which is more con-
cerned with the scope of a decree than
with legislative jurisdiction to' determine
liability. In cases where it may be inap-
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propriate to apply the permissive-manda-
tory distinction to legislation affecting in-
dustry, and in cases where it may be im-
possible to crystalize, for purposes of analy-
sis, the relationship between government
and industry, the precatory approach seems
desirable.
CONCLUSION
The defense of sovereign immunity and
the act of state doctrine are available to
defendants who are affected with a pub-
lic character through public ownership and
function, or, in the case of the act of state
doctrine, because of the nature of a public
authority delegated to them, In addition,
the act of state doctrine may be available to
private parties who have benefited by an
act. which they claim has Governmental
status, although it is none too clear when
a defendant should be held liable for pri-
vate solicitation of governmental action.
The defense of foreign legal compulsion is
available to private parties who may suffer
public sanction for noncompliance with ac-
tivity prohibited by American antitrust law,
although here too it is unclear whether a
private party should be held liable for
solicitation of the legislation that compels
his anticompetitive behavior.
Sovereign immunity and the act of state
doctrine are well known and widely applied
doctrines. They may be held good objec-
tions to jurisdiction over person and subject
matter respectively, without regard to any
special analytical requirements occasioned
by the nature of antitrust Iaw, The defense
of foreign legal compulsion is more diffi-
cult to apply. A strict territorial view of
legislative jurisdiction would preclude any
conflict of laws problems, but such a view
would sacrifice much of the effectiveness
of antitrust law in an increasingly inter-
dependent world economy. A jurisdictional
approach in the conflict of laws sense would
be most in keeping with traditional legal
analysis of conflicting state policies; but
until such time as other nations assert COIl-
trol over industrial power comparable to
American antitrust law, this approach
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would also run a heavy risk' of damaging
American antitrust policies. On the other
hand, the precatory approach suggested by
Brewster, and apparently utilized by the
court in Swiss Watch, seems most usefuL
Although a vigorous extraterritorial appli-
cation of the antitrust law may occasionally
offend foreign states whose contrarypoli-
cies are involved, no serious or lasting
grievance should be occasioned unless a
court permits a decree of wide scope.
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CRIMINAL LAW AND CRIMINOLOGY
A BIBLIOGRAPHY OF PERIODICALS
. Richard Rank*
Crime in the United States is a growing menace. In fact, it has reached
such proportions as to cause serious concern for our entire society. Recog-
nizing the urgency of this problem, President Johnson appointed/ on Jul y
23, 1965, a Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice,
to examine all aspects of crime and to recommend ways in which America
might meet its challenge." This .. Committee, in a recently published study,
"The Challenge oj- Crime in a: Free Society,"3 emphasizes the seriousness
of the. problem in the following terms: -
"There is much crime in America, more than ever is reported, far more
than ever is solved, far too much for the health of the Nation Every
American knows that. Every American is! in a sense, a victim of crime.
Violence and theft have not.only injured, often irreparably, hundreds of
thousands of citizens, but have directly affected everyone. Some people
have been impelled to uproot themselves and find new homes. Some have
been made afraid to use public streets and parks. Some have come to doubt
the worth cif a society in which so many .people behave so badly." (p. 1)
It is no wonder, therefore, that the battle against crime has become a
major concern not only for federal law enforcement officials, but also for
the various civic and religious organizations, businesses,' schools, and even
individual citizens.
On the state level there is also evidence of serious effort in fighting crime.
Thus, in California, e.g., a Special Governor's Commission headed by Dean
Lloyd Tevis, School of Law, Loyola University, Los Angeles was appointed
in the Fall of 1966 to study crime laws in California.'!
In addition, some private Foundations have made grants to various univer-
sities for the purpose of expanding their study and training programs in
criminal law and criminology." Also, professional organizations are con-
cerned with this problem. The Federal Bar Association, e.g., has announced
its plan to study another aspect of the problem, the effect of crime on its
victims." .
In view of all this increased effort in the control of crime, it would seem
that a bibliography of periodicals in ··criminal law and criminology might
further this effort by bringing to the attention of those concerned with the
problem the multitude of materials in periodical literature. Periodical litera-
ture may be considered one of the most useful sources for legal researchers,
in view of the fact that periodicals almost always cover new and interesting
areas which have not yet been adequately dealt with in textbooks, encyclo-
pedias, or other types of legal materials.
Since the crime problem is not confined to our part of the world, foreign
experiences in fighting crime should be considered valuable. For this reason,
the major foreign periodicals in criminal law and criminology have been
included in this bibliography.
The bibliography is arranged in an alphabetical list by title. Entries are
under thel atest title, with information of previous titles whenever available.
It is my hope that the material presented in this bibliography might be
helpful in opening up new vistas for those working to curb the menace of
crime to our society.
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PART 1.
1)
ALPHABETICAL LIST OF PERIODICALS BY TITLE
Allgemeine deuische Strajrechtszeitung zur Forderung einheitlicher Entwicke-
lung auf den Gebieten des Strafrechts, des Strafprocesses und des Ge-
fiingniswesens, sowie fur strafgerichtliche Medizin. Hrsg, von Franz von
Holtzendorff, Jg. 1-13, 1861-1873. Leipzig, Barth. 13 v.
2) American Bar Association, Section of Criminal Law. Bulletin. March 21,
1966- Chicago. Irregular.
3) American Bar Association. Section of Criminal Law. CLS newsletter; news
and comments on criminal laui. Summer 1959- . [Chicag.o] 0 Irregular.
4) American Correctional Association. Newsletter. v. 1-12, no. 1, Dec. 1920-
Sept. 1932; 1933- New York.
None issued 1939. Aug. 1928 as Congress newsletter.
5) American Correctional Association. Proceedings of the Annual Congress of
the American Correctional Association. v.l- 1870- New York.
Annual.
Title varies: 1870-1907,National Prison Association; 1908-1954,' American
Prison Association.
6) American criminal law quarterly, v.l,no.l- November 1962-
Title varies: Nov. 1962-Feb. 1963, Criminal law quarterly.
7) American journal 0/ correction. v.l- 1939- St. Paul, Minn., American
Cotrectional Association. Bi-Monthly.
Title varies: 1939-June 1940, National fail Association journal; July 1940-
1954, Prison world.
Chicago.
8) The American journal of police science. v.1-3,no.2, Jan./Feb. 1930-Mar./ Apr.
1932. Chicago, Northwestern University Press, 1930-32. 3v. Bi-monthly.
Merged into: f ournai 0/ criminal law and criminology.
9) Annale» de medecine legale, criminologie, police scientifique et toxicologie.
Organe officiel de la Societe de Medecine legale et de criminologie de France
et des Congres de medecine legale de langue francaise, annee 1-. 1921-
Paris, 1. B. Bailliere. 10 issues a year.
Title varies slightly ..
10), Annali di diritto e procedura penale. anno 1-12,no:8, 1932-43. Torino,
Unione tipografico-editrice torinese. 12 v.
11) The Annals of crime, and New Neiogate calendar. no.1-53. Aug. 24, 1833-Sept.
8, 1834. [London? Published for the Proprietor' by Berger, HolIywelI
Street] 1833-34. 1 v. -
No more published.
12) 'Anuario de derechn penal y ciencias penales. v.l- .1948-
Annual.
Buenos Ai res.
13) Anuario de derecho penal y ciencias penales. tomo 1- 1948- Madrid,
Instituto nacional de es'tudios juridicos, 3 nos. a year.
Added t.-p.: Publicaciones del Institute nacional de estudios juridicos, Ser.
1, Publicaciones peri6dicas, 110.3. Ministerio de justicia y cunsejo superior
de investigaciones cientificas.
14) Anuario de derecho penal y ciericias penales: v.l.
Annual
1946- . Mexico, D.F.
15) Archiu des Criminalrechts. Bd, 1-7, 1798-1810. Brunswick, Halle, Hemmerde
und Schwetschke, 1798-1821. 7 v. Quarterly.
Superseded by: Neues Archiv 'des Criminalrechts.
16) Archie des Criminalrechts. Neue Eolge. Bd. 1-25, Jahrg. 1834-1857. Brunswick,
Halle, C. A. Schwetschke, 25 v. .
Supersedes: Neues Archiv des Crimiruilreclus.
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28)
.. 29)
30)
31)
32)
33)
]",2
17) Archie fiir Kriminologie. Monatsschrift fur naturwissenschaftliche Krimina-
listik und Polizeiarchiv. v.I. Sept. 1898· . Lubeck, George Schmidt-
Romhild, 1899· Monthly.
Title varies: vols. 1·65 published under title: Archie fiir Kriminalanthro-
pologie und Krimindistik.
Archie fiir Strafrecht urul Strafprozess. Bd. 1·77, 1853·1933. Berlin, Decker.
77 v.
Title varies: 1853·70,Archiv fiir preussiches Strafrecht; 1871·79, Archiv
fiir gemeines deutsches und fiir preussisches Strafrecht; 1890·99, Archie
fiir Strafrecht; 1900·33, Archivfiir Slrafrecht urul Strafprozess. Suspended
1920.25. 1934·1941, continued as: Deutsches Strafrecht, Strairechtspolitik
und Strafprozess. Editor: 1853·71 Theodor Coltdammer,
Archie fiir Zioil- und Straireclit der konig], preuss. Rheinprovinz. Bd. l·11I.
Coln, P. Huebner [etc.] 1820·1915. III v.
Title varies: 18 .1899, 1901, Archiv fiir das Civil- und Criminal-Reclit der
. konigl. 'Preuss, Rheinprooinz (varies slightly) .1900, Rheinisches Archie
fiir das Civil- urul Criminal-Reclit del' konigl. preuss. Rheinprouine. Cover
title: 1900·1915; Rheinisches Archie fiir Ziuil- urul Strairecht.
Archies d'anthropologie crimineile, de medecine legale et de psychologie nor-
male et pathologie. t.l·30, 1886·1915. Paris, Lyons, Editions Masson.
1886.1892 as Archives de l' anthropologie criminelle et des sciences penales,
Sub-title varies.
18)
19)
20)
Archives of criminal psychadynarnics. v.L Winter 1955· Washington.
Quarterly.
None published 1956.
Archioio penale. v.I· 1945· . Roma, Iuris Domus. Bi-Monthly.
Archioos de crirninologia, neuropsiquiatria y disciplinas conexas. v.I. Jan.
1937. Quito, Universidad de Quito, Instituto de Criminologia.
Archivos de psiquiatria y criminologia, rnedicina legal. Ano 1·12, 1902·1913.
Buenos Aires, Talleres gnificos de la Penitenciaria nacional. 12 v.
v..l, 1902 as Archivos de criminologia, medicina legal e psiquitria. Super.
seded by Revista de criminologia, psiquitria y medecina legal.
Arkhiv kriminologiii subdebnoi meditsiny. t.l·2, 1926·1927. Khar'kov, Iuri·
dicheskoe izdatel'stvo Narkomiusta USSR. 2 v.
Title also in Snglish, Italian, German and French. Contains articles in other
languages. Resume in French, German and English. Editor: N. Bokarius.
No more published?
26) Arquivos de medicina legal e identifica(ao. Publicao official .de Instituto
de identifica~ao. 1· 1931· . Rio de Janeiro.
27) .Arquivos de policia e identifica(ao. I·,April 1936· Sao Paulo, Gabinete
de investigacoes da policia.
1936·37 as Archivos depolicia e identifica~ao.
21)
22)
23)
24)
25)
Beretninger am frengselsvaesenet i Danmarlc. v.I· 184.9·;' Kpb~nhavn, Di·
l'ektqratet for Frengselvresenet. Annual. (Reports of the Director of the
Danish Bureau of Prisons) ., '
Berlin. Vniversitat. Kriminalistisches lnstitut. Abhandlungen. v.l·4., 1888·95.
n.s. v.l·7, 1905·15. s.3, v.l·3,pt.l, 1914·16. s.4., v.I· 1925· Berlin.
Entry varies: through 1913, as the University's Kriminalistisches Seminar.
Biblioteka za nakazatelno pravo, kriminalna tekhnika i administrativna prak.
tika. v.I· 1938· Sofiia. (Journal of Criminal law, criminology and ad·
ministrative practice).
Blatter fiir Gefangniskunda. Organ des Vereins del' deutschen Strafanstalts·
beamten. Bd.l·75, 1864·1944/45. Heidelberg, C. Winter, 1865·1945. 75 v.
Blatter fiir Gej(ingniswesen. Bd.l·4, 1909·1912. Wien.
Boletin de criminologia; organo de la Direcci6n general de pri3iones. ano
1.4, July 1927·1931/32. Lima, Tallere3 gridicos de la penitenciaria. 4 v.
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4.2)
34) Bolotin. juridico militar; organo de divulgaci6n juridico-militar de la Sec-
retaria de la defensa nacional y de la Procuraduria gral. de justicia militar.
t.l- 1935- Mexico, D.F. Hi-monthly.
Bollettino bibliographico della Rivista penale, diretta da Luigi Lucchini. 1.-3.
serie. Torin..o,Unione tip. ed., 1878-1899. 4. v. in 2.
I. serie has imprint: Mirenze, Le Monnier.
The British journal of criminology, delinquency and deviant social behavior.
v.l- July I, 1960- . London, Stevens. Quarterly.
Published on behalf of the Institute for the Study and Treatment of De-
linquency, London. Editors: 1960- Edward Glover, Hermann Mannheim
and Emanuel Miller. Continuation of: The British journal of delinquency.
The British journal of delinquency. v.l-10, July 1950-1960. [London]
Bailliere, Tindall and Cox. 10 v. Quarterly.
Official organ of the Institute for the Study and Treatment of Delinquency,
London. Continued by: The British journal of criminology, delinquency and
deviant social behaviour.
35)
36)
37)
38) Bulletin de ['Administration des prisons. v.l- 1936-
d'Etude de l'Administration des Prisons. Monthly
French and Flemish). ,
Title varies: Bulletin de l'Administration penitentiaire.
Bulletin de la Societe General des Prisons et de legislation
1877- Paris.
Bruxelles, Bureau
(Text and title in
39) criminelle. t.l-
40) Bulletin de la Societe iruetruuionale de criminologic. t.I. Paris, Societe 1l1-
ternational de criminologie avec Ie coneours du Centre national de la re-
cherche scientifique.
Bulletin de la Societe internationale de defense sociale. t.l- 1955- Paris,
Societe internationalo de defense sociale,
Continuation of: Revue international de defense sociale.
Bulletin des tribunaux de police congolais. 1.-7. annee, 1935-1958. Publie par
la Societe d'etudes juridiques du Katanga, 7 v. in 1. Quarterly.
Nor more published?
4.1 )
43) Bulletin of the Bureau of Criminal Investigation. v.l- Aug.1936-
nectady, N. Y. '
44) Biinteto [ogtudomanyi szemle (Criminal law review). v.l- -1880
pest.
45) Biintetojog (Criminal law). v.I-Ll., 1926-1936. Budapest. II v.
4.6) Biintetiijog tam. (Archive of criminal law). v.I-65, 1880-1944. Budapest. 65 v.
Sche-
Buda-
47) Biinugyi szemle (Review of criminology). v.1-8, 1912-1919. Budapest. 8 v.
48) The Canadian journal of corrections; La revue canadienne de criminologie.
v.I. Octo,ber 1958- Ottawa, The Canadian Corrections Association,
The Canadian Welfare Council. Quarterly.
49) La' cassazione penale; rivista di dottrina giurisprudenza e legislazione. anno
1- 1945- Bari, 1.Macri.
50) La cassazione unioa (periodico giuridico di Roma) , , , [Parte penale] anna
1-35, 1889-1923. Roma, 35 v.
Ceased publication with vol. 35, 1923.
51) "La Ciencia juridica" revista y biblioteca quincenal de doctrina, jurisprudencia
critica, bibliografia y consultas ... Seccion penal. t.I-7, 1897-1903. Mexico,
Talleres de la Libreria religiosa, 7 v.
vols. 1-5 have title :"La Ciencia juridica" reuista y biblioteca quincenal de
doctrina, [urisprtulencia y ciencias anexas,
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82) Collezione "Archiuio penale." 1- 1945 Roma.
53) Compte general d'administration de la justice criminelle. v.I. 1825- . Paris,
Imprirnerie Nationale. Annual.
54) Crime and delinquency. v.l- July 1955- [New York} National Council
on Crime and Delinquency. Quarterly.
Title varies: v.1-6, no.2, July 1955-April 1960, National Probation and
Parole Association Journal. Supersedes in part Focus, 1942-1954, and the
Yearbook of the National Probation and Parole Association, 1915-1953.
55) Crime .nd delinquency abstracts. v.I. 1963- Bethesda, Md., U. S. Pub-
lic Health Service, National Institute of Mental Health.
Formerly: International bibliography on crime and delin.quency . "Prepared
under contract by the Information Center on Crime and Delinquency of
the National Council on Crime and Delinquency."
56) The Crime annual, A complete and authoritative record of the most notorious
crimes committed during the past year, v [1] - 1931- London, F. V.
White and Co.
No more published?
57) Crime Prevention Association of Philadelphia. Crime prevention. A report.
1943- Philadelphia.
58): Crime preueruion. digest; a quarterly journal of legal-social jurisprudence.
[no.I] v.1-3,na.l, [1940] Dec.194.1-Jan./Mar.1944. San Francisco, State
Bar of California, Juvenile Crime Prevention Committee, 1940-1944. 3 v.
Monthly, Dec.1941-Dec.1942; Quarterly, Jan./Mar.1943-Jan./Mar.1944.
[No.1, 1940] is issued without volume or number notation.
59) Crime review. v.l,no.l, Dec.1946. London, Pan Press Publications, Ltd. 30 p.
No more published?
60) Crime statistics. Suuistique de la criminalite (police). 1- 19 . Ottawa,
Queen's Printer and Controller of Stationery. Annual. French and English.
61) Crime survey. v.l, no.1-3, April-June 1935. [New York, 1935] 1 v.
62) Criminal-Bibliothek, Merkwiirdige Criminal-proces~e aller Nationen. Begrundet
von J. D. H. Temme. Bd.1-4, Jahrg. 1867-1873. Leipzig, Imme. 4 v,
63) Criminal case and comment. v. 1-
well, 1960-
64) Criminal' justice. Journal of the Chicago Crime Commission, nos. 1-77, Feb,
15, 1919-Jan.1950. Chicago. 77 nos. in 2 v. Irregular.
Title varies: Nos.1-46, Bulletin of the Chicago Crime Commission. nos.47-
77, Criminal Justice. Journal oj the Chicago Crime Commission. Suspended
1930-1934. Superseded by the Commission's Report on Chicago crime.
1959- London, Sweet and Max-
65) Criminal law bulletin. v.l,no.l- 1965-
Inc. Monthly.
66) The Criminal law journal of India; a monthly legal publication containing
full reports of all reported criminal cases of the High courts and chief
courts, &c., in India. v.I. 1904- Lahore, The Law Publishing Press;
Nagpur, Printed at the All India Reporter Press and published by W. R.
Raj andekar.
Vols.3-47 have title: The Criminal Lato journal 0/ india; a fort/vightly legal
publication. Editor: 1904- S. D. Chaudhri. Subtitle varies.
New York, Crimi;lal Law Bulletin,
67) The Criminal law magazine and reporter, a bi-monthly periodical devoted to
the interests of bench and bar in criminal cases. Containing original arti-
cles on timely topics, full reports of important cases, and a digest of all
recent criminal cases, American and English. v.l-lS, Jan.lS80-Nov.1896 .
Jersey City, N. J., F. D. Linn and Co. 18 v.
No more published.
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The criminal law quarterly. A Canadian journal of criminal law
magistrates, lawyers and police officers. v.Lno.>- May 1958-
Ont., Cartwright.
69) Criminal law reporter. 1,no.l, Oct.2,1886. Austin, Texas.
70) Criminal law reporter. v.1-12,1911-23. Parvatipur, India.
68) f~r judges,
Toronto,
71) The criminal law review. v.l- 1954-
Monthly.
72) Criminal law review. v.l-l0,no. 4., 1913·1917. Madras, India, Modern Print-
ing Works, 10 v. -
v.1-3 have imprint: Madras, Thompson. In two sections: Journal and re-
ports.
London, Sweet and Maxwell.
73) Criminal law review. v.1-7, Spring 1954-1961. [New York, Association of
Lawyers of the Criminal Courts of Manhattan] 7 v. Quarterly.
v.L, nos.2-4 never published. Discontinued. -
74) The criminal lawyer. A monthly journal. v.I-3, May 1928-June 1930. Par-
vatipuram, Madras Presidency, King, 1928-1930. 3 v.
Ceased publication.
Criminal science iournol: a semi-scientific monthly. v.L Nov.1946-
Manila. .
76) Criminal science monographs. 1-4., 1915-23. Boston.
Supplement to I ournai o] Criminal law and criminology .
75)
. 77) Criminalia ; rassegna italiana di studi penali. t.l- 1937 Roma. -
78) Criminalia, reuista mensual. afio Lno.I. Sept. 1933- Mexico, D.F., Botas.
Organo de la Academia Mexicana de Ciencias Penales.
Criminalia. Bibliografia de ciencias pen ales, fonnada con los trabajos pub-
licados en Ia revista Criminalia de los afios 1 al 9 de septiembre de 1933 a
agosto de 1943. 1943. 159 p.
79) Criminaliste et le financier; ou, Chronique des tribunaux criminels et journal
des finances. nos.Lfi, Aug.20-SepU4, 1790 (Y}. Paris.
80) Criminologia, 1- July/Aug-.1947- Milano, Societa Lombarda di crimin-
ologia.
Title varies: July/Aug.-Sept./Oct.1947, Diritto criminale d'indirizzo positi-
vista; Nov./Dec.1947-Sept./Dec.1951, Revistadi dirittoc.riminale d'indirizzo
positivista; J an./Mar.1953-0ct./Dec.1958, Diritto criminale e criminologia.
None published 1952. 1953-58 also called n.s.
81) Criminologia moderna. v.L, 1899. Buenos Aires.
No more published.
82) Criminologic. Organo oficial del Departamento de Bienestar de Investigaciones.
v.I- Oct./Nov.1937- . Santiago de Chile. Monthly. _
Published 1937-1955 by Direc(;lion General de Investigaciones e Identifica-
cion; Oct.1955- by Departamento de Bienestar, Direccion General de In-
vestigaciones (called also Servicio de Investigaciones) .
Title varies: 1937?-1942 as Detective; 1943-Sept.1955, Revista de cruu-
inologia y policia cientifica.
83) Criminological research bulletin. no.I-9, 1931-1939. New York, Bureau of So-
cial Hygiene. 9 nos.
nos.6-7, 1936-37, in Journal of criminal law and criminology.
84.) Criminologische sttulien, I- 1938-'. Utrecht, Rijksuniversiteit, Criminolo-
gisch Instituut.
85) The Criminologist; the only journal published for the study of criminology and
scientific criminal investigation. v.I,no.1. May IS, 1927. [London, Missen-
den] 1 v. .
No more published.
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86) Criminology. v.l,no.l-l0, May-June 1963-1964. [London, The Blado Press]
· 2 v. in 1.
87) Critica penale. v.l- Bologna, Azzoguidi. Quarterly.
88) Dansk Forsorgsselskabsaarsberetninger. v.l- 1902- Kabenhavn, Dansk
Forsorgsselskab, Annual. (Reports of the Danish Probation and Parole So-
ciety) .
89) Deutsche StraJrechts-Zeitung. Zentralorgan fur das gasamte Strafrecht, Straf-
prozessrecht und die verwandten Cebiete in Wissenschaft und Praxis des
In- undAuslandes. Jahrgang 1-9, April 1914-0ct.1922. Berlin, O. Lieb-
mann. 9 v. Monthly.
Merged into: Deutsche luristen-Zeitung.
90) Deutsche Zeitschriit [iir die gesamte gerichtliche Medizin. Bd.l- 1912
· . Berlin, Hirschwald, Deutsche Gesellschaft fur gerichtliche und soziale Med-
izin.
Continuation of: Vierteljahrsschrijt fur gerichtliche Medizin und ofJentliches
Sanitdtsioesen. Suspended between Nov. 1944 and June 1948.
91) Deutsches Strafrecht; Strairecht; Strajrecluspolitik [und] Strafprozess. Bd.
1-77, 1853-1933. Neue Folge, Bd.l-11, 1934-1944. Berlin, R. V. Decker's
, Verlag. 88 v. Monthly ..
Title varies: 1853-70, Archiv fiir preussisches Strafrecht; 1871-79, Archiv
fiir allemeines deutsches utul preussiches Strajrecht ; 1880-99, Archiv fur
Strajreclu ; 1900·33, Archie fiir Strafrecht und Strajprozess. Continued by:
Goltdammer's Archie fii.r Strafrecht, 1953- N.F. Bd.l has subtitle:Zeit-
schrift der Akademie fur Deutsches Recht. Bd.2 has subtitle: Strairechtsuiis-
senschajtliches Ergi:inzzmgsblatt der "Deutschen fustiz."
92) Documentatieblad. Uitgave van het Studieen Voorlichtingscentrum van het
Ministerie vaan Justitie. Jaarg. 1956- ['s-Gravenhage] 6 issues per
year.
93) Eglimatologiki statistiki (Criminal statistics). v.1-25, 1911-1923, 1926-1937.
Athens, Ministry of Justice. 25 v.
94) Ephimeris to fylakon (The prison journal). v.1-4, 1875-1878. Athens, Oeko-
nomos. 4 v.
95) Estadistica criminal y administratioa. v.l- 1938-
cion General de Institutos Penales.
96) . Estudios [uridicos, Fasciculo de derecho penal. v.l- 1941-
· sejo Superior de investigaciones Cientificas.
Montivedeo, La Direc-
Madrid, Con-
97) Etudes internationales de psycho-socialogie- criminelle. t.l-
du Cedre. Quarterly.
98) .. Excerpta criminologica. v.Lno.l- Jan./Feb.1961- Amsterdam, Excerpta ,
Criminologica Foundation. Bi-monthly.
"An international abstracting service covering the etiology of crime and
juvenile delinquency, the control and treatment of offenders, criminal pro-
cedure, and the administration of justice."
99) Famous crimes, past and present. Police budget edition, ed. by Harold Furniss.
v.1-3 (?), 1903-1905. [London, H. Furniss] 3 (?) v.
Incorporated in: Illustrated police budget, July 1, 1905.
100) FBI law eniorcement bulletin. v.I. Sept. 1, 1932- [Washington, D.C.]
Monthly, Sept.1932-Apr.1942; Bi-Monthly, May/June 1942-
Title varies: Sept. 1932-Sept.1935, Fugitives wanted by police. Issued by
the Federal Bureau of Investigation (called Sept.1932-Aug.1933, Bureau of
In,;estigatic:in; Sept.1933-Feb.1935, Division of Investigation).
101) Federal probation. A journal of correctional philosophy and practice. v.I.
1937- Washington, D.C., Administrative Office of the U. S. Courts.
Quarterly.
Paris, Editions
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102), Forenses. 1· Mar.20,l935· Madrid.
Published 1935·36 as the organ of the Asociaci6n nacional del Cuerpo de
medicos forenses; 1948· of the Cuerpo nacional de medicos forenses. Sus.
pended Aug.1936.April 1946.
103') Foro penale. v.I. Jan./Mar.1946· Napoli, Jovene.
104) Foro penale napoletano, 1·2, 1926·27. Napoli. 2 v.
105) Il foro penale. Hivista critica di diritto e giurisprudenza penale e di discipline
carcerarie. anno 1·9, 15 luglio 1891·Jan.12,1901. Roma, Bertero, 9 v.
106) Gerichtsmedizinische Forshungen. Schriften uber Forschungsergebnisse auf
dem Gebiet der gerlichtlichen Medizin und der Kriminalistik. Bd.l,1940(?).
Berlin.
107) Gerischtssaal. Beilagehejt. sa.i.79, 1849·1912 (?). Stuttgart, 79 v.
108) Der Gerichtssaal. Zeitschrift fur Zivil- und Militarstrafrecht und Strafprozess-
recht sowie die erganzenden Disziplinen. Bd.l·116, 1849·1942. Stuttgart, F.
Enke. 116 v.
Subtitle varies. v.l·25 published in Erlangen.
109) Giurisprudenza penale, collezione di decisioni e massime in materia penale con
note di commento. v.l·30, 1881·1910. Torino, Tipografia legale, 1882·1910.
30 v. Weekly.
110) La giustizia penale. Rivista critica di dottrina, giurisprudenza, legislazione.
v.I. 1895· . Roma. Monthly.
Title varies: v.I-Zt), 1895·1914, called La giustizia penale.: reuista critica
settimanale ; v.21·35, 1915·192~, Giustizia penale e la procedura penale
italiana.
v.ll·20, 1905·14, also called ser.2, vr.io.
v.21·30, 1915·24, also called ser.3, v.l -l.O;
v.31·40, 1925·34, also called ser.4, v.l·10;
v.41·51, 1935·44, also called ser.5, v.l-Iu;
v.52· also called ser.6, v.I.
"Procedura": v.U·15 also called ser.2, v.I-S. Vol.36·40 published in 3 sec-
tions: Part 1: II codice; parte 2: Le leggi speciali ; parte 3: La procedura.
Vol.41· published in 4 sections: Parte 1: I presupposti del diritto e delle
procedura penale; parte 2: II codice e I'esecuzione; parte 3: Le leggi spe-
ciali; parte 4: La procedura.
Ill) Goltdammer's Archie fiir Stralrecht, Bd.I. Jahrg. 1953· Berlin, R. V.
Decker's Verlag. Monthly.
Continuation of: Deutsches Strafrecht; Strajreclu, Strafrechspolitik und
Strafrprozess. Continuation of: Archiv fiir Strairecht und Strajprozess.
112) Gt. Britain. Home Office.
Criminal statistics, England and Wald. London, H. M. Stationery Office,
1858· Annual.
113) Gt. Britain. Home Office.
Offenses relating to motor vehicZes in England and Wales. v.I. 1928
Londo', H.M. Stationery Office. Annual.
114) Gt. Gritain. Home Office.
Report of the Commissioners of Prisons. v.L 1878 London, H.M.
Stationery Office. Annual.
115) Heidelberger Abhandlllngen aus dem. Gesamtgebiete der Kriminalpsychologie,
Bd.I-S, Berlin, Springer, 1912·1921. 5 v.
U6) The Howard journal of penology and crime prevention. v.l- Oct.1921·
London, Howard League for Penal Reform. Irregular.
Title varies: 1921·1964, Howard journal. A review of modem methods for
the prevention and treatment of-crime and juvenile delinquency; Official or-
gan of the Howard League for Penal Reform.
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Cairo, Ministry of Justice. Annual.117) al-" ihsa" al-qada" y. v.L 19
Judiciary statistics.
U8) "ihsa" at al-" amn. al-am, v.l- 19
Annual. Police statistics.
Cairo, Ministry of the Interior.
119) "ihsa" at al-sujum. v.L 19
Correctional statistics.
Cairo, Administration of Prisons. Annual.
120) ilisa" at jara" im. al-ahdath. v.l- 19
Annual. Juvenile delinquency statistics.
Cairo, Ministry of Social Welfare.
Illinois State Bar Association.: Section _on' Criminal Law. Neuisletter. v.l-
, 19.57?- ,[Springfield, Ill.] , Quarterly.
Informations penitentiaries suisses ; Der Strafvollzug in der Schweiz. t.1-
1953- , Aarau, Imprimerie Sauerlander and Co. Quarterly.
Continuation of: Bulletin de fa Societe suisse d' administration des prisons
et de liberte surueillee.
123)' International Criminal Police Commission. Statistiques criminelles interruuion-
ales; International crime statistics. 1950- Paris.
English title varies slightly. After 1953 text in Spanish also. Tables in
-French and English-only. '
Intem~tional Criminal Police Organization. Library. Liste trimestrielle d'ar-
ticles selectionnes. Quarterly list of selected articles. 1- Oct./Nov.1949?-
Paris.
Published 1949?-1957/58 by the Organization under its earlier name, Inter-
.vnational Criminal Police Commission (Interpol).
h~te;nationl criminai police review. Revue internationale de police criminelle.
v.l- Sept.1946- Paris" International Police Organization. Monthly.
English edition of Revue international de police criminelle. Appeared pre-
viously under the names of International public safety and International
aminal police.
Intenuuional Penal and Penitentiary Foundation. Trauaux, Publications. t.I.
1?59- '. , Berne, Staempfli, 1960-
127)}riternational review of criminal policy. Revue internationale de politique
," crminelle. Revista internacional de politico criminal. no.l- Jan.1952- .
New York, United Nations, Department of Social Affairs. Semi-annual.
" (Document ST/SOA/ser.M).
121)
122)
124)
125)
126.),
Inte,rnationale kriminalistische Vereinigung. Mitteilungen del' Internationalen.
. Kriminalistisclien. Vereinigung, Bulletin de l'Union internationale de droit
penal. Bd.1-22, 1889-1914; N.F. Bd.1-6, 1926-1933. 28 v. '
Forms supplement to "Zeitschrift fiir die gesamte Strafrechtswissenschaft."
Vo1.4hasFrenchtitie only." v.5-10 have French title preceding German
title: Bulletin. de l'Union intertuuionale de droit penal. Text in German or
French. Suspended 1915-25.
129);·' International~ kriminalistische Vereinigung, Deutsche Landesgruppe. Mittei-
lungen der Deutschen. Landesgruppe. Bd. 1-2, 16-19, 1890-91, 1919-1924..
Berlin, Walter de Gruyter. 3 ?v.
Earlier and later "Mitteilungen" are published in the Vereinigung's Mittei-
lungen. '
130) Investigacoes, afio 1- Jan.1949- Sao Paulo, Sao Paulo (State) 'Departa-
mento de Investigacoes. Monthly.
- .. "\1.
132)
131) Issues in criminology. v.l,no.l- 1965- Berkeley, University of California.
18
Lahrbuch. des .Straireclits urul Stralprozesses, 1-15 Jahrgang, 1906-1920. Han-
, , over, Helwing, 1907-1921. 1.5v.
Issued as it supplement to Das, Recht from 1907·1917.
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133) Japan. Criminal Law Society Nihon Keiho Gakkai. Strairecluliclie Abh.and-
lungen. v.I. 1955- . Tokyo, Nihon Keiho Gakkai. In Japanese.
134) lournal des parquets. Revue mensuelle. annee'l-[33] 1386-[1923] Paris,
Rousseau. 38 v. .'
135) f ournal du droit criminel, ou, Jurisprudence, recueil critique. .annee 1~60,
1829-1889. Pari" Au Bureau du Journal: 60 v. . , .'. ,
Title varies: v.I-4, lurisprudence criminelle da royaume. Absorbed by':
f ournal du ministere public et du droit criminel. .
136) lournal du ministere public et du. droit criminel. I-56, 1858-1914. :'pal~is.56 ~.
Title varies: v.I-32, 1858-1889, as f ournal du ministere public. Absorbed
f ournal du droit criminel.
137) [ournal of clinical and experimental psychopathology and Qug,rterly reuieui
of psychiatry and neurology. v.I. July 1939- . New York. Quarterly.
Title varies: 1939-1944, fournal of criminal psychopathology; 1944-1951,
f ournal of clinical psychopathology; 1951-1954., f ournal 0/ clinical and
experimental psychopathology; 1954- published with the present title.
Now publishes criminological studies occasionally. '. ,.
Absorbed: Quarterly review of psychiatry and neuroloy; 1954.
Published: July 1939 by Woodbourne Institution for Defective Delinquents,
New State Department of Correction; July 1944-April 1946 by the Assoc-
ciation for the Advancement of Psychotherapy; 1948-July 1952 by Wash-
ington Institute of Medicine.
138) fournal of clinical and experimental psychopathology and quarterly reuieui of
psychiatry and neurology. Monograph series. v.1- 1945- . Monticello,~y - ,
139) The Journal o] criminal law. v.1- lan.1937- London, The Journal of
criminal law. Quarterly.
Publisher varies.
Subtitle: A quarterly review for barristers, solicitors,magistrates' clerks,
police officers, and all engaged in the practice and administration. of crirn-
inallaw.
140) The lournal of criminal law, criminology and police science. v.1- May 1910-
Chicago, Ill., Northwestern University School of Law, 1911- Bi-
Monthly, 1910-1918, 1931-1934. Quarterly, 1918-1931.
Cumulative index, 1-24, 1910-1934.
Title varies: v.1-30, 1910-1941, Journal of the American Institute of Crim-
inal Law and Criminology; v.31-41, 1942-1951; f ournal of criminal law
and criminology. Absorbed American journal of police science, Apr. 1932.
The journal is also the official journal of the American Correctional Asso-
ciation, the International Association of Arson Investigators, the Illinois
Academy of Criminology and Society for the Advancement of Criminology.
141) The [ournalo] criminal science. v.1-2, 1948--1950. London, Macmillan, 2 v.
Issued by the Department of Criminal Science, Cambridge University,
Editors: Leon Radzinowicz and J. W. C. Turner. No more published,
142) Journal of forensic sciences; the official publication of the American Academy
of Forensic Sciences. v.l- .Tan.1956- Mundelein, Ill., Callaghan. Quar-
terly.
143) Journal oj juvenile research. v.I-23, no.3/4, Mar.1916-JuL/Oct.1938. Whittier,
Calif., California Bureau of Juvenile Research. 23 v. Qualierly.
Title varies: v.I-12, 1916-1928, Iournal of delinquency; 1928-1938, [ournal
of juvenile research. Suspended 1924.
144) The [ournal 0/ research in crime and delinquency, v.Lno.l- January 1964-
[New York, National Council on Crime and Delinquency] Semi-annual.
145) f ugerulschutz. Zweimonatschrift fur erzieherischen und gesetzlichen Schutz del'
Jugend. Bd.I- 1956- . Nurnberg, Stoytscheff. Bi-Monthly.
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146) Keiho zasslii (Journal of criminal law). v.I. June 1950- Tokyo, Nihon
Keiho Gakkai (Japanese Criminal Law Society) .
Title page and contents page in English and Japanese. Text in Japanese.
147) Keisaisu jiho (Police affairs) v.1-6,no.6, July.1946-June 1950. Tokyo. 6 v.
148) Keisei (Penal administration) v.l- 1894.-
149) Kinoniki pronia. (Social protection). v.I.
Social Protection.
150) Kriminalbiologische Gegenwartsjragen. BeU- 1927-1938, 1951-
Enke.
Tokyu.
1956- Athens, Ministry of
Stuttgart,
152)
151) Kriminalisticko sluiba. v.I. 1950- Ljubljana. Quarterly.
153)
154)
155)
156)
157)
158)
159)
160)
·20
161)
Kriminalistik, Bd.l- May 194.7- Stuttgart.
Title varies: v.1-2, Kriminalistische Rundschau.
Kriminalistik, Monatshejte Jiir die gesamte lcriminalistische WissenschaJt und
Praxis. Jahrg.1-19,no.2, Jan.1927-Feb.1945. Berlin, Kriminalwissenschaft
und -Praxis Verlag, E. Jaedicke. 19 v.
v.I-Ll., 1927-37, have title:Kriminalistische Monatslieite.
Kriminalietik, Zeitschriit ii/r die gesamte kriminalistische Wissenschaft urul
Praxis. Bd.I. 1927-1944, 194.7- Hamburg, Verlag fur kriminalistische
Fachliteratur.
Kriminalistika; revue pro kriminologii a trestni prduo, v.I. March 18,
1946- Prague, Kriminalisticky Klub. Monthly.
Subtitle varies. Summaries in English, Russian and French.
Kriminalistische Abhandlungen. Bd.1-47, 1926-1941. Leipzig, Wiegant. 47 v.
Kriminalistische Beytrdge. Bd.1-3, 1825-27. Hamburg. 3 v.
Kriminalistische Blatter. no.1-38, Aug.l , 1876-June 10, 1877? Wien.
Kriminalsuuistik, v.I. 1832- Kebenhavn, Statistik Department. Annual.
Kriminalstatistikk, v.I- 19 .0510, Statistik Sentralbyra. AnnuaL Pub-
lished annually in the series ; Norges Off~sielle Statistikk.
Kriminologische Abhandlungen. Bd_1-9, 1926-32. N.F. Bd.l- 1946- Wien,
J. Springer.
Kriminologische Untersuchungen; Freiburger Beiuage zur Straloollzugskuude.
Bd.l- 1950- Bonn, Hohrscheid.
Die kritische Darstellungeii del' kriminolistischeri Rechtsprccluuigen, v.l-
1940- . Tokyo. In Japanese.
Maandschrift uoor het geuangenisioezen; (Monthly review of penitentiaries).
v.L 1949/1950- s'Cravenhage, Ministerie van Iustitie, Monthly.
The Madras laio journal (Criminal) v.I. 1957- Mylapore, Madras.
al-majallat al-jina" iyat al-quawrniyat .. (The national review of criminal
science). v.l- 1958- Awquaf City, Egypt, Jyzat.
Published by the National Institute of Criminolugy three tim~;; a y~ar in
March, July, November.
The medico-legal journal. v_l- 1933- Cambride, The Medico-Legal So-
ciety. Quarterly.
Title varies: v.1-14, 1933-1947, Medico-legal and, criminological review.
Official organ of the Medico-Legal Society, Cambride. Vols_1-7, 1933-39
have imprint: London, Balliere, Tindall arId Cox. Supersedes the Trans-
actions 0/ the Medicolegal Society.
The medico-legal jozmwl. v.1-50,no_3; June lS83-June 1933. New York,
Medico-Legal Society; Society of Forensic Medicine; and National Asso-
ciation of Coroners. 50 v. Quarterly.
162)
163)
164)
165)
166)
167)
168)
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169) Medico-Legal Society, London, Transactions, v.1-26, 1902/04-193] /32. Lon-
don, Bailliere, Tindall and Cox. 26 v. in 24.
Superseded by Medico-legal and criminological review.
170) Minerva medicolegale. v.I- 1880- Turin, Fratelli Bocca, 1881- . Quar-
terly, 1880-98; Bi-Monthly, 1899-
Title varies: 18801-908, Archivio di psichiatria; 1909-0ct.1949, Archivio di
antrapologia criminale, psichiatria e medicina legale. v.17-24, 1886-1903
also called 2d series, v.1-8; v.25-29, 1904-1908 also called 3d series, v.1-5;
v.30- 1909- also called 4. series, v.L . Subtitle varies. Includes section:
"Bibliografia"_ v.39 (published 1919) covers the years 1918-1919.
171) Monaischrij: liir Kriminologie urul Strajreclusrejorm, Jahrg.l- Apr. 1904-
Koln, Miinchen, J. F_ Lehmann, 1905- . Monthly.
Title varies: v.1-27, 1904-1936, as Monatsschrilt [ur Kriminalpsychologie
tuul Strajrechtsrejorm; 1937-1944, Monatsschriit liir Kriminalbiologie tuul
Stralrechtrelorm. Published Nov.1937-1944 by the Kriminal-biologische
Cesellschaft. Not published, Feb.1916-May 1917; July 1917-Nov.1921; July
1944-Sept.1953.
172) Monasschrilt Iii J(rimilw/ogie urul Stralreclusrejorm; Eeihele. Bd.1-2,1926-
1930. Koln, Mi.inchen, etc.
173) Moscow. Tsentralnyi Nauchno-Issledovatelskii Institut Sudebnoi Psikhiatrii.
Problemy Sulebnoi Psikhiatrii. v.L 1938-, . Moscow.
Publication suspended 1948-1950.
174) NCCD news. v_l- 1922- New York, National Council on Crime and De-
linquency.
Title varies: 1922-1947, Probation (varies slightly); Jan.1948-March1955,
as Focus; Sept.1955-May1960, as NPPA news (varies slightly). Absorbed
Neuislet in Jan.1948. .
175) National Probation and Parole Association ...Pro[essional Council. Newslet.
v.1-9, 1939-1947. New York. 9 v.
Merged into Focus in Jan. 1948.
176) National Probation and Parole Association. Yearbook. v.1-27, 1915-1953.
New York. 27 v. Annual.
Title varies: 1915-1947: National Probation Association; 1915-1927 as
Annual report and proceedings of the annual conference; 1928 as Pro-
ceedings. .
177) Nederland» tijdschrijt uoor criminologie, v.I. J an.1959-
Bi-Monthly.
178) Die Neue Polizei. Fachzeitschrift fur die gesamte Polizei. Bd.l- 1947- .-,
Munchen, Pflaum.
Meppel, Boom.
179) Neues Archi; des Criminalrechts. Bd.1-14, i816-1834. Halle, Hemmerde und
Schwetschke, 1817-1834. 14 v.
Supersedes: Archie des Criminalrechts.
Superseded by: Archie des Criminaltechts, Neue Folge.
180) Nordisk kriminolistisk arsbok: ar 1- 1936- . Stockholm, Ivar Haeggstri:ims
boktryckeri,
Title varies: 1936-1952: De nordiska kriminalisiioreningamo» arsbok.
Subtitle: Yearbook oj the Northern associations oj criminalists.
181) Nordisk kriminalteknisk tidsskrijt, (Scandanavian journal of criminal tech-
nique). v.I. 1930- Oslo, Oslo Politi. Monthly. '.
182) N ordisk tidsskrijt lor [aegselsuaesen. og praktisk straller~t. (Scandanavian
journal for prisons and practical criminal law ). v, 1-34, 1878-1911. Keben-
havn, C_E.C.Cad. 34 v.
Superseded by: Nordisk tidsskrijt [or stral ieret.
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183) Nordisk tulsskri]t [or kriminaloidenskab, 1- argo 19B- Kabenhavn,
G.E.C.Gad. Quarterly,
Supersedes: Nordislc tulsskriit for faegselsvaessen. Title varies: v.1-36, 1913-
194,8, Nordisk tidsskrift for stra/feret. 1949- Nordisk tidskrift for krimi-
nalvidenskab.
184) Osterreichische Zeitschrilt fii Strafrecht. Jqhrgang 1,8, 1910-1920. Wien, Manz.
8 v.
.: No morepublished. Beilage: ():;terreichische Reclusprechung in Strajsachen,
1 ,.Bd.1-7, bound with corresponding volumes.
185) Peli~l affairs. v:1-23, Dec.1923=Feb.1931. Philadelphia; Pennsylvania Com-
'-mittee on Penal Affairs. 23 V.
V.U omitted in numbering.
186)' Penal Reform League, London. Penal reform league series, v.1-14, 1908-17.
.: London. 14 V.
, .United with Howard Association to form Howard League for Penal Reform,
. I
187) Penal Reform League, London. Quarterly record. v.1-9, Jan.1909-1920(?).
London."
Titlevil't"ies: ~v.l:4,no.8/9, Jan.I909-Sept.1912, as Penal reform league
monthly record. v.2nos.9-10, 12 not issued.
1(8)(' Penal' reform news:Strafhervenninrj;uu§. v.( 19 Pretoria, So. Afri-
ca, Penal Reform League of So. Africa. Quarterly.
Title in Engllsh and Afrikaans. .
o : , f.:ritle varies: -March 1948, Newsletter, 1948- Penal.reform news.
!8~) , Penal reform pamphlets. v.l- 1947-
.: .:~:,:; League of South Africa.
190) Penal reformer. v.1-6,no.l, 1934-July 1939. London, Howard 'League for
Penal Reform; National Council for the Abolition of the Death Penalty. 6 V. ,
." ..'.\ Supersedes ~.;Thou shalt not kill. Suspended due to war.
Superseded by: National Council's Wartime bulletin.
Pretoria, So. Africa,' Penal Reform
191.) Penal reformer. v.l, Jan.1939-
:., venti on Society. '
Lucknow, United Provinces Crime Pre-
192) ': II pensiero giuridico-penale. Rivista internazionale di dottrina e di giurispru-
denza.xanno 1- 1929- Messina, Edizione de "II pensiero giuridico-
penale." Quarterly.
Publisher varies. Title varies slightly .
.';'"
193) Plirojoriae tis genikis solronistikis diikiseos. t. 1- 19 Athens, Direc-
tor General of the Prison Administration, Ministry of Justice.
Information of the Director General of the Pnson'AdministrationPublished
with the Sofronistiki epitheorisis (The Prison review).
"194)Poinikachronika: It.l- ']1951- 'Athenai, Ekdotikos Oikos,"To Nomi-
kon.". Monthly.
Criminal law chronicle.
195) The police journal .. A monthly review for the police forces of the British
. , , 'Comni'onwealth of Nations. v.l- 1928- London, 'Philip Allan &., Co,
Monthly.
Subtitleand frequency vary.
196) Polic9a: v.1-27, 1910-1940. Beograd, Vasa Lazarevic, 27 V.
197) Politiembetsmennens blad, v.l- 19- .. Oslo; Politiembetsmennes Lands-
, forening, 0510 Politi. Monthly.
_. " C" .', 'Journal' of the .chiefs of police., .::fr~.;~." ", ",;".. " .
198) Die Polizei. Fachzeitschrift fur das Sicherheits- und Ordnungswesen. Bd. 1-
1948- Hannover, ohler.
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199) Polizeipraxis. Fachzeitschrift fur die gesamte Polizei. Bd, 1· 1952·
Frankfurt a.M., Reinhardt.
200) Primera epoca. v.l- 1955·
penales.
,201) Prison Discipline Society, Boston. Annual report. 1826.-1854...Boston. 29 v.
Montevideo, Direccion General de Ihstitutos
202) Prison journal. v.l- 1921- Philadelphia, Pa.,: The- Pennsylvania Prison
Society. Semiannual.
Continuation of: Pennsylvania journal of prison discipline and philanthropy,
1845·1861; and Journal of prison and philanthropy, 1862·1919,
203) The prison service journal. v.I. July 1960- London, H.M. 'Stationery
Office.
204) Probation. v.I 1929-
Quarterly.
London, National Association of Probation Officers.. ',' ,- .., , -_- . ..'~ ... . .'~:..
205 ) Problemas carcelarios. v.I. 1953-
stitutos Penales. _
Penitentiary problems.
206) II progresso del diritto criminale. anno 1-7, May/June 1909-Mar./ Apr. 1915;
Homa. 7- v. in 6. Bimonthly.,
Vol. 7, parts 1-2 only. No more published. Vols. 1-3 published in Palermo.
"
Montevideo.: Direccion General de In-
207) Quaderni di "Criminalia:" v.l- 1936-
208)
Roma.
Quademi di criminologia clinica; pubblicazione ti:irilestl:ale a cura della "Ras-
segna di studi penitenziari." anno 1, no. 1- Jan./Mar. 1959- Homa.
Quarterly. .'
Pubblicazione del Ministero di Grazia e Giustizia, Direzione generale per
gli Istituti di prevenzione di pena. Supplemento . ordinario della Rassegna
di studi penitenziari.
209) The Rangoon criminal laui journal. v.l , Jan./Dec.1931.Vizagapa_tam, Madras,
Presidency, Law Printing House. 1 v. Monthly. ' .,
No more published.
Rapport annuel de l'Administration peniteruiaire et rapport annual d~ la Direc-
tion de l'education. surueillee. t.l- 19 . -Paris, Ministere de la Jus-
tice. Annual. . .
210)
211) Rassegna di studi penitensiari. v.l-, 195i-
Giustizia.
212) Recht der Jugend. Zeitscrift fur Jugenderziehung,. JugendpfIege und Jugend-
schutz, fur Jugendfursorge und Jugendstrafrecht. Bd. 1- 1953- Berlin,
Luchterhand. .
Roma, Ministero di Gi-lizia e
213) Rechtsvergleichende Untersuchungen zur gcsamten. Strafrechtswissenschaft. Bd.
1- 1955- Bonn, Rohrscheid.
214) Recueil.tle documents en matiere penale et penitetuiaire, Select papers on penal
and penitentiary affairs.' Bulletin' of the International Penal and Peniten-
tiary Commission. v.l- 1934- Bern, International Penal and Peniten-
tiary C9mmission. Quarterly. ..
215) Recueil de droit penal. v.l- 1947- Paris, 29 rue de Bourgogne.· Monthly.
216) Reeducation. Revue. [rancaise de t'eniance delinquarue, de/iciente _et en danger
moral. v.l- 1947- . Paris, 7 rue de Navarre. - ::_
Merger of "Revue d' education surveillee" and Sauvons l'enfance."
,t.
217) Rebista 'btasileira de' criminologia. v.l- 194.7-" Rio de Janeiro, Quarterly.'
218) Revista Colombiana de biologia criminal. ".1-2,no.2, 193-5-1938. Bogota, Im-
prenta Nacional. 2 v. _
Organ of the Instituto de Anthropologia y de Pedagogia Penitenciaria de la
Sociedad Colombiana de Biologia Criminal. . . - .
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219) Reoista cubana de derecho ; secctoti de materia penal. tomo 1·3,no.6. 1929·
June 1931. Habana, Verdugo. 3 v. Monthly.
220) Revista de ciencias penales. v.I. 1953· Bogota, Irnprenta Nacional.
'. Organ of the Institute of Penal Sciences of the Faculty of Law of the
National University of Colombia. Direceor: J. E. Gutierrez Anzola. Title
varies: Reuista del Instituto de Ciencias Penales y Penitenciarias.
221) Revista de ciencias penales. t.l- marzo/abril 1935· [Santiago; Chile].
Bimonthly, 1935·38; quarterly, 1941·
Publication suspended from J an.1939 to June 1941, inclusive. Vols. 1·4
called also afio 1·4; v.5· called segunda epoca. Published by the Direccion
general de prisiones of Chile, 1935·38; by the Institute de ciencias penales
of the Universidad de Chile, 1941·
222) Revista de criminologia. v.I· 19 Montevideo. Quarterly.
223) Revista de criminologia, psiquitaria y medicine legal. Organo del Institute
de criminologia de la Penitenciaria nacional. afio 1·22 (nos.L'l Sz}, 1914.
1935. Buenos Aires, Talleres graficos de la Pentenciaria nacional. 22 v.
Supersedes Archivos de psiquiatria y criminologic, medicine legal. Super.
seded by Psiquiatria y criminologic, later Revista de psiquiatria y crimin-
ologia.
224) Revista de criminologia y ciencias penales. afio 1·4,no.7, May 1945.May 1949.
Potosi, Bolivia, Universidad Aut6noma "Tomas Frias." 4 v.
225) Revista de derecho penal. afio 1·2,no.3, Apr.30,1929·Dec.31,1930. Buenos
Aires,,valerio Abeledo. 2 v. in 1. Quarterly.
246) Revista de derecho penal. afio I· July ISept.1955· [Lima]. Quarterly.
2,27) Revista de derecho penal. t.l· Abr./Mayo 1941·
(City), Universidad Aut6noma.
228) Reoista de derecho penal, organo de la Sociedad de derecho penal. tomo 1,
no. I· 1922?· Bogota, Impr. del Departmento,
At head of title: Departmento de Cundinmarca.
San Luis Potosi, Mexico
229) Reuista de derecho penal. Publicaci6n trimestral. afio 1·7,,1945·1951. Buenos
Aires, EDIAR. 7 v. Quarterly.
No more published?
230) Reoista de direito penal. Orgao oficial da Sociedade brasileira de criminologia
e da 'Sociedade riograndense de criminologia. afro I· v.L Abril 1933·
Rio de Janeiro.
Monthly (irregular)
231) '.Reuista de drept penal, si, stiinta penitenciara. :.v.I·
Title varies: 1922·31? as Reuista penala.
232) R~vista de estudios penales. v.I· 1943?· Valladolid, Spain, Seminario de
derecho penal, Facultad de Derecho, Uuiversidad de Valladolid [in' coopera·
tion with the] Instituto Francisco de Vitoria, Consejo Superior de Investi-
gaciones Cientificas.
1922· Bucharest.
233) Reuista de estudios penitenciarios. v.Lno.L Apr.1945. Madrid, {Jni.
versidad. Escuela de Estudios Penitenciarios.
234) .Reuista de [uerzas de policia de Colombia. v.I. 19· Bogota, Imprenta
Nacional.
235) Revista de identificaci6n y ciencias penales. Biblioteca. no.L Agosto, 1932·
La Plata., Rep. Argentina.
236) Revista de identificacion y ciencias penales. Publicacion bime3tral del Museo
Vucetich, Facultad de Ciencias juridicas y sociales. ano I· t.l· Nov./Dec.
1921; '. La Plata, Taller de impresiones oficiales.
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241)
242)
243)
237) Revista de la Escuela de estiulios penitenciarios, v.I. 1945- Madrid. Bi-
monthly.
Has bibliographical section: "Bibliografia," listing Spanish and foreign
materials. Publication 0.£: Facultad de Derecho, Ciudad Universitaria, Ma-
drid, Escuela de Estudios Penitenciarios: .
238) Revista de medicina legal. v.I. April 194.6- Madrid. Bimonthly.
239) Revista de m.edicina legal, criminologia :y psiquiatria [orense. v.l,no.1-9,
April-Dec.1932. Barcelona.
Superseded by Anales de medicine legal, psiquiatria y anatomia patologica.
Revista de rnedicina legal de Colombia. v.Lno.L Aug.1935- Bogota, Em-
pressa Nacional de Publicaciones.
"Organo del Instituto de Medicina Legal de Bogotrt."
Revista de medicina legal de Cuba. v.l-lO, 1922-1931. Habana, Scotland, So-
ciedad de Medicina Legal.
240)
Revista de policia tecnica. v.l- 1935- Lima.
Revista de psiquiairia y criminologic. t.l- 1936- Buenos Aires, La So-
ciedad de psiquiatria y medicina legal de La Plata [and] Sociedad Argen-
tina de Criminologia. Bi-monthly.
Title varies: 1936-AbriI1937, Psiquiatria y criminologia.
Supersedes: Revista de criminologia, psiquiatria y medic-ina legal.
244) Revista del l nstituto investigaciones y docencia criminologicas. v.l- 1957-
Buenos Aires.
245) Revista di direito civil, commercial e criminal; publicacao mensal de doutrina,
jurisprudencia e legislacao, v.1-154, Iulho 1906-June 1945. Rio de .Janeiro,
J. Ribeiro dos Santos. 154 v. Monthly.
24.6) Revista [uridico-criminal ; publicacion mensual del cuerpo auxiliar del organo
judicial. no.1-14/15, Mar.1938-Agosto 1939. Bogota, Imprenta Nacional.
15 nos. in 1.
247) Revista mexicana de derecho penal. afio 1, t.l,no.l, Julio 1930. Mexico, D.F.
[1930] 127 p.
Organo del Consejo supremo de defensa y prevencion social. No more pub-
lished. .
248) Revista penal argentina. 1.1-8, July 1922-1928. Buenos Aires,Universidad
Nacional, Facultad de Derecho y Ciencias Sociales. 8 v. Monthly.
24.9) Revista penal de La Habana. v.1-5, June/.July 1939-1944. La Habana, .J.
Montero. 5 v. Irregular.
250) Reuista penal e penitenciaria, v.I. 1940- . Sao Paulo, Service de hiotipo-
logia criminal da penitenciaria do estado de Sao Paulo. Semi-annual.
251) Revista penal y penitenciaria. v.l- 1936- Buenos Aires, Direccion Gen-
eral de Institutes Pen ales, Republica Argentina. Quarterly.
252) Revista pernambucana de direito penal e criminologic. afio 1- 1954-
Recife. Quarterly.
253) Revue critique de droit criminel. annee 1-27, 1881-1907. Liege, Vaillant-Car-
manne, 1882-1908. 27 v.
Continued by: Revue de droit penal et de criminologie. .
254) Revue de droit penal et de criminologie. v.1-9, 1907-E.i20; new series v.I.
1921- Bruxelles, Union helge et luxembourgeoise de droit penal. Month-
ly.
Suspended, 1915-1919, June 1940-June 1946. Continuation of: ReV1W cri-
tique de droit criminel. Imprint varies. Subtitle varies: v.3-4, 1909-1910,
Bulletin de l'Union lnternationale de Droit Penal; N.S. v.1-26, 1921-1940/46,
et Archives internationales de medicine lep;ale. "Publiee sous les auspices du
Ministere de la Justice," 1921- .'. .
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Revue de droit penal militaire et de droit de La guerre. The. military law of
war review. v.l- 1962- . Bruxelles, Seminaire de Droit Penal Militaire, Bi-
annual.
English, Dutch, French, German, Italian or Spanish. Published under the
auspices of the International Society for Military Law and the Law of War.
Revue.dela gendarmerie. v.1-12, 1927-1939. Paris, Lavauzelle. 72 nos. in 12 v.
Bimonthly.
Re~ue de neuro-psychiatric infantile et d'hygiene metuale de l'enfance. t.l-
19", Paris, L'Expansion Scientifique Francaise. Bimonthly.
Revue de science criminille et de droit penal compare. t.1-6, 1936-1942;
,- , Nouv. ser. '[ t.lr [1946J - . Paris, Recueil Sirey.
(Published under the auspices of Centre francaise de droit compare avec la
collaboration de l'Institut de criminologie et de I'Institut de droit compare
de .l'Universite de Paris et avec le concours du Centre national de la re-
cherche scientifique). Quarterly.
1942-1945 not published.
2~9), ,,Rev_,ue,des tribunaux ppur enfants; doctrine - [urisprduence. t.1-5. annee, 15
_ " des;~913.1qmai 1919? Paris, F. Alcan. 5 v. Irregular.
. Revue intertuuionale de' criminalistique. annee 1-10, Iuiller 1929-1938. Lyon,
J. Desvigne. Organe officiel de FAcademie internationale de criminalistique,
262) , .Reuue internationale de criminologie et de police technique. v.l- Jan.z'Mar.
1947- Ceneve, Centre International d'Etude3 Criminologiques. Quar.
terly.
Title varies: v.1-6, 1947-1952, Revue de criminologic et de police technique.
,', " ';' .
Revue internationale de defence social: Bulletin de la Societe et de l'Institut
Internationaux of Defense Sociale. v.l-11, 1947-1957. Ceneve, Societe et de
l'Institut Internationaux of Defense Sociale. 11 v. Quarterly (irregular).
Volumes 1-5, 1947-1951, issuedunder Italian title: Rivista eli dijesa sociale,
as organ of the Istituto Internazionale per gli Studi di Defesa Sociale
'(Called 1947 'Centro Internazionale di Studi di Tlefesa Sociale). Includes
the proceedings of the societies paged separately.
264)' Revue interruuionale de droit penal. t.l- 1924- Paris, Recueil Sirey.
'1940-1945 'norie published: "Bulletin de l'Assoeiation internationale de
, ": droit penal." Supplement to Revue penitentaire et de droit penal et etudes.
265) Revue internationale de police criminelle. v.l- 1946- Paris. Monthly.
French edition of International criminal police review.
Supersedes Suret~ publique internationaleand Police criminelle internation-
ale. "
2(6) RevU{ moderhe)le la police. Chronique internationale de pollee. Internation~l
Police chronicle. t.I. 1952- Paris, Federation internationale des fonc-
.tionnaires superieursde police.
O~ficial organ of the International Federation of Superior Police Function-
,anes ..
255)
256)
257) ,
258)
260)
261)
263)
Revue [rancaise de psychoanalyse. v.I. 1927- Paris, Societe Psychoan-
alytique de-Paris, Presses Universitaires de France. Bimonthly.
Suspended '1940:47;
; '.;_
267) Revue penitentiaire de Pologne. The Polish review of penal sciences. Revue de
droit penal, de legislation crimineUe et de science penitentiaire. v.1-6, 1925-
1931. Varsovie. 6 v.
268),'-' Revue penitentiaire'et de droit penal et des etudes criminologiques. t.l- 1877-
. Paris, Societe general des prisons et de legislation cr:iminelle; -Union
des ~ocietesde patronage. Monthly.
,[,':PubliEJier and title varies. v.58-62, 1934,-1938 never published. Resumed with
,·;·,:vohime 63, Jan.1939.
26~r"'R~~:ie' 'pe;liteiltial'e '~t des institutions prev,entive. t.f4, 1843-1847. Paris. 4. v.
2~, LOYOLA DIGEST
Rivista di diritto e procedure penale. v.l-11, Jan.1910-Dec.1920. Milano, Val.
lardi. 11 v. in 18. Monthly.
In 2 sections: 1, Dottrina, legislazione, letteratura; 2, Ciurisprudenza, 1921
merged with Scuola positiva. Supplement: Bollettino di giurisprudenza
penale, v.1-6, Jan.1914-Dec.1919. 6 v. Monthly.
Rivista di diritto e procedure penale militare e rassegna di diritto amminis-
tratiuo militate, v.1-9, 1930-1938. Palermo, Italy, 9 v.
Rivista di diritto penale e sociologia criminale ..v.1-15, 1900-1914. Pisa, 15 v.
v.6-10 also called Nuova serie, v.1-5. v.Il-15 also called 3. serie, v.l-S.
Rivista di diritto penitenziario, studi teorici e pratici. anna 1-14, 1930-1943.
Roma. Tipografia Mantellate, 14 v. in 18. Bimonthly.
Publication suspended, 1943. Published by the Societa internazionale di
criminologia, Editor: ·G. Novelli.
Rivista di diritto processuale penale. v.Lfi, 1954·1958. Milano, A. Giuffre.
5 v. Quarterly.
Began publication in 1954 under title: Rivista italiana di diriuo processuale
penale. United in 1958 with Rivista italiana di diritto penale to form «c
vista itoliana di diritto e procedure penale.
Rivista italiana di dirittoe procedure penale. Nuova ser, anno 1- 1958·
Milano, A. Giuffre. Quarterly.
Formed by the union of Rivista italiana di diritto penale and Rivlsta di
diritto processuale penale. "., '" ,"'~ , " .'. ,.. .
Rivista italiana di diritto penale. v.I-Id, 1929-1942. Padova, A. Milani. 14 v.
in 15.
Monthly, 1929·30; bimonthly, 1931-1942.
Rivista itoliana di diriuo penale. Nuova serie. v.l-l0, 1948·1957. Milano, A.
Giuffre. 10 v.
In 1958 united with: Rivista di diritto processuale penale to form: Rivista
italiana di diritto e precedura penale.
Rivista penale di dottrina, legislazione e. giurisprudenza. v.1-110,. 1874-1929,
Roma. 110 v. in 56. Monthly.
Superseded by Rioista penale, Rassegna di dottrina, legislazione, giurispru-
denza in 1930. Imprint varies. .
279) Rivista penale, Rassegna di do ttl-ina, legislazione giurispriulenza. v-L 1930-
Roma. Monthly.
Supersedes Riuista penale 'tli tlottrina, legislazione a giurisprudenza.
275)
276)
277)
278)
280)
281)
282)
270)
271)
272)
273)
274)
Scandanavian studies in criminology. v.l- 1965· [Oslo] Universitets·
forlaget.
Published under the auspices of the Scandinavian Research Council for
Criminology,
Schriften zwn modernen Stmfvollzug. Bd.1-4, 1924-1928 ( ?). Hamburg.
Schriftenreihe des Hundeskriminalamtes Wiesbaden. Bd. 1- 1951·
baden, Bundeskriminalamt.
Wies-
283) Schweizel'ische kriminalistisc'he Studien. Bd.l· 1946-
. Herausgegeben von O. A. Germann und J. Graven.
284) Schwe..izerische Zeitschrift fiir Strafrecht; Revue penale suisse. Bd.I- 1888-
Bern, Verlag Stampfli.
Title varies: v.1-5, 1888-1892; Zeitschrift fiir Schweizer Strafrecht; v.6·8,
1893-1895: Zeitschrift fiir Schweizer Strafrecht. Revue penale suisse; 1896·
Schweizerische Zeitschrift fiir Strafrecht. Revue phULle suisse.
285) Schweizerischer Verein fiir Straf- und Gefangniswesen und Schutzaujsicht.
Bulletin. Bd. 1·82, 1869-1951. Aar.au.
In French: Bulletin de la Societe suisse d'administmtion des prisons et de
lib·erte surveillee. Continued by: Informations penitentiair.es suisses; Del'
Strafvollzug in del' Schweiz.
Basel.
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'Schweizerischer Vereiii [iir Stra]. und Celiingnisioeseti rind Schutzaulsiclu,
Verhandlungen. Band 1- 1867- Neue Folge, Heft 1- (also as Bd.
'. 29- ) 1921- Aarau, H. R. Sauerlander.
Text partly in German, partly in French. Some numbers have t.-p ..in French:
Actes de la Societe suisse pour la reforme penitentiaire et la patronage des
detenus liberis. Imprint varies.
La Scuola positiva. Rivista dicriminologia e diritto criminale, v.1-30, 1891-
1920. Nuova serie, v.l·23 (v.31-S3), 1921·1943. Nuova serie, anno 1-10
(v.54·63), 1947·1956. Serie 4, anno 1- (v.63/64-,), 1959' Milano,
A. Giuffre, 1891·
Since 1921 continuation of: Rivista diiliritto e procedure penale; Inter-
rupted during the war, 1944-1946; Not published 1957-58. Title vanes.
Fondatore: Enrico Ferri.
La Scuola penale umanista. Rassegna trirnestrale di dottrina e di giurispru-,
denza penale. anno 1-5, 1923-1927. Catania. 5 v.
v.1-2, 1923-24, have title: Bolletino di diritto penale.
La Scuola penale unitaria. v.Lfi, 1927-1931. Roma. 5 v.
Sofronistiki epitheorisis. v.I. 1948· Athens, Ministry of Justice, Office
of the Director General of the Penal Justice.
(The prison review).
Sofronistikae plirophoriae. (The prison bulletin). v.1-5, 1936·1940. Athens,
Minis~ry of Justice. 5 v.
Soironistiki: statistiki. "(Prison statistics). v.l·9, 1929-1937. Athens, Ministry
of National Economy. 9 v. r.
293) Sovetskaia kriminalistika na sluzhbe sledstoiia. v.l- 19 Moskva,
Vsesoiuznyi Nauchno-Issledovatelskii Institut Kriminalistiki.
294)" Stat istiki tis astinomias. (Police statistics). v.I. 19· Athens, ,Astino-
mia poleon,
295) Statistiki tis pinikis diaeoslnis. (Statistics of criminal justice). v.l·8, 1929-
1936. Athens, Ministry of Justice. 8 v.
'"296) Statistique penitentiaire. v.L 1852- Paris. lmprimerie administrative,
Melun, Publication du Ministere de la Justice.
286)
287)
288)
289)
290)
291)
"7,
292)'
297) Statistiques nationales de police. t.L 19 -. Paris, Ministere de I'In-
terieur, la Direction Cenerale de la Surete Nationale. Annual.
298) Strajrechterlijke en criminologische orulerzoekningen, v.I. 1932-
enhage.
299)
28
s'Grav-
1IIJ'tr'-
300)
§t~ajrechtliche Ablzandlungen. na.r 1896- Breslau, Schletter ..
427 vols. published to date. Supersedes: Strajrechuiche Abhandlungen,
v.Lti, 1893-1895, by Breslau Universitat, Iuristisches Seminar.
Studieilog van het Nederlands geuangenisuiezen; (Research publication of th~
Dutch prison system). v.I. 1950- . Den Haag, Studieen Docurnentatie-
centrum van het Ministerie van Iustitie, Irregular.
Suomen kriminalistiyhdistyksen uuosikirja. (Yearbook of Finnish Crimi nal
Lawyers' Association). vuosi 1- 1934(?)· Helsinki. Annual.
Title also in Swedish.
Tidskrijt for kriminalvard. v.L Stockholm, G. Marnell.
Tijclschryt uoor Strairechi. v.L 1886/67· . Leiden, E. J. Brill.
,
U.S. Bureau of Pri;ons. Federal prison service newsletter. no.1-52, April 1954·
Dec.1962.,Washi.pgton, D.C., Published by the Administrative Office of the
United States Courts in cooperation with the Bureau of Prisons of the
Department of Justice. 52 nos. in 4 v. Bimonthly.
301)
302)
303)
3(4)
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305) U.S. Bureau. of Prisons. Newsletter. v.l,no.l- Aug./Sept. 1965- Wash:
ington, D. C.
U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation. Uniform crime reporting; quarterly re-
lease of crime index data for the United States, lan./Sept.1958- .Wash-
ington. Quarterly.
Includes some cumulative figures; final figures published in the annual
Uniform crime reports.
U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation. Uniform crime reports for the United
States. v.l- Aug.1930- Washington, D.C., U.S. Government Printing
Office.
Monthly, Aug.1930-Dec.1931; Quarterly, Apr.1932-1an.1942; Semiannual,
luly 1942-1an.1958; Annual, 1959-
Supersedes a publication with the same title issued 1an.-l uly 1930, by the
Committee on Uniform Crime Records of the International Association of
Chiefs of Police.
Untersuchungen zur Kriminalitdt in Deutschland. Bd.I-12, 1938-1941. lena,
Biedermann. 12 v.
Untersuchungen zur Kriminalitdt in Thiiringen, Bd.l-10, 1932-1938. lena"
Biedermann. 10 v.
Vestnik ceskoslovenske spolecnosti pro trestni prduo, (Journal of the Czecho-
slovak Association for Criminal Law). v.I-23, 1925-1948. Praha, Ceskos-
lovenska spolecnost pro trestni pravo v Pr~e. 23 y. Q~art,!?r!y:
Vieteljahresschrift fur angewandte Kriminalistik ; Kriminalistiche Rundschau
fur Industrie, Bankwesen, Verischerungsgewerbe, Handel, Polizei, u. Wis-
senschaft. Hrsg. von 1., K. Kley, Lothar Philipp [nd] Hans Schneickert.
lahrg.l- 1928(?)- . [Berlin]
Vierteljahrsschrift fur gerichtliche Medizin. tuul 0ffentliches Sanitdtsioesen:
Bd.1-25, 1852-64; Neue Folge, Bd.I-53, 1864-90; 3. Folge, Bd.1-62, 1891-
1921. Berlin, Hirschwald. 179 v.
Ser.l (25 v.) and new ser., v.1-15 have title: Vierteljohrsschrijt [iir gericht-
liche und 0ffentliche Medizin, Continued by Deutsche Zeitschrift fiir die
gesamte gerichtliche Medizin:
Voordrachten. van het Psychiatrisch Iuridiscli Gezelschap. (Proceedings of the
Psychiatric-juridical Society). v.l- 1907- Amsterdam, Psychiatrisch
Juridisch Gezelschap. Annual.
Voprosy sudebno-meditsinskoi ekspertizy ; sbonik statei, (Problems of for-
ensic medicine examination. Collected articles). vyp. 1-3, 1954-1958. Moskva,
Gos. Izd-vo lurid. Lit-ry. 3 v.
Voprosy ugolovnogo prava i protsessa; sbornik statei. (The problems of crim-
inal law and criminal procedure. Collected articles.) no.l- 1958-
Minsk, Izd-vo Belgosuniversiteta, _
Issued by: Kafedra Sovetskogo Ugolovnogo Prava i Protessa, Belorusskii
Gosudarstvennyi Universitet.
Wojskowy przeglad prawniczy rok 1- 1945(?)- Warszawa, Department
sluzby sprawiedliwosci m.o.n. Quarterly.
Zeitschri]t [iir die gesamte Strafrechtswissenschaft. Bd. 1- ,1881-' . Berlin
und Leipzig, l. Guttentag [etc.]
Suspended 1945-1949. v.62 complete with no.4. Includes a series of num-
bered supplements, entitled :Sammlung ausserdeutscher Strafgesetzbiicher in
deutscher Ubersetzung, The current supplement "Mitteilungen der lnterna-
tionalen kriminalistischen. Vereinignng" has been issued with Zeitschrift
since 1889. '
Zeitschrijt fiir Strafvollzug. Bd.l- 1950- Berlin, Stranfanstalt Tegel.
Zeitschrift fiir Wehrrecht. Hrsg. von der Akademie fur Deutsches Recht. Bci.
1-8, Mai 1936-April 1944. ,Berlin, 1. Schweitzer. 8 v. Monthly.
306)
307)
308)
309)
310)
311)
312)
313)
314.)
315)
29
320) Zentralblatt fiir lugendrecht unci [ugeruluiohliahrt. Bd. 1· April 1909-
Kaln.
Suspended 1944-1949_ Title. varies: 1909-1924 as Zeiuralblatt [iit Vormund-
schaftswesen, lugendgerichte und Fiirsorgeerziehung; 1937-1943? as
Deutsche lugendhilfe. 1909-1943 published by Vereinigung fur Iugendge-
richte und lungendgerichtshilfen; 1950-' by Deutsches Institut fur Vor-
mundschaften.
*LL.B.,University of Tartu, Estonia, 1936; LL.M., University of Tartu, 1939; Dr.jur., Uni-
versity of Heidelberg, Germany, 1944; M.L., University of Washington, 1956; Assistant, University
of Tartu, 1936-44; Assistant, University of Upsala, Sweden, 1944-52; Library Consultant, Columbia-
Michigan Int. Legal Studies, Istanbul, Turkey, 1957-59; Law Librarian ancl Assistant Professor of
Law, University of Toronto, Canada, 1960-63; Professor of Law and Law Librarian, Loyola Uni-
versity, 1963-.
1. Through Executive Order No. 11236, 30 Fed. Reg. 9349 (1945).
2. Section 2 of the Executive Order provides as follows: "The Commission shall: (1) Inquire
into the causes of crime and deliquency, measures for their prevention, the adequacy of law en-
forcement and administration of justice, and the factors encouraging respect or disrespect for law,
at the national, State, and local levels, arid make such studies, conduct such hearings, and request
such informationas it deems appropriate for this purpose. (2) Develop standards and make recom-
mendations ... tp prevent, reduce, and control crime ... "
3. Washington, D .. C, United States Government Printing Office, February 1967.
4. LO:f Angeles Times, October 7, 1966, Part I, p. 28.
5. Thus, e.g., Ford Foundation granted $600,000 to the Georgetown University Law Center to
expand graduate legal internship program in criminal law; $320,000 to Columbia University School
of Law, for joint program in criminal justice with Cambridge University, Institute of Criminology;
$250,000 to University of Montreal, Department of Criminology, to expand research and training
program; $150,000 to University of Toronto, Centre of Criminology, for study of crime in Canada:
See 8 Foundation News 37 and 44 (March 1967).
6. See Los Angeles Dail» [o urnal, March 22, 1967, at p. 1.
':'*Part II, A List of Criminal Law Periodicals Arranged by Country, will be published in the next
issue of the LOYOLA DIGEST. In this listing, only the titles will be shown, referring to Part I
for full bibliographic information.
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CALIFORNIA PRODUCTS
LIABILITY LAW:1 A REVIE\V
AND PROSPECTUS
The doctrine of products liability is
perhaps one of the most outstanding de-
velopments in California tort law in recent
years. Yet the doctrine, contrary to popu-
lar belief, is not a static concept, but
rather one which is influencing California
tort law to a significant degree today" an
influence which will be overshadowed only
by the developments of tomorrow.
In order to examine properly the present
and future roles of products liability law
in California, it is first necessary to re-
view briefly the formation of that law in
California. 'Two sources of such formation
are detectable. The first is the liberaliza-
tion or elimination of traditional require-
ments, such as privity of contract, for con-
sumer recovery on the theory of negl.igence.
This development may be seen in the land-
mark case of MacPherson v. Buick Motor
CO.,2 accepted as California law in Kalish
v. Los Angeles Ladder CO.3 .
The second source, and the one with which
we will be presently concerned, is a similar
liberalization in the field of implied warran-
ty. The Macpherson-type development will
not be discussed, because products libality is
primarily concerned with recovery regard-
less of fault, and it was early established
in the field of implied warranty that the
liability imposed was "an absolute liability
regardless of negligence."4
The basis for this imposition of liability
in the field of implied warranty was, until
recently, Civil Code Section 1735, enacted
in 1931. 5 The pertinent parts of that set-
tion, effective through January 1, 1965 (for
transactions after that date see Commercial
Code §§2314-2317), read as follows:
Subj ect to the provisions of this act and
of any statute in that behalf, there is no
implied warranty or condition as to the
quality Oil' fitness for any particular pur-
pose of goods supplied under a contract to
sell or a sale, except as follows:
(1) Where the buyer, expressly or by
implication makes known. to the seller the
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- Comments- particular purpose for which the goods are
required, and it appears that the buyer
relies on the seller's skill or judgment
(whether he be the grower or manufac-
turer or not), there is an implied warranty
that the goods shall be reasonably fit for
such purpose,
(2) Where the goods are bought by de-
scription from a seller who deals in goods
of that descripteon (whether he be the
grower or manufacturer or not), there is
an implied warranty that the goods shall
be of merchantable quality.
It will be noted that subsection (1) of
Civil Code Section 1735 speaks only of a
warranty in favor of the buyer, and that
subsection ('2) reaches the same result in-
directly. Thus, it would seem that a major
prerequisite to recovery under Civil Code
Section 1735 is privity of contract. Indeed,
this requirement was explicitly stated both
before and after the enactment of Section
1735, in the cases of Lewis v. Terry,G Cliff
v. California Spray Chemical Co.,' and
Burr v. Sherwin Williams Co,"
LIBERALIZATION IN THE AREA OF
IMPLIED WARRANTY
Yet this seemingly impregnable fortress
of privity of contract was breached early
and often in favor of consumers seeking
recovery under Section 1735, thus prepar-
ing the way for the entrance of the current
products .Iiabil ity theory. Thefirst case to
eliminate the privity requirement of Sec-
tion,1735 was Klein v.' Duchess Sandwich
Co., Lul." There a husband and wife went
to a restaurant, and the husband purchased
a ham and cheese sandwich which was
. wrapped in waxed paper and sealed by
two metal clamps which had been placed
thereon by the manufacturer of the sand-
wich, Duchess Sandwich Company. The
sandwich had been delivered to the restau-
rant by Duchess approximately one hour
before the purchase in question. The hus-
band took the sandwich to his wife who
thereupon removed the wrapper and be-
gan to consume the sandwich. At that point,
the wife discovered the sandwich was full
.of worms and maggots, and she became
violently ill for a period of six months.
In the subsequent action brought against
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Duchess by the husband and wife, and. upon
these facts, the trial court directed a verdict
for the defendant, but on appeal the judg-
ment for defendant was reversed.
In reviewing the case the California Su-
preme Court first noted that the plaintiffs
had alleged, inter alia, that Duchess had
breached an implied warranty under Civil
Code Section 1735 (1) that the sandwich
was fit for human consumption. Duchess
contended, however, that this statutory im-
plied warranty ran only from an immediate
seller to an immediate buyer, and that here
no such relationship-existed; i.e., that privi-
ty . of contract was absent. In answering
this contention, the Supreme Court first
stated that the question concerning a man-
ufacturer's liability to an ultimate pur-
chaser or consumer on a warrantv as to
the fitness of food manufactured by it was
one of the first instance in California. After
reviewing the decisions of other jurisdic-
tions the Court then announced the Cali-
fornia rule as follows:
In adopting the statute here concerned
as' a part of the Uniform Sales Act, it
was the clear intent of the legislature that,
with respect to foodstuffs, the implied war-
ranty provisions therein contained should
inure to the benefit of any ultimate pur-
chaser or consumer of food; and that it
was net-intended that a strict "privity' of
contract" would be essential for the bring-
Ing.of an action by such ultimate consumer
for an asserted breach of the implied war-
ranty ..
AlthQugh authorities to the contrary of
the -conclusion herein reached have im-
posed a strict privity of contract on a pur-
chaser or consumer of assertedly un-
wholesome rood ..as an essential requisite
. for the bringing of an action on the im-
plied warranty' theory, nevertheless.' the
rulings made ill the authorities herein
cited are based on sound principles, af-
rordtng' .as they do an adequate remedy
tpr injuries which may result from the eat-
ing6f unwholesome food by an ultimate
consumer who, under modern economic
conditions, almost of necessity, must pur-
chase many items of food prepared in
?riginal packages by the manufacturer liLpd
mtended for the consuming public, al-
thoughmarketed through an intermediate
dealer.w '. ,'::' "
The first product expansion of the new
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doctrine eliminating prrvrty as a require-
ment for recovery under Civil Code Sec-
tion 1735 came in Free v. Sluse." There it
washeld that a printed guarantee as to the
quality of soap would enable a retailer as
well as a wholesaler to recover against the
manufacturer for breach of an implied
warranty of merchantability. The rationale
of the court was that the manufacturer
had both the knowledge and the intention
that the soap should move through the
usual channels of trade and reach personti
in the position of plaintiff.
Still other cases applied the rule of the
Klein case to vaccine.l" soft-drink bottles, ~3
and dangerous instrumentalities.l" In the
last-cited case, Peterson v. Lamb Rubber
Co., the court took note of the fact that in
the then most recent case stating the gen-
eral rule that privity of contract was re-
quired to .recover under Civil Code Section
1735, Burr v. Sherwin Williams Co./5 the
court had noted that an exception existed
to the general privity requirement in the
area of foodstuffs. And, stated the Peter-
son court, "The court's reference [in Burr
v. Sherwin Williams Co.] to 'some excep-
tion' was clearly intended to guard against
closing the door to the development of other
exceptions as law and justice and changing
economic conditions might require. "16
Applying this language, the Peterson
court then proceeded to hold that in the
case of a dangerous instrumentality which
caused injury to an employee, "in view
of modern industrial usage, employees
should be considered a member of the in-
dustrial 'family' of the employer ... and
to thus stand in such a privity to the manu-
Iacturer as to permit the employees to be
.covered by [implied] warranties made to
the purchaser-employer."17
The expansion of liability under Civil
Code Section 1735 beyond the limits of
privity was again noted in the case of Hay-
man v. Shoemake,18 where the court stated
as follows:
In recent years the extension of the rule
of liability, particularly as to implied war-
ranties in the entire absence or privity, has
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been one of the notable features of the
enlargement and adjustment of our law
to meet the needs of business and human
relationships under modern conditions.
The foreseeability of harm, the degree of
certainty that a plaintiff suffered injury,
the closeness of the connection between
a defendant's conduct and the injury suf-
fered, the moral blame attached to defen-
dant's conduct and prevention of future
harm have become the general tests of lia-
bility, rather than a strict adherence to a
theory of prlvity.w
Privity of contract is not only the re-
quirement of Civil Code Section 1735 which
was liberalized prior to the first statement
of the California products liability rule.
Civil Code Section 1735 (3) provided that
"if the buyer has examined the goods, there
is no implied warranty as regards defects
which such examination ought to have re-
vealed." At first glance, this requirement
appears absolute. Yet the California courts
lost little time in applying this rule strictly
against the seller. Thus, in one case where
the plaintiff sued for breach of implied
warranty as to the quality of potatoes, the
defendant argued to no avail when he stated
that since the potatoes "bore some evidence
of heat necrosis and rot, he [the plaintiff]
was charged with knowledge of their con-
dition before he planted them.i"? For, as
the court replied, "inspection does not nec-
essarily waive all defects. A buyer still
might claim a breach of implied warranty
as to defects which a reasonable examina-
tion would not have revealed.I''"
Again, in 1959, when a buyer sued
for breach of an implied warranty that an
aircraft was reasonably fit for sustained
flight, there being a latent defect in the
craft, the court, after quoting Civil Code'
Section 1735 (3), stated: "This [sectionJ
negates warranty only as to defects that
could be discovered by reasonable inspec-
tion. "22 To the same effect is Intrastate
Credit Service, Inc. v. Pervo Paint CO.,23
although in that case the appellate court
stated that plaintiff's evidence was insuf-
ficient to support the contention that the
defect in certain signs "would have eluded
a reasonable examination of same. "24
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STATEMENT OF THE CALIFORNIA
PRODUCTS LIABILITY RULE
The culmination of this development in
the area of implied warranty came in the
case of Greenman v. Yuba Pourer Products,
Inc.25 There, plaintiff was injured when a
piece of wood flew out of a "Shopsmith"
machine and struck him on the forehead.
The machine had been bought by plaintiff's
wife from a local retailer and given to
plaintiff. Thus, plaintiff was not in privity
of contract with the manufacturer, against
whom the jury returned a verdict of
$65,000. In addition, the manufacturer
raised the defense that plaintiff had failed
to give timely notice of breach of war-
ranty, as required by Civil Code Section
1764.
The case was appealed to the California
Supreme Court, which affirmed judgment
for plaintiff. Justice Traynor, who had
urged the adoption of a products liability
rule nineteen years earlier in the case of
Escola v. Coca Cola:'Bottling CO.,26 wtate
the' majority opinion in Greenman. He
stated as follows:
A manufacturer is strictly liable in tort
when an article he places on the market,
, knowing that it is to be used without in-
spection for detects, proves to' have a de-
fect that causes injury to' a human being.
Recognized first in the case of unwhole-
some food products, such liability has now
been extended toa 'Variety of other prod-
ucts that create as great or greater haz-
ards if defective [citations].
Although in these cases strict liability
has usually been based on the theory of
an express or implied warranty running
from the manufacturer to the plaintiff,
the abandonment of the requirement of a
contrac.t between them, the recognition
that the liability is not assumed by agree-
ment but imposed by law [citations of
sister-state. decisions], and the refusal to
permit the manufacturer to define the
scope of its own respo:p.sibility for defec-
tive products [citatdons of sister-state de-
cisions] make clear that the liability is not
one governed by the law of contract war-
ranties but by the law of strict liability
in, tort. Accordingly, rules defining and
governing warranties that were developed
to meet the needs 'of commercial transac-
tions cannot properly be invoked to, gov-
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ern the manufacturer's liability to those
injured by its defective products unless
those rules also serve the purposes for
which such liability is imposed.
We need not recanvass the reasons for
imposing strict liability on the manufac-
turer. They have been fully articulated in
the cases cited above . . . The purpose of
such 'liability is to insure that the costs
of injuries resulting from defective prod-
ucts are borne by the manufacturers that
put such products on the market rather
than by the injured persons who are pow-
erless to protect themselves. Sales war-
rarities serve this purpose fitfully at best
. .'. "The remedies of inj uried consumers
ought not to be made to depend upon the
intricacies of the law of sales." (Ketterer
v: Armour & Co., 200 F. 322, 323, Klein v.
Duchess'Sandwich Co., Ltd. 14 Gal. 2d 272,
282 [93 P. 2d 799J.) To establish the manu-
facturer's liability it was sufficient that
plaintiff proved that he was injured while
using the Shopsmith in a way it was, in-
tended to be used.jas a result of a defect
in design and manufacture of which plain-
tiff was not aware that made the Shop-
smith urisafe for its intended use.st
CALIFORNIA DEVELOPMENTS IN THE
',' )
AREA OF PRODUCTS LIABILITY
SINCE GREENMAN
Since this original statement of the Cali-
fornia products liability rule, several in-
terestingand rather extensive modifications
of the. rule have been formulated by the
California courts. The first of these modi-
fications relates to the persons' against
whom liability inures under the rule. Fol-
lowing the policy statement of the Green-
man court, the California Supreme Court
in Vandermark v. Ford Motor CO.28 applied
the strict liability rule of Greenman to
retailers. The reason for the extension was
that. "retailers, like manufacturers, are en-
gaged in the business of distributing goods
to the public . '. . Strict liability on the
manufacturer and retailer alike affords
maximum protection to the injured plain.
tiff .: .. "211
In a still more recent case, the California
District Court of Appeal extended the rule
to "one who sells any product 'in a de-
fective condition unreasonably dangerous
to the user or consumer . . . if (a) the
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seller is engaged in the business of selling
such a product and (b) it is expected to
and does reach the user or consumer with-
out substantial change in the condition in
which it is sold ... "~o It should be noted
that in this latter case, the defendant mere-
ly took the order for the defective prod.
uct (dynamite fuse), it being shipped di-
rectly from the manufacturer to the'
consumer. At the same time it should be
noted that a retailer is only liable under
the doctrine of products liability to the
original consumer from that retailer, and
not to a third party to whom the original
consumer sells the manufactured product. 31
Since Greenman the California courts
have indicated, as a second modification
of the products liability rule, that neither
the nature nor the source of the defect in
the product will affect the application of the
products liability rule. Thus, 'in Vander-
mark v. Ford Motor CO.,32 the court, al-
though taking as established for purposes
of reviewing a nonsuit the fact of defect in
the master braking cylinder of the auto-
mobile involved in the case, noted that the
strict liability rules "focus responsibility
for defects, whether negligently or non-
negligently caused ... "33 In addition, the
court made it clear that the source of the
defect was immaterial. As the court stated,
"since the liability is strict, it encompasses
defects regardless of their source, and
therefore a manufacturer of a completed
product cannot escape liability by tracing
, the defect to' a component part supplied by
another. "34 The court also noted that
"plaintiffs were entitled to establish the
existence of a defect and 'defendants' reo
sponsibility for same by circumstantial evi- .
dence ... "35 ' .
The trend toward a broad definition of
what constitutes a defective product was
given further impetus most recently in Cani-
fax v. Hercules Powder CO.,36 where the
allegedly defective product was dynamite'
fuse. The court stated, in adopting the Re-
statement (2d) Torts Section 402A (1965),
"we' think . . . that a product, although
faultlessly made, may nevertheless be
deemed 'defective' under the [products lia-
bilityJ rule and subject the supplier thereof
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to strict liability if it is unreasonably dan-
gerous to place the product in the hands of
a user without a suitable warning and the
product is supplied and no warmng is
'given. "37
A third modification in the rule relates
to the requirement in Greenman v. Yuba
Power Products, Inc.38 that to establish
strict liability in cases of defective prod-'
ucts, the plaintiff must show that "he was
injured while using the [product] in a
way it was intended to be used "39 This _
requirement was very strictly applied in
Erickson v. Sears, Roebuck & Co/" There"
plaintiff brought an action against Sears
and against a manufacturer for personal
injuries received when a wooden step-
ladder, purchased by plaintiff from Sears,
broke and threw him to the ground. The
trial court ordered a directed verdict for
defendant Sears, judgment being entered in
its favor. At the time the ladder broke,
plaintiff was using it to inspect a water
trough which he had just installed on the
edge of his roof, using the same ladder.
At the time of the inspection, the ladder's
front or step legs were, according to plain-
tiff's own testimony, on grass and slightly
lower in elevation than the back legs of
the ladder, the back legs being on semi-soft
ground. Plaintiff had nailed wooden cleats
to the bottom of the legs to stabilize the
ladder. The accident occurred when both
rear legs broke.
On the ladder's side were directions re-
garding its use, which read in part: "Place
ladder on a firm level foundation. Do not
use on boxes or [on] other unstable, slippery,
or soft surfaces." Upon these facts, the Dis-
trict Court of Appeal affirmed the trial
court's judgment in favor of defendant. In
speaking of the application of the doctrine
of strict liability in tort on the part of a
manufacturer or retailer, the court stated,
"the trial court could properly conclude,
as a matter of law, that at the time of the
accident the plaintiff was not using the
ladder in a way it was intended to be used,
- and that he had not established a prima
facie case of strict liability in tort on the
part of defendants. "41
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Finally, until recently, the doctrine of
products liability in California was ap-
plied only in case of personal injury. Thus,
in Greenman v. Yuba Power Products,
IncY the court stated, the strict liability
rule in terms of a product which "proves
to have a defect that causes injury toa hu-
man being. "43 This requirement was' af-
firmed in Vandermark v. Ford Motor CO.44
where the court, extending the Creenman.
rule to retailers, stated, "Maywood Bell
[the retailer] is strictly liable in tort for
personal injuries caused by defects in cars
sold by it. "45
However, this requirement of personal
injuries was clearly abandoned by the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court in Seely v.. White
Motor Co.4G where the plaintiff brought
action for damages to his truck incurred as
a result of an accident allegedly caused by
a defe'ct 'in tlte tnlcR:"TlITr'coiirt noted that
had plaintiff not failed in his proof that the
alleged defect caused the accident, such
damages could have been recovered on 11'
products liability theory. As the Court
stated, "Plaintiff contends that ... the doc-
trine of strict liability in tort should be ex-
tended to govern physical injury to plain-
tiff's property, as well as personal injury.
We agree with this contention. Physical in-
jury to property is so akin to personal in,
jury that there is no reason to distinguish
them. "47
At the same time, however, the court
refused to extend the strict liability doc-
trine to commercial losses which plaintiff
had attempted to recover, viz., lost profits
and the money he had paid on the truck.
The court stated: White [the manufacturer-
erJ is responsible for these Iosses only be-
cause it warranted the truck to be 'free from
defects in material and workmanship under
normal use and service'. "48 And the court
left no doubt that its position on commer-
cial losses was firm. Speaking through
Chief Justice Traynor, the architect of prod-
ucts liability law 'in California, the court
stated:
. The distinction that the law has drawn
between tort recovery for physical inj uries
and warranty recovery for economic loss
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is not arbitrary and does not rest on the
"luck" of one plaintiff in having an acci-
dent causing physical injury. The distinc-
tion rests, ra-tlner, an an undeestarrdmg
of the nature of the responsibiltty a man-
uracturer must undertake' in distributing
his products. He can approprtately be held
liable for physical injuries caused by de-
fects by requiring his goods to' match a
standard of safety defined in terms of
conditions that create unreasonable risks
of harm. He cannot be held tor physical
injuries caused by defects by requiring his
goods to' .match a standard of safety de-
fined in terms of conditions that create
unreasonable risks of harm. He cannot be
held tor the level of performance of" his
products in the consumer's business unless
he agrees that the product was designed to
meet the. consumer's demands. A consum-
er should not be charged at the will of
the manufacturer with bearing the risk of
physical injury when he buys a product
on the market. He can, however, be fairly
charged w:!,th ·tJW ,r~l;l~ that the product will
not match his economic expectations un-
less the manufacturer agrees that it will.
Even in actions tor negligence, a manufac-
turer's liability is )imited to damages for
physical injuries and there is no recovery
tor economic loss alone, (Wyatt v. Cadillac
Motor Car Divison, 145 Cal. App. 2d 423,
426 [302 P. 2d 665], disapproved on other
grounds in Sabella v. Wisler, 59 Cal. 2d
21, 31 [27 Cal. Reptr. '689, 377 p. 2d 889];
Trans World Airlines v. Curtiss-Wright
Corp., 1 Misc. 2d 477 [148 N.Y.S. 2d 284,
290].) The Restatement of Torts similarly
limits strict liability to physical harm to
person or property. (Rest. 2d Torts [Tent.
Draft NO'.10], § 402A.)
The law of warranty is not limited to
parties in a somewhat equal bargairiing
position. Such a limitation is not supported
by the language and history Df the sales
act and is unworkable, Moreover. it finds
no support in Greenman. The rationale
of that case does not rest on the analysis
of the financial strength or bargaining
power of the parties to the particular ac-
tion. It rests, rather, on the proposition
that "The ca-st of an injury and the 'loss
of time or health may be an overwhelming
misfortune to the person injured, and a
needless one, for the risk of injury can
be insured by the manufacturer .and dis-
tributed among the public as a .cost of
doing business." (Escola v. Coca Oola Bot-
tling Co., 24 Cal. 2d 453, 462] [150 P. 2d
436] [concurring opinion j.) That rationale
in no way justifies requiring the consuming
public to pay more for their products so
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that a manufacturer can insure against
the possibility that some of his products
will not meet the business needs of his cus-
tomers.w
A LOOK INTO THE FUTURE
In gazing into the future of products
liability in California, some four areas of
possible extension, limitation, or definitive
application of the strict-liability rule ap-
pear to deserve exploration. Perhaps the
most fascinating of these areas deals with
the nature of what constitutes a defective
produce. We saw earlier"? that a product
although not defective in its manufacture, is
considered to be defective for the purposes
of products liability if it is supplied to the
cor..sumer without adequate direction as to
its proper use. A related question now
arises. Will a product, the design of which
results in injury to the consumer, result in
strict liability against the manufacturer or
seller under the products liability rule?
In order to properly answer this ques-
tion, we must carefully distinguish the con-
cept of defective design from the concept
of a product defectively manufactured. The
latter concept involves no defect in the de-
sign of the product itself, but rather in the
manner of manufacture or-in the situation
closest to defective design-in the manufac-
turer's choice of parts and materials to be
used in constructing the product. Thus, in
Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc.,u1
the defect consisted of inadequately set
screws used to hold parts of the Shopsmith
together, "so that normal vibration caused
the tailstock of the lathe to move away
from the piece of wood being turned per·
mitting it to fly out of the lathe. "52
In the case of defective design, however,
the product is manufactured according to
the design given and in the manner in which
the product is intended to be manufactured,
with no inadequacy of parts or materials.
Further, the product reaches the consumer
in the state in which both the manufacturer
and designer intended it should. Then, in
that state, the product causes injury to the
consumer. As thus defined, the question
of whether defective design constitutes a
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defect for the purposes of products liability
has not been faced or answered by the Cali-
fornia appellate courts.
The question has, however, been ans-
wered by the Supreme Court of New Jer-
sey. That New Jersey has so spoken is sig-
nificant, since that state is authoritatively
regarded as the founder of the products
liability rule.P" The defective-design case
which both faced and answered the question
is Schipper v. Levitt & Sons, Inc.54 This was
an action against a builder and vendor of
a mass-produced house in a project, for in-
juries sustained by a child of the purchas-
ers' lessee due to excessively hot water
drawn from a bathroom faucet. The action
was based in part upon the theory that the
hot water distribution system, found in
every home in the project, was defectively
designed in that the system, i.e. the speci-
fications given the mariufacturers by the
builder vendor, did not provide for a mix-
ing valve which would have prevented ex-
cessively hot water from issuing from a
house's various taps, including those found
in the bathroom. At the close of plaintiff's
case, the trial court, upon motion by the
defendant, dismissed the case. In reversing
for plaintiff, the court stated:
The law should be based on current con-
cepts of what is right and just and the ju-
diciary should be alert to the never-ending
need for keeping its law principles abreast
of the times Ancient distinctions which
make no sense in today's society and tend
to discredit the law should be readily re-
j ected as they were step by step in Hen-
ningsen and Santor [the two leading New
Jersey products liability cases] , . , That
being sO', the ' .. strict liability principles
of Henningsen and Santor should be car-
ried over into the realty field, at least in
the aspect dealt with here.55
Turning to the specific facts of the case,
the court then stated: "We are satisfied that,
in the particular situation here, the plain-
tiffs may rely not only on the principles
of negligence set forth in their first point
but also on the ... strict liability principles
set forth under their second point. "56 In so
stating, however, the court cautioned that
in order for the design to b~ considered de-
fective for the purposes of the products Iia-
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bility rule, it had to be shown "that the de-
sign was unreasonably dangerous . '. ,"57
The court did not define the phrase "un-
reasonably dangerous." But the decision
clearly answered the question. A product
defectively designed is, at least under cer-
tain circumstances, defective for the pur-
poses of products liability.
Two questions now arise: (1) Will Cali-
. fornia follow this New Jersey view? (2)
Is such a view consistent with the principles
of California products liability? As to the
first question, a recent Los Angeles Su-
perior Court case indicated that the New
Jersey rule would indeed be followed, but
that heavy emphasis would be given to the
"unreasonably dangerous" requirement
enunciated by the New Jersey court. (The
" bl d " I .unreason a y angerous anguage, It
should be noted, is also contained in Cani-
fax v. Hercules Potikler Co.58) The case is
Drummond v. General Motors CorpF" In
that case, the parents of a teen-age driver
brought a wrongful death action for their
son's death, which occurred when the auto-
mobile he was driving, his parents' 1960
Chevrolet Corvair, failed to negotiate a
curve, with the result that the Corvair col-
lided with another vehicle.
The primary theory upon which the cause
of action was predicated was products lia-
bility, specifically, defective design. As
Judge Jefferson stated in his opinion (this
being a non-jury trial):
It is the position of plaintiffs that the
1960 Corvair was defective in its design as
the result of the speciricattons of a 2,600
pound automobile with the. engine in the
rear, with the consequent concentration
of weight distributed in the rear, the
height and rearward Iocatlon of the cen-
ter of gravity, the rear suspension with its
swing axles permitting the rear wheels to
develop excessive positive camber, the roll
couple distrtbutdon and the differential
tire pressures between front and rear,
Plaintiffs assert that this design of the
1960 Corvair created an oversteering auto-
mobile with dangerous handling charac-
teristics and difficulties for the average
driver which was a proximate cause of
the accident of May 16, 1960 and the death
of Don Wells Lyford [the decedent],
In discussing this theory of strict Iiahil-
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ity, the court first noted the problem in-
herent in product liability defective design
cases, namely, the definition of the. term.
"defect." As the court state-d, -. .. ·c
One of the questions which remains to
be answered by our courts is the meaning
to be given to the word "defect" in design
or manufacture as used in Greenman and
Vandermark, and the meaning to be given
to the phrase I'derective condition" used in
Section 402K6f~the Restatement of 'I'orts
(2d).I& would appear that no single den-
nition of "defect" or ."defective" will cover
all types of cases. ..
The meaning of these words will hav€
to' be developed by our courts ona case by
case basis. An ordinary meaning of the
word "defect" or "derecttve" would imply
that something is faulty or imperfect. This
plain meaning would cover a case in w,hich
some portion or a product failed to meet
the specifications of the manufacturer.
Thus, a cracked bolt used in a. product
would be an obvious case of a defective
product. We get into a more difficult prob-
lem of definition when a product is made
exactly to spectricattons. This is the sit-
uation involved in the case at bench.
A hint of one meaning to be ascribed
to the word "defect," where the product
is made according to speciricattons, is
found in language used by the court in
Seely v. White Motor Company, 63 Cal 2d
9, 18, in which the court said in part: "...
he (the manufacturer) can appropriately
be held liable for physical injuries caused
by defects requiring his goods to match
a'standard of safety defined in terms of
conditions that (do not) create unreason-
able risks of harm ... "
What is meant by. a "standard of safety,"
which does not create an unreasonable risk
of harm? It could mean .using Similar
products as a standard of comparison and,
if the specific product doesn't come up to
that standard, it is defective. Thus in Yuba,
the lathe was defective because it did not
ha ve a proper fastening device as other
lathes have. In Vandermark, the auto-
mobile was defective because :the . brakes
went on without the driver pushing the
brake pedal and normal brakes don't go
on this way.
But such a meaning has difficulties. One
major difficulty is that of determining
what products shall constitute the stand-
ard.
Another problem with the use of similar
products as a standard of comparison re-
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lates to how far or how much of a devia-
tion from the standard is required to con-
stitute a defect.
Another meaning to be· given to "stand-
ard of safety" would be simply that of
drawing a line between relative degrees
of a risk of danger, of a risk of harm, of
a risk of injury. This kind of standard for
determining a defective product recognizes
that products may be dangerous but lia-
bility follows only if it can be said that
the product is unreasonably dangerous.
This doesn't try to define a defect in terms
of a standard of quality of similar prod-
ucts as much as it does in terms of how
strong is the likelihood of inj ury from the
product. This is the approach of Section
402A of the Restatement of Torts (2d).
The emphasis upon the Iikelthood of in-
jury takes intouccounj the consumer's or
user's knowledge of danger. This approach
seeks to protect the consumer or user who
is unaware of the danger involved in .the
use of a product in a way it was intended
to be used or in using the product in a
normal manner. This approach does not
protect the consumer or - user when he
uses a product in a way in which he knows
requires certain precautions be taken to
make the product safe in such a. use.:»
Specifically discussing the social philos-
ophy behind such a limited definition, the
court then stated:
It is apparent that the use of the phrases
"unreasonable risk of harm,". . and "un-
reasonably dangerous to the user 'or con-
sumer" is a recognition of the fact that
many products cannot possibly be made
entirely safe to all consumption or all uses
and that many products are dangerous for
some uses and not others.
In comment "h" of Section 402A of
the Restatement of Torts (2d) it is said
in part that "a product is not: in a derec-
tive condition when it is safe tor normal
handling and consumption."
Thus, tobacco is not unreasonably dan-
gerous simply because the effects of smok-
ing may be harmful. [See, in this connec-
tion, Lartique v. R. J. Reynolds Tobacco
Co., 317 Fed. 2d 19 (5th CiT., 1963).] Candy
. is not unreasonably dangerous because
overconsumption of it will make one ill.
Many dangerous drugs fall in the cate-
gory of being reasonably safe if taken in
moderation but exceedingly harmful if
taken in excessive doses. The automobile is
somewhat similar to dangerous drugs.
Every automobile, no matter how con-
structed or designed, presents more dan-
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gerous characteristics in certain uses than
in others
The questions which have to be 'ans-
wered in this case in light of [these] ...
principles or liability for defective design
are twofold: (1) Is the design of the 1960
Corvair automobile defective SD that it
creates an unreasonable risk of harm to
the driver or is unreasonably dangerous
to the driver when it is being used in the
way it was intended to be used Dr is be:ing
handled in a normal manner? If the ans-
wer to this question remains in the af-
firmative' there remains the question: (2)
Did the May 16, 1960 accident result from
the 1960 Corvair being so used or so han-
dled by the driver?G2
Upon the evidence presented, the court
answered both these questions in the nega-
tive, stating that the Corvair was not de-
fective, and that the sole cause of the acci-
dent was the actions of the deceased. The
court also opined that "there is no law
today imposing upon the automobile man-
ufacturers the obligation to design the
safest car that they know how to _de-
sign ... "63
At this point, the New Jersey and Drum:
mend defective design decision should be
critically examined. (The following criti-
cism is also 'applicable to the "unreasonably
dangerous" language of Canijax v. Her-
cules Powder Co. 64) And if, in looking at
those decisions, one sees no clear extension
of the products liability rule, he is but ob-
serving the obvious. For the type of ap-
proach is not one of products liability at
all, but negligence. That is, the court, al-
though carefully excluding questions of
fault, is using language more properly ap-
plicable to the- field of negligence than to
the field of products liability, since proba-
bility of injury bears upon the standard
of care expected of the actor. Compare and
contrast, for example, the following two
quotations, the first taken from Drummond,
the second from Greenman:
Is the design or the 1960 Corvair de-
fective so that it creates an unreasonable
risk of harm to the driver or is unreason-
ably dangerous to the driver when it is
being used in the way it was intended to
be used ... ?GG
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"A maufacturer is strictly liable in tort
when an article he places on the market,
knowing that it is to be used without in-
spection for defects, proves to have a defect
that causes injury to a human being. ",iG
In the first of these statements the Los
Angeles Superior Court is concerned with
unreasonable danger. In the second state-
ment, the California Supreme Court is con-
cerned with actual injury to the consumer
caused by defective products, irrespective
of the reasonable probability of injury oc-
curring from such products. Indeed, if there
had ever been any doubt as to whether
reasonableness had a legitimate place in
products liability, the California Supreme
Court itself answered the question when it
noted that the strict liability rules "focus
responsibility for defects, whether negli-
gently or non-negligently caused . . ."Gi
From the point of view of California prod-
ucts liability, then, the approach of the
above New Jersey and California defective
design cases is not only disappointing, but
wrong.
Fortunately, the impact of Drummond
may be limited. Consider the more recent
case of Cantos v. General Motors Corp.GS
There, one Joseph Cantos was employed
by a Chevrolet agency as a lot boy. As
part of his duties, J oseph<was to deliver
Chevrolets to other dealers and return with
Chevrolets from those dealers (car-trading),
On the day in question, Joseph, with his
wife and their minor daughter, drove an
Impala Chevrolet to the second dealer, and
there traded the car for a 1960 Corvair ,
to be returned to Joseph's employer. On
the return trip Joseph felt the Corvair be-
gin to drift to the left while negotiating a
slight curve on the highway. The Corvair
,then suddenly skidded to the left, leavinz
a single skid mark of several hundred fee~
The automobile then skidded to the right,
hit a culvert, and rolled from one to three
times. Joseph's wife, who was pregnant,
and his daughter were injured. They sued
General Motors and the dealer who had
supplied the Corvair, alleging iinter alia)
negligence and products liability. Specific-
ally, as to products liability, plaintiffs al-
leged that the Corvair was defectively de-
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signed and engineered. Defendants alleged
that the accident was solely due to the. ac-
tion of the driver, who was allegedly speed-
ing and intoxicated. While the case was be-
ing tried, the Drummond decision was writ-
ten and given wide publicity. The Cantos
case was submitted to the jury on both neg-
ligence and products liability theories. The
products liability instruction was as fol-
lows:
"The manufacturer of an article who
places it on the market for use under cir-
cumstances where he knows or should
know that such article will be used with':
out inspection for defects, is liable for in-
juries proximately caused by defects in
the manufacture or design of the article
of which the user was not aware, provided
the article was being used in a manner
which was reasonably foreseeable by the
manufacturer at the time the product was
placed on the market." •
On this instruction (which admittedly is
ambiguous insofar as if uses the phrase
"reasonably foreseeable by the manufactur-
er") the jury returned a general verdict in
plaintiffs' .favor in an amount exceeding
$50,000. At first glance, such a general ver-
dict appears to have little significance as to
defective design and .product liability
theories. Upon being interviewed following
the trial, however, the jurors stated that
prior to discussing the question of negli-
gence, they had taken among themselves a
poll to determine if they were of the opinion
that the 1960 Corvair was, as alleged by
plaintiffs, defective. The result of this poll
was that nine of the twelve jurors were
of the opinion that the 1960 Corvair in
question had been defectively designed and
engineered, and that, therefore, the defen-
dants were liable on a products liability
basis.
However, Cantos leaves open the ques-
tion, as does Drummond, as to precisely
how the term "defect" should be defined.
For example, should .the term "defect". be
defined in terms of unreasonable danger
to the average consumer, or unreasonable
danger to anyone, including supersensitive
consumers, or in terms of unreasonable-
ness at all. Should the term "defect" in-
clude reasonable foreseeability on the part
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of the manufacturer? If nothing else, the
defective design cases serve to point out
the difficulties and the unanswered ques-
tions from the failure of the California Su-
preme Court to formulate a definition of
the term "defect" which can be used
throughought the products liability field.
If one now looks at the Greenman case,
including the language of the court as to
the policy reasons necessitating a products
liability doctrine, perhaps such a definition
can be formulated. Such a definition should
first take into account that products liability
is an application of strict liability in tort
to a particular field. Such a definition
should also take into account that the pur-
pose of such liability is to protect the con-
sumer against injury resulting from char-
acteristics in manufacturing products, the
presence of which characteristics is both
unknown to the consumer and not subject
to his control. At the same time the level
of risk of such defect is under the control
of the manufacturer.
Given these considerations, the follow-
ing definition of the term "defect" is pro-
posed. A defect is any characteristic of a
product which proximately causes personal
or physical injury'" to a consumer (or by-
stander?"}. It is believed that" this defini-
tion, when read in context with the other
requirements of products liability (such as
lack of knowledge of the defect on the part
of the consumer; and use of the product in
a predictable manner?"] satisfies the pre-
viously-mentioned policy considerations of
Greenman, though, of course, many read-
ers may draw a contrary conclusion. It is
hoped, however, that at least one sees that
a working definition of the term "defect"
is needed if products liability is to fulfill
the truly vital role outlined in Greenman
in providing recovery to the consumer for
injuries resulting from products, the risk
of which injuries the consumer should not
be made to bear.
The second area of future California
products liability law to be explored is con-
cerned with the rise of special defenses
to liability under the law. We saw earlier
that in order for a consumer to recover on
a products liability theory, he must show
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(inter alia) that at the time the injury oc-
curred, he was using the product in question
in the manner in which it was intended to
be used, and that the injury was proxi-
mately caused by a defect of which the
consumer was not aware.?" It appears, how-
ever, that California may add to these re-
quirements the requirement that at the time
the injury occurred, the consumer was ex-
ercising reasonable care for his own safety.
The appellate case in point is Martinez
v. Nichols Conveyor & Engineering Co.,
Inc.73 There, an employee brought action
against the manufacturer and bailor of a
paper baler operated by plaintiff during
the course of his employment. The plain-
tiff was injured while using this machine
when a certain metal bolt sheared off, al-
lowing an 800-pound platen on the baler to
fall on his arm. Trial judgment was for
the defendants and plaintiff appealed.
Among other errors, the plaintiff alleged
that it was error to fail to instruct the jury
on products liability, which was one of the
theories upon, which plaintiff sought re-
covery. In affirming judgment for defen-
dants, and holding that the fa'ilure to in-
struct was not error, the District Court of
Appeal, Third Appellate District, stated as
follows:
Plaintiff contends it was error to fail to
instruct on Independent's (one of the de-.
fendants) strict liability. Plaintiff's pro-
posed instruction No. 17 omits the condi-
tion that the chattel, at the time of the
injury, must have been used in its intended
manner, This element is present .In the
Greenman holding ... Moreov1er, the pro-
posed instruction states: "Contributory
negligence of the plaintiff, if any there
was, is not a. defense to the action, based
on strict liability." It is a defense to show
that the injured party knew of the defect
and fa iled to exercise reasonable care for
his own safety ... There was evidence that
Martinez knew of the prior failure of a bolt
and the falling of the platen.ts
Illustrating the possible confusion inher-
ent in this District Court of Appeal language
is the earlier-decided case of Drummond
v. General Motors Corp," where it was
stated that,
Crane and Kassouf [two warran ty cases]
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would justify a holding that contributory
negligence is not a defense to an action
based upon strict liabililty in tort. Section
402A of the Restatement of Torts (2d)
takes this view. [This is a fascinating
statement in view of the District Court
of Appeal's later citation of Section 402A
for its conclusion that failure to exercise
reasonable care for one's own safety con-
stitutes a defense to a products liability
cause of action.] However, something akin
to contributory negligence appears to be
involved in the doctrine of strict liability
in tort inasmuch as liability requires that
the consumer handle the produtc in a nor-
mal manner or use the product in the way
it was inteded to be used.7G
It is submitted, in critically examining
these above two cases and statements, that
both are confusing the Greenman require-
ments of lack of knowledge of the presently
existing defect and use of the product in
the manner in which it was intended to be
used, with the exercise by the consumer
of reasonable care for his own safety. The
first two requirements obviously do not in:
elude the third. A consumer could exercise
reasonable care for his own safety and
still fail, through excusable lack of knowl-
edge, to use the product in the manner in
which it was intended to be used. By the
same token, a consumer could use a prod-
uct in the manner in which it was intended
to be used and have no knowledge of a
presently-existing defect, but still fail to
exercise reasonable care for his own safety.
In fact, this was the factual situation in
Martinez v. Nicholas Conveyor & Engineer-
ing Co., Inc." where the failure to exer-
cise reasonable care, according to the court,
consisted of use of the product with knowl-
edge of a prior-existing defect which had
been, at least to plaintiff's knowledge, cor-
rected.
The foregoing distinction between the
two Greenman requirements noted above
a~d failure by the consumer to exercise
reasonable care for his own safety was
expressly recognized in Preston v. Upright,
lncl" decided only one month before Mar-
tinez, but by the Second (as opposed to
the Third) Appellate District. There, the
court first noted that "contributory negli-
gence is not an issue in a case governed
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by the law of strict liability in tort. "79
The court then refused to find as error an
instruction to the effect that the product's
use must have been reasonable only because,
by virtue of other instructions, it was made
clear that use of the product in its intended
manner, rather than the consumer's reason-
able care for his own safety, was at issue.
It is clear, then, that Martinez seeks to
interject a requirement, and thus a defense,
which is inapproapriate to the field of
products liability. In view of the conflicts
between Appellate Districts, and the result-
ant confusion, it is to be hoped that the
California Supreme Court will clearly re-
solve this issue and reaffirm the strict lia-
bility character of California products lia-
bility. .
The third area of exploration in future
California products liability law is" con-
cerned with the persons against whom lia-
bility may inure under the rule. We saw
previously that the rule first applied only
to manufacturers.v" It was then extended, as
also seen previously, to retailers'" and to
sellers other than occassional sellers, even
though such seller neither manufactured
the product nor ever had possession of the
product.V The question now arises: Will
the rule apply to any person who merely
furnishes, directly .or indirectly, the de-
fective product to the consumer who is per-
sonally or physically injured thereby?
The answer appears to be a qualified
"yes." In the recent case of Martinez v.
Nichols Conveyor & Engineering Co., Inc.83
one of the defendants was a bailor of the
defective product to the plaintiff's employ-
er. The court refused to apply the rule of
productsliabiliy to the case because of
special defenses.t" However, the court, after
reviewing the persons against whom lia-
bility currently inured under the rule (man-
ufacturers, retailers, sellers), stated: "We
shall assume for the purpose of this opin-
ion that the rule of strict liability in tort ap-
plies also to lessors and bailors. "85 The
court cited as basis for this statement the
case of Cintronev. Hertz Truck Leasing &
Rental Service,86 where the Supreme Court
of New Jersey had applied that state's prod-
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ucts liability rule to a commercial bailor
of the product to plaintiff's employer.
The trend thus appears to be toward
holding liable a supplier of the product,
no matter what his title is. But does this
mean that any supplier, including a non-
commercial supplier, such as a gratuitous
bailor, or a donor, will be liable under
the California products liability rule? Al-
though no cases have answered this ques-
tion, the answer appears to be "no." For
in both Vandermark v. Ford Motor Co.,
and Caniiax v. Hercules Powder Co., the
extension in the types of defendants liable
was made in terms of this type of defen-
dant being better able than the consumer
(1) to prevent the defective product from
reaching the consumer and causing injury
(risk control), and (2) to bear the risk.
Thus, in Vandermark, the court stated with
respect to these two considerations:
The retailer himself. may play a sub-
stantial part in insuring that the product
is safe or may be in a position to exert
pressure on the manufacturer to' that end;
the retailer's strict liability thus serves
as an added incentive to safety. Strict lia-
bility on the manufacturer and retailer
alike affords maximum protection to the
injured plaintiff and works no injustice
to the defendants, for they can adjust the
costs of such protection between them in
the course of their continuing business re-
tattonship.sr [Compare: One who sells any
product in a defective condition ... to the
user or consumer : . . if (a) the seller is
engaged in the business of selling such a
product ... 88]
But, in the case of the non-commercial
supplier, such as a gratuitous bailor, the
supplier is ordinarily not better able than
the consumer to prevent the defective prod-
uct from reaching the consumer. This is
true because the non-commercial furnisher
is ordinarily not in the business of supply-
ing the product in question to consumers.
Accordingly, such a supplier has not the
means (such as inspecting machinery and
processes) to detect defective products.
Moreover, such a supplier is ordinarily not
in a better position than the consumer to
bear the risk of 'injury occurring from such
a defective product. Not being in the busi-
ness of supplying the product in question,
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and the supplier-consumer transaction be-
ing gratuitous, there is no way by which
such supplier can "adjust his costs" of sup-
plying protection to the consumer, even if
the supplier can obtain such protection.
It thus appears that under the considera-
tions which have heretofore guided the ex-
pansion of the types of defendants liable
under California products liability law, con-.
siderations which do not appear likely to be
repudiated in the foreseeable future, non-
commercial suppliers of products will not
be held liable upon a products liability
theory (strict liability).
The fourth and final area of future Cali-
fornia products liability law to be explored
concerns the bystander who is injured by
a defective product. We have previously
seen that any user or consumer of the prod-
uct, in the broadest sense of the terms, is
protected by the strict liability rule. Thus,
not only the purchaser or lessee of the
product, but his employee, members of his
family, his donees, and in general those
Closely related in some way to the actual
purchaser or lessee of the product, are con-
sidered consumers for purposes of the
Greenman rule. But will protection extend
to the bystander, the person who is not
using the defective product but who suf-
fers injury thereby nevertheless?
In commenting on this question, which
has not been faced by the California
courts.f" Prosser, the recognized expert in
the field of products liability, has recently
stated as follows: .
Bystanders, and other non-users in the
vicinity of the expected use, present a fun-
damental question of policy. If the philos-
ophy of the strict liability is that all in-
jured platnttrts are to be compensated by
holding the suppliers of products to strict
liability for all the harm they do in the
world, and expecting them to insure
against the liability and pass the cost on
to society by adding it to the price, then
there is no reason whatever to distinguish
the pedestrian hit by an automobile with
bad brakes from the injured driver of the
car. If the supplier is to be held liable
because of his representation of safety in
marketing the goods, then the pedestrian
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stands on quite a different footing. He is
not the man the supplier has sought to
reach, and no implied representation has
been made to himthat the product is safe
for use; nor has he relied upon any as-
surance of safety whatever. He has only
been there when the accident happened;
and in this he differs from no other plain-
tIff.9o
If one accepts this definition of the policy
considerations inherent in protecting the by-
stander under the strict liability rule, it is
apparent that California courts should pro-
vide such protection. For, as noted earlier
in this article, and as noted by Prosser
himself, California has adopted the risk-
distributing theory of products liability,
that is "the supplier should be held liable,
because he is in a position to insure against
liability and add the cost to the price of his
product."?'
Nor would California be the first to so
protect the bystander. In Piercefield v. Rem-
ington Arms CO.!l2 the Michigan Supreme
Court allowed a bystander who was injured
when a shotgun barrel exploded due' to a
defective shell to recover against the manu-
facturer, wholesaler and retailer of the
shell. Although the court spoke in terms of
implied warranty of fitness, it is clear
from the court's disregard of traditional
warranty requirements, such as privity and
notice, that a strict liability theory such as
we know in California products liability
was actually being applied.?" Accordingly,
this case can and should be used to support
the proposition that the recovery under a
strict liability theory for injury caused by
defective products may properly be ex-
tended to bystanders as well as to users of
those products.
Another case supporting such a proposi-
tion is Mitchell v. Miller.": There, plain-,
tiffs decedent was killed while playing
golf when struck by another player's auto-
mobile. The automobile had been parked,
but because of a defective transmission the
automobile became a runaway (unoccu-
pied) vehicle, rolled down a hill, and then
struck decedent.
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The action was brought by .plaintiff
against, inter alia, General Motors, manu-
facturer of the automobile, on . a theory
which sounded 'in strict liability, although
framed in terms of "breach of implied
warranty of reasonable fitness for use. "!Jr.,
General Motors demurred on the ground of
lack of privity. In overruling this demurrer,
the Connecticut Superior Court stated as
follows:
The second Restatement of the Law of
Torts adopts the basis of strict liability, in
the case of the seller of [defective] prod-
ucts, for occasioning physical harm to a
user or oonsumer . . . The rule is one of
strict liability, making the seller subject
to liability to the user or consumer even
though the seller has exercised all possible
care in the preparation and sale ,of the
product ...
The question . . . is whether strict lia-
bility ought to be extended to one who is
not in the category of one who is a user
or consumer of the product ...
A defective automobile manufactured as
alleged in this complaint by the defendant
General Motors, constitutes a real hazard
upon the highway. See Greely v. Cunning-
ham, 116 Conn. 515, 518,105 A. 678. The
likelihood of injury from its use exists not
merely for the passengers therein but for
the pedestrian upon the highway. The pub-
Iie policy which protects the user and con-
sumer should also protect the innocent by-
stander.es
In view of the above discussion, it ap-
pears certain that California, which already
expressly includes within the protective am-
bit of its strict-liability products liability
law virtually every type of user and COI1-
sumer, will also include within that ambit
the bystander who is injured by a defec-
tive product.
CONCLUSION
In conclusion, it should be noted that
there are several areas of future develop-
ment in California products liability law
where no indication may be found as to,
the direction in which the law will develop.
Yet that direction will finally determine
how effectively the present strict-liability
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concept will provide recovery to the con-
sumer (which term hereinafter includes by-
standers as above discussed) for injuries
resulting from product, the risk of which
injuries the consumer should not be made
. to bear.
For example, the so-called "supersensi-
tive" consumer presents a fundamental
.question of policy. The primary basis for
products liability in California appears to
be the activity ?risk theory, that is, that the
manufacturer and retailer or other com-
mercial supplier of the product in question
by conducting his business has created a
fisk of injury which he should bear as a
part of the costs of that activity. It is clear
that as between him and the injured party,
he is also better able to bear such risks be-
cause he can distribute the cost through the
pricing mechanism. But supersentive per-
sons are consumers, too. Therefore, unless
one is to say that only other than supersen-
sitive consumers (apart from any question
of individually wealthy consumers) are less
able to bear the risk of loss from injury
than the supplier of the product, indemnity
under California products liability law
should extend to such supersensitive per-
sons. The definition of the term "defect"
proposed earlier in this article would make
such indemnity possible.
A closely related question concerns the
recovery requirement of "using the prod-
uct in the manner in which it was intended
to be used." Intended by whom? If the man-
ufacturer or other supplier, then the phrase
is inadequate in terms of the activity-risk
basis of California products liability. For
a use unintended by the supplier may, nev-
ertheless, be within the risk created by the
supplier of the product in his activity of
supplying the product. Certainly, at the
least the courts should insist upon some
causal relationship between the "unin-
tended" use and the resultant injury, as
was not done in Erickson v. Sears, Roe-
buck & CO.,97 the leading California case
on the application of the "intended-use"
requirement. And the requirement should
not be applied on an ad hoc basis, as has
been done, but rather defined so as to be
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connected with the activity-risk basis of
California products liability. Such a defini-
tion would not be concerned with the sup-
plier's expectations of the product's use,
but rather whether the use was such as to
render the consumer's injury essentially
self-inflicted rather than product-inflicted.
Another fundamental question of policy
concerns whether assumption of the risk
should be a defense to products liability in
California. Logically, the answer to this
question appears to be "no," since the risk
with which the California products liability
law is concerned is not that of the plaintiff
consumer, but rather that created by the
defendant manufacturer, retailer, or other
commercial supplier in conducting his busi-
ness. But one District Court of Appeal
case'" has at least indicated that such a de-
fense may be successful, so that an authori-
tative pronouncement by the California Su-
preme Court in this area is clearly needed.
Finally, the injured consumer today (as
a general proposition) has no guaranty that
the particular supplier he chooses to sue
will be financially responsible. Properly
speaking, the consumer is seeking indemni-
ty for his injury, much as a workman in-
jured during the course and scope of his
employment while performing an activity
arising out of that employment. However,
the employer, under State laws, is required
to carry workmen's compensation insurance
or be self-insured. No insurance is presently
required of the supplier of products. Nor is
there any alternative provision to guar-
anty recovery, such as some type of con-
sumer's fund. While an answer to this dis-
parity must be found in commercial law,
not the law of products liability, an ans-
wer must be found, so that consumer in-
demnity is an actuality, not a possibility.
Indeed, it should be remembered that
without men who are willing to find ans-
wers as to how to best protect the con-
sumer against the risk of loss resulting from
product injury, California products liability
law will be reduced to .an interesting aca-
demic exercise without practical applica-
tion.
T_ A. R.
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-- Comments-
CONGRESSIONAL POWER
UNDER THE FOURTEENTH
AMENDMENT TO PREVENT
PRIVATE DISCRIMINATION
IN HOUSING
Recently Congress attempted to enact a
statute/ based partly on the Fourteenth
Amendment, which sought to "prevent dis-
crimination on account of race, color, re-
ligion, or natural origin in the purchase,
rental, lease, financing, use and occupancy
of housing throughout the nation."? That
statute was Title IV of the Civil Rights Bill
o! 1966, the so called fair housing provi-
SIOn.
Title IV was an ambitious attempt to pro-
mote human rights. It was a comprehensive
statute designed to prevent both state and
private discrminiation. It provided broad
sanction and enforcement procedures and
represented federal intervention into areas
where traditionally' it has been thought to
be precluded.
The bill was the subject of much con-
troversy. The most controversial provision
was Title IV.3 Nevertheless, the bill, in
amended form, passed the House on August
9, 1966, but it died in the Senate after
two unsuccessful attempts to invoke cloture
to cut off filibuster and begin debate.
Although Congress failed last session to
enact the first effective federal law against
discrimination in housing, the political eli-
mate is right for such legislation. In fact
a similar bill is before Congress at the time
of this writing. It- is thus not unlikely that
such a statute will be enacted in the near
~uture and" its constitutionality challenged
Before the United States Supreme shortly
thereafter. Therefore, the purpose of this
cominent is to discuss the constitutionality
of a fair housing provision based upon the
Fourteenth Amendment as a source of con-
gressional power.
Historically, Congress and the courts
have been plagued by the question of
whether the rights secured by the Four-
teenth Amendment are protected against
private interference.
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In 1868, the Fourteenth Amednment was
adopted. It provides, in part:
"No State shan make or enforce any law
which shall abridge the privileges or im-
munities of citizens of the United States;
nor shall any State deprive any person of
life, liberty, or property, without due proc-
ess of law; nor deny to any person within
its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
laws ... 4 The Congress shall have power
to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the
provisions of this article."G
Much has been written and discussed
about the circumstances surrounding the
adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment, the
debates, ratification by the states, and the
views of the proponents and opponents of
the Amendments. The literature on the mat-
ter is voluminous, yet it is inconclusive on
the issue of the intent of the framers re-
garding private interference."
The language of the final draft of the
Amendment was a compromise between the
two extreme positions taken in the Congress
which proposed the Amendment. There
were those whose position was to make cer-
tain civil rights would be truly national and
that Congress would have the po,wer to en-
act laws dealing directly with private inter-
ference with civil rights. The other extreme
position was to confine the Amendment to
dealing with the states and to prevent the
federal government from injecting itself
into a realm that had, prior to the Civil
War, been exclusively reserved to the
states, namely protection of fundamental
individual rights.
One school of thought on the post Civil
War Amendments (13th, 14th, and 15th)
and the civil rights legislation enacted un-
der those Amendments between 1866 and
1875 is that they were intended tu sub-
stantially change the balance between state
and federal power." Accordingly, civi]
rights were conceived of as inherent ingre-
dients of national citizenship and as such
were entitled to federal protection.
In any event, the judiciary gave a far
stricter construction to the Fourteenth
Amendment, whatever the intent of its
framers.
One of the most far-reaching decisions
came in the Slaughterhouse Cases." The
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Supreme Court upheld a Louisiana law
creating a monopoly in a single corpora-
tion for the slaughtering of animals. They
Were met with the argument that the Four-
teenth Amendment had given primary na-
tional citizenship to Louisiana citizens and
had provided that no state could abridge
their privileges and immunities, among
which was the privilege of engaging in the
business of slaughtering animals. The ma-
jority refused to' accept the ,argument. The
Court said that only national citizenship re-
ceived protection from the privileges and
immunities clause and that such national
citizenship did not encompass any of the
fundamental rights of the individual. Those
rights attended only to state citizenship.
The Court construed national citizenship'
as including only rights arising out of the
relationship between the citizen and the na-
tional government, such as the right to
travel to the national capital. These rights
were already protected by the supremacy
clause.
The decision of the Slaughterhouse Cases
has never been overruled. For all practical
purposes the privileges and immunities
clause became ineffective as a means to pro-
tect individual rights.
Shortly after that decision came United
States v. Cruikshank:" The decision in that
case was that the right to assemble peace-
ably is not attributable to national citizen-
ship unless it is directly related in some
way with the functions of the federal gov-
ernment, such as petitioning Congress for
a redress of grievances.
The Court invalidated civil rights legis-
lation enacted under the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. In so doing, the Court stated that the
'provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment
were restrictions upon state action exclu-
sively and not to any actions of private in-
dividuals. If the Amendment's framers had
any hopes of reaching private action by fed-
eral legislation, they were now destroyed.
The high water mark in the early con-
struction of the Fourteenth Amendment
came in the Civil Rights Cases.t" Two sec-
tions of the Civil Rights Act of 1875 re-
lating to public accommodations were de-
clared unconstitutional.
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It was again pointed out that the Amend-
ment affected only action by the states and
their agents and instrumentalities. Individ-
uals were free to discriminate so' long as
their discriminatory action was not affirm a-
, tively authorized or permitted by state law.
The Fifth Section of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment was held to only give Congress the
power "To adopt appropriate legislation
for correcting the effects" of the state ac-
tion prohibited in the first section, "and
thus to render them effectually null, void,
and innocuous."11
The effect of these decisions was to frus-
trate the attempts of the legislators of 1866
to 1875 to nationalize civil rights protec-
tion. The main responsibility was given to
the states.
A few remnants of the early civil rights
statutes remained after these decisions.
However, they were separated under un-
related chapters of the Revised Statutes and
lost their distinctive, coherent character. It
was over eighty years before Congress again
enacted any comprehensive civil rights leg-
islation, beginning with the Civil Rights
Act of 1957.
During the interim, the chief responsi-'
bility for individual human rights ulti-
mately fell upon the Supreme Court. Coni-
mitted as they were to the construction of
the Fourteenth Amendment established in
the early cases, the C'ourt performed its
function by preventing abuses of state pow-
er. Nevertheless, the Court afforded a meas-
ure of protection for individual rights far
greater than the strict construction seemed
to allow by easing the criteria for determin-
ing when there is enough state involvement
to bring Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment into play.
A prime example of this easing is Shel-
ley v. KraemerP in which the Supreme
Court :heJldracially restrictive covenants on
, the sale of private housing to come under
the prohibitory provisions of. the Fourteenth
Amendment. There, the discriminatory ac-
tion originated in agreements among pri-
vate individuals. Participation by the state
consisted in judicial enforcement of the pri-
vate discriminatory agreements. It Was
found that in 'so doing, the state had denied '
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the discriminatees equal protection of the
laws.
Likewise, in Barrows v. [ackson.t? the
requisite state action was found 'in awarding
damages for breach of racially restrictive
covenants.
Of course, there is obvious state action
where the state passes a law affecting the
purchase of property.i" There is no basic
difference where an official acts, under
authority granted by the state'" or where
the official acts contrary to the authority
from the state.!" It is still state action.
State action has been found where a
private person has a quasi-official status
and is thus technically not part of the state.
This is best illustrated by Burton v. Wil-
mington Parking AuthorityY There, a state
agency owned a parking building but leased
a restaurant located with to a private com-
pany. There was not a clear transfer, and
the Court held there was sufficient reten-
tion of control by the state to make it a
joint venture. Thus there was state action.
Finally, where the state authorizes or per-
mits a private person to act, there has been
found to be state action in such combined
action. This situation is best illustrated by
Evans v. Neioton.i" A park was devised to
the city in trust. The will specified that
Negroes were not permitted in the park.
The city resigned as trustee, and the court
appointed private trustees. The genisis of
the discrimination was in a private indi-
vidual and there were now private trustees,
but the Supreme Court held that many
years of operation by the city had endowed
the park with a public character. Merely
changing from public to private ttustees
did not transfer the park from the public
to the private sector.
The preventing - abuses - of - state - gov-
ernmental- power approach, though work-
able, has its obvious limitations. The most
obvious is where a private person acts with-
out connection with the state, as for example
an individual simply refuses to sell his
house to a Negro because of the latter's
race. He does not go into the courts nor
involve the state in any way.
A very important opinion raising this
problem is the dissenting opinion of Justice
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Black in Bell v. Maryland [The 1964 Sit-In
DecisionsJ.20 That opinion states:
"Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment
... unlike other sections-t is a prohibition
against certain conduct only when done
by a State ... [T] his section of the Amend-
ment does not of itself, standing alone, in
the absence of some cooperative state ac-
tion or compulsion, forbid property hold-
ers, including restaurant owners, to ban
people from entering or remaining upon
their premises, even if the owners act out
of racial prejudices ... "22
This statement is even more applicable
to the case supposed of the private individ-
ual refusing to sell his house to a Negro.
Since the homeowner does not open his
home to the public, the public access
theory23- that there is a constitutional
right to accommodations at a public fa-
cility-to which Justice Black's words were
directed cannot extend to such a case. In-
deed, no concept of state action can reason-
ably stretch this far.
Justice Black continues:
"Once a person has become a property
owner then he acquires all the rights that
go with ownership ... [T]he propert own-
er may in the absence of a valid statute
forbidding it, sell his property to whom
he pleases . . ."24
As this opinion indicates, the difference
between cases like Shelley v. Kraemer and
Buchanan v.W arley'" and the supposed
situation is that in the former there is a
willing buyer and a willing seller, but in
the latter one party is unwilling. In such a
situation,
".. he is entitled to rely on the guar-
antee of due process of law, that is, 'law
of the land,' to protect his free use and en-
joyment of property and to know that only
by valid legislation, passed pursuant to
some constitutional grant of power, can
anyone -disturb his free use."26
In the supposed situation, there is only
non-governmental action. As stated above,
no amount of stretching can validly extend
the state action concept far enough to cover
the situation.
Despite the statements of a few of the
Justices,27 that the Fourteenth Amendment
applies per se to prevent discrimination by
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certain private businesses serving the pub- .
lie, it is unlikely that the Court will bring
any nongovernmental action under the pro-
hibition of Section 1 without legislation by
Congress.
Thus, with the Court committed to the
requirement of state action under Section
1 of the Fourteenth Amendment, the prob-
lem becomes one of how to, in the words
of Justice Black, enact" a valid statute pro-
hibiting" private discrimination.
Perhaps a preview of the answer is seen
in Justice Black's opinion itself, where ,he
refers to other sections of the Fourteenth
Amendment as not being subject to the lim-
itation of Section 1. He was referring
specifically to Section 5, the enforcement
clause."
The answer lies in two recent develop-
ments. One is "the strong declaration of
congressional power under Section 5 of
the Fourteenth Amendment'P'' under the
1965 Term's opinions interpreting that sec-
tion. The Court also emphasized the re-
sponsibility of Congress for human rights
under the enforcement section. The other
development is the change in, emphasis in
the decisions of the Warren Court under
the equal protection clause. Earlier cases
concentrated on the prohibition theme and
typically directed the states to refrain from
a particular form of regulation. Now the
emphasis is upon affirmative obligations
imposed upon the states."?
There are four principal decisions which
lay the foundation for sweeping away the
private barriers. to the enjoyment of funda-
mental human rights. These cases are
United States v. Price," United States v.
Guest,32 'South Carolina v. Katzenbach,33
and Katzenbach v. Morgan.34
The principal criminal sanctions avail-
able today against crimes of racial violence
are Section 24135 and 2423U of the Federal
Criminal Code. The source of power for
the enactment of these statutes is Section 5
of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Price
and Guest cases involved the construction
of these statutes as they were applied in
indictments for consipracies involving civil
rights killings.
The Price decision upheld the validity of
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indictments charging three police officers
and fifteen private citizens with violations
of Sections 241 and 242 for their alleged
part in the murders of three northern civil
rights workers near Philadelphia, Missis-
sipi in 1964.
In discussing one of the indictments un-
der Section 242, it was held that the dis-
trict court erred in dismissing theindict-
ment as to the fifteen private individuals.
In an opinion by Justice Fortas, the Court
'said that the color of law requirement of
the statute is met where private persons are
jointly engaged with state officials in the
prohibited action.:" In such situations the
Court has had no difficulty in finding a
valid exercise of a congressional power.
Since Section 242 requires state action, it
is not significant in reaching solely private
action. However, Section 241 has no such
requirement.
As to one of the indictments under Sec-
tion 241, the Court rejected the contention
that the Section applies only to "conduct
which interferes with rights arising from the
substantive powers of the Federal Govern-
ment." The Court said that,
"The language of § 241 is plain and un-
limited, . ' [and] , .. embraces all of the
rights and privileges secured to citizens
by all of the Constitution and all of the
laws of the United States."38
The Price case establishes that when pub-
,lie officials or private individuals acting
in concert with public officials interfere
with the exercise of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment rights, Section 241 is violated.
Although the decision did not concern
solely private action, it establishes a con-
struction of Section 241 as not applying
only to a narrow and relatively unimportant
category of rights but as also covering
rights under the Fourteenth Amendment.
It recognizes the power of Congress; acting
under Section 5, to legislate to 'protect Four-
teenth Amendment rights. Furthermore, the
decision suggests that those who granted
Congress the power to require equal pro-
, tection might well have supposed that they
were establishing the authority to provide
all necessary protection in the enjoyment
of the benefit.
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The Guest case is the far more important
of the two; only private individuals had
been indicted. Although the court opinion
assumes the necessity of finding state ac-
tion, the concurring opinions face the ques-
tion of private action.
In this case, the Court reversed dismissal
of an indictment under Section 241 charg-
ing conspiracy to deprive Negroes of their
civil rights in Athens, Georgia_ The Court
opinionreversed and remanded.
The' Court agreed with the district,
court that the first paragraph of the indict-
ment was defective as a matter of pleading,
due to the specific intent requirement read
into Section 241, because it failed to allege
that the acts of the defendants were moti-
vated by racial discrimination.
The second paragraph of the indictment
alleged a conspiracy to deprive Negroes
of the right to equal utilization of public
facilities. The defendants argued that this
paragraph stated no cause of action, be-
cause no one was alleged to have acted
under color of state law and there is no
equal protection clause against wholly pri-
vate action. The Court held that there was
sufficient allegation of official involve-
ment to prevent dismissal, because it was
alleged that one of the means of accomplish-
ing the object 0 r the conspi-racy was "by
causing the arrest of Negroes by means of
false reports that such Negroes have com-
mi tted criminal acts."
The fourth' paragraph alleged a con-·
spiracy to interfere with the right of inter-
state travel. The Court sustained this para-
graph on the ground. that, while thereis no
specific provision of the Constitution guar-
anteeing such' right, it is thoroughly estab-
lished.3D
Justice Clark wrote a concurring opinion
in which Justices Black and Fortas joined.
This opinion said that the Court had
avoided the question of whether Congress
has, the power to punish private conspira-'
cies that interfere with Fourteenth Amend-
ment rights. The opinion states:
". __ it is, I believe, both appropriate and
necessary to say that there can be no
doubt that specific language of § 5 em-
powers the Congress to enact laws pun-
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ishing all conspiracies-with or without
state action-that interfere with Four-
teenth Amendent rtght."-»
Justice Brennan, joined by Chief Justice
Warren and Justice Douglas, also wrote an
opinion concurring in part and dissenting
in part. This opinion read the Court as
accepting the defendants' contention that,
because there exist no equal protection
rights against wholly private action"
a conspiracy of private persons to in-
terfere with such rights is not a conspiracy
to interefere with a right secured by the
Constitution within the meaning of Section
241. Justice Brennan disputed that point,
and he also spoke more generally of con-
gressional power. He spoke of congressional
power "to enact laws punishing all con-
spiracies to interfere with the exercise of
Fourteenth Amendment rights, whether or
not state officers or others acting under
color of state law are implicated in the
conspiracy. "41
He also spoke of Section 5 as "a posi-
tive grant of legislative power, authorizing
Congress to exercise its discretion in fash-
ioning remedies to achieve civil and politi-
cal equality for all citizens. "42
Although this last statement by Justice
Brennan is rather broad and difficult to
support, the importance of the Guest case
is that six Justices agreed that Congress
had the power to protect Fourteenth Amend-
ment rights against wholly private interfer-
ence. This is nonetheless true even though
it is not clear from this case just how far
they are willing to acknowledge the power
of Congress to define the substantive scope
of the Fourteenth Amendment.
This case goes a long way toward fur-
nishing support for Title IV in authorizing
injunctive relief against a mob seeking to
prevent a minority group family from mov-
ing into a home by considering such action
as a conspiracy.
In South Carolina v. Katzenbach, South
Carolina challenged the constitutionality
of certain provisions of the Voting Rights
Act of 1965. These sections provided for
suspension of literacy tests used for racial
discrimination. The provisions were chal-
lenged on the ground that Congress had
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exceeded its powers under the Fifteenth
Amendment.
South Carolina argued that Congress is
empowered only to forbid violations of the
Fifteenth Amendment and cannot enact
specific remedies or apply them to specific
localities.
The Court rejected that interpretation
and accepted the broad interpretation urged
~ by the United States,' that Section 2 gives
Congress the same broad discretion 'under
the Amendment as the necessary and proper
clause'" does to regulate local activities to
protect interstate commerce.
In the Court opinion, the Chief Justice
stated:
"The basic test to be applied in a case
involving § 2 of the Fifteenth Amendment
is the same as in all cases concerning the
express powers of Congress with relation
to the reserved powers of the States,"45
He then quoted Marshall as laying down
the classic formulation:
"Let the end be legitimate, let it be within
the scope of the constitution, and all
means which are appropriate, which are
plainly adapted to that end, which are
not prohibited, but consist with the letter
and spirit of the constitution are consti-
tu tional."46
As support for this holding and to dem-
onstrate that Marshall's formula was not
limited to the necessary and proper clause,
the Chief Justice cited cases where similar
language was used by the Court in describ-
ing the Civil War Arnendments'" and the
Eighteenth Amendment. 48 ,
The significance of this decision is in
the implication that, under the parallel en-
forcement clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.t" Congress may regulate activities
which in themselves do not violate the
Amendment's prohibitions, if the regula-
tion is a rational means to effectuate one of
its prohibitions.
Carried to its logical limit, this implica-
tion could overcome the objection that Con- ,
gress cannot regulate private action because
the prohibitions of Section 10f the Four-
teenth Amendment are directed only to the
states and not to private persons. The ans-
wer would be, by analagy to the above
52
opinion, that Congress' power to enact leg-
islation to effectuate those prohibitions may
include regulation of purely private action
where that is an appropriate means of ef-
fectuating them.
The Katzenbach v. Morgan case illus-
trates the full sweep of the implication of
the South Carolina v. Katzenbach opinion
and the Court's willingness to embrace it.
This decision upheld the validity of Sec-
tion 4 (e) of the Voting Rights·· Act of
1965.50 The statute provides that no person
who has successfully completed the sixth
grade in a Puerto Rican school where the
language of instruction was other than En-
glish shall be denied the right to vote be-
cause of his inability to read or write
English. The practical effect of the holding
was to prohibit enforcement of New York's
English literacy test which had barred from
voting thousands of New York City resi-
dents who had migrated from Peurto Rico.
The opinion by Justice Brennan extended
the proposition stated in South Carolina v.
Katzenbach regarding Section 2 of the Fif-
teenth Amendment. It stated that the drafts-
men of the Fourteenth Amendment intended
to give Congress by means of Section 5 the
same broad powers experssed in the neces-
sary and proper clause.
Section 5 was viewed as,
"a positive grant of legislative power au-
thorizing Congress to exercise its discretion
in determining whether and what legisla-
tion is needed to secure the guarantees of
the Fourteenth Amendment."51
The Court viewed Section 4 (e) as plain-
ly adapted to furthering the aims of the
equal protection clause. It was stated that
Congress has thus prohibited the state from
denying the rIght that is preservative of
all rights, the vote.
"This enhanced polrtlcal- power will be
helpful in gaining nondiscriminatory treat-
ment in public services for the entire
Puerto Rican community. section ~(e)
thereby enables the Puerto Rican minorit~
better to obtain 'perfect equality of CiVIl
rights and equal protection of the laws'."52
It is significant to note that the Court
stated that the issue was, without regard t?
whether the equal protection clause nulh-
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fies New York's English literacy reqiure-
ment, whether Congress could prohibit its
enforcement by legislating under Section
5."3 The opinion in effect says, assuming
the state law is valid and also assuming
Puerto Ricans are being discriminated
against in obtaining public services because
they lack the vote, which is seen as en-
. abling them to secure, these services, then
Section 5 authorizes Congress to enact leg-
islation which will remove such obstacles.
Note that the state may not be discrimin-
ating where it is willfully or directly deny-
ing equality of public services. It has taken
no action, because the state law is assumed
valid. However, if the lack of the vote is
~n obstacle to the state's performance of
~ts constitutional duty not to discriminate
In providing public services, then Section
5 authorizes Congress to remove that ob-
stacle.
Thus if, as is highly probable, urban
ghettos are found to be obstacles to the
state's constitutional duty not to discrimi-
nate in the quality of public services, Con-
gress would be authorized to enact a law
prohibiting discrimination in the sale and
rental of housing so as to break up the
ghettos and remove the obstacle. This is so
because, on the basis of Morgan, although
the prohibitions of Section 1 of the Four-
teenth Amendment are directed only at the
states, and not to private 'individuals, the
Power of Congress to enact legislation to ef-
fectuate those prohibitions may include the
regulation of private activities where such is
a lDeans of securing the prohibition against
the state. .
Although in Morgan it appears that the
~tate itself might have been guilty of deny-
l~g equality in public service, the opinion
dld not emphasize this factor. The tone of
the opinion indicates that it would be the
shalD~if private action impedes or results in
t e lDeffectiveness of the state to provide
equality of services.
P !his position receives support from the
nee, Guest, South Carolina v. Katzenbach
~nd Morgan cases taken together. Price and
leu:st establish the power of Congress to
glslate under Section 5 to protect Four-
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teenth Amendment rights and show a will-
ingness by the Court to find congressional
power to reach private as well as state dis-
crimination. South Carolina v. Katzenbacli
and 111organ, by viewing Section 5 as broad-
er than Section 1and equating it to the nec-
essary and proper clause, potentially give it
the same broad reach as the commerce pow-
er. Thus, by analogy, where private action
has a substantial effect on Section 1 rights,
Congress has the discretion to regulate it.
There is a theoretical difficulty in equat-
ing Section 5 to the necessary and' proper
clause. It is well established that the nec-
essary and proper clause is not an inde-
pendent source of power.P" It has only been
used where it is tied to another grant of
power. Yet the Court has described Section
5 almost as an independent source of power
by saying it is much broader than Section
1. Whatever the theoretical difficulties, the
Court has found apparent authority for such
a construction of Section 5.
The second significant aspect of the
Morgan case is an indication of the Court's
willingness to defer to congressional judg-
ment in reviewing legislation enacted under
Section 5. The opinion stated that it was
for Congress to assess and weigh the various
conflicting considerations involved in mak-
ing the judgment.
"It is not for us to review the congression-
al resolution of these factors. It is enough
that we be able to perceive a basis upon
which the Congress might. resolve the con-
flict as it did."56
It is to be noted that qualifying phrases
such as "rational basis" and "reasonable re-
lation," found in previous opinions.F" are ab-
sent. The implication of this fact and of the
language quoted above is that it is exclu-
sively a legislative function to find the facts
and appraise their significance, and that
the basis for Congress' determination need
not be supported by a legislative record.P"
This criticism is brought out in the dis-
senting opinion by Justice Harlan, joined by
.Justice Stewart. [;9 Justice Harlan is con-
cerned that the Court reads Section 5 as
giving Congress the power to define the
substantive scope of the Fourteenth Amend-
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ment. He warns that, "I see no reason why
[Congress] could not also substitute its
judgment for that of the States in other
fields of their exclusive primary compe-
tence as well. "60
The basis of Justice Harlan's argument
is that before Congress' power under Sec-
tion 5 can be exerted, there must be a court
finding that the state has violated one of
the first four sections. A rationale for his
position might be that, although Section
5 does not say there must be a violation,
the first four sections have language to the
effect, "no state shall." On this rationale; it
would seem to logically follow that Con-
gress could not legislate if there were no
violation.
However, there is sound' authority fOT
the Court's opinion in the entire line of
cases discussed above imposing an affirma-
tive duty upon the states and supporting the
enforcement clause as a positive grant of
legislative power like the necessary and
proper clause.
The matter can best be summed up in the
words of Archibald Cox:
"In any event, the Morgan ease left no
doubt that Section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment gives Congress power to deal
with conduct outside the scope of section
1 and within the reserved powers of the
states where the measurement is a means
of securing the state's perfomance of its
Fourteenth Amendment duties, regardless
of its past compliance or violations.
The scope of the principle will naturally
depend upon the extent to which the ju-
dicial branch reviews legislative judgments
concerning the relation between the statu-
tory measures and the Constitutional 01)-
j eetive."61
CONCLUSION
Thus, this paper has attempted to estab-
lish that there is sufficient constitutional
authority for the Supreme Court to sustain
fair housing legislation prohibiting all dis-
crimination, including that of private indi-
viduals, should Congress enact it.,
It has attempted to show that fair hous-
ing is sustainable under either the com-
merce power or the Fourteenth Amendment.
The discussion, in seeking to establish
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the premise that Congress has the power to
reach private discrimination, has raised as
critical and evasive a question as it sought
to resolve. That question is how far does this
congressional power reach. Ultimately, the
limits will depend upon the extent to which
the Supreme Court reviews the legislative
judgment.
Signs of a possible overwillingness to
defer to the discretion of Congress have
been noted. Perhaps, in reality, these signs
reflect an invitation to and urging of Con-
gress to legislate in this area. Hopefully, the
Court has no intention of avoiding its prop:
er duty by allowing Congress full discretion
in defining the substantive scope of the
Fourteenth Amendment.
The Court has had the primary respon-
sibility for protecting civil rights for over
eighty years. During that time it has often
had to act as a superconscience. Sensing
that the politcal climate is right for con-
gressional action, the Court may be endeav-
oring to. shift the primary responsibility
for civil rights to Congress, where it prop-
erly belongs.
Among the advantages of legislative over
court action are: preventive' rather than
remedial relief, greater fact finding ability,
more certainty in the law, and greater pub-
lic acceptance of a doctrine rooted in a
law passed by Congress than adjucated
under the Fourteenth Amendment.
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--Notes-
DAMAGES: PAIN AND
SUFFERING: USE OF A
PER DIEM ARGUMENT
I
Beagle v. Vasoldi! Plaintiff brought an
action against defendants for personal in-
juries suffered by him as the result of an
automobile accident. Plaintiff's counsel, in
his prayer, asked for general and special
damages, encompassing pain and suffering
and medical expenses.
After a trial upon the merits before a
jury, the Superior Court of San Diego
County awarded the plaintiff damages in
the sum of $1,719.48, $34:2 mere than the
medical expenses incurred prior to trial.
At the trial, plaintiff's counsel, in his argu·
ment to the jury on the issue of general
damages, was not permitted to mention the
total amount of damages he sought nor was
he permitted to suggest a per diem figure.
The trial court had informed plaintiff's
attorney in chambers that these restrictions
were necessary because such argumenta-
tion, as a matter of law, was not evidence.
Plaintiff then appealed to the Supreme
Court of California contending .that the
trial court's action in restricting the argu-
ment of counsel on the issue of general
damages constituted prejudicial error.
The Supreme Court of California
unanimously reversed, holding that in an
action to recover damages for personal in-
jury involving pain and sufferirig, counsel
may read the complaint, including the pray-
er, to the jury and may argue for a per
diem allowance for such pain and suffering.
II
I
I
II
T. Evidentiary Requirements
The di fper rem argument re ers to, argu-
ment by counsel which suggests a segmen-
tation of the damages to be allowed for
pain and suffering into a stated amount of
money representing a certain period of
time, such as $1 aday."
The per diem approach by counsel is
neither novel nor extraordinary m Cali-
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tornia." The propriety of the approach was
the subject of a vigorous dissent by Justice
Traynor in the 1961 case of Seffert v.
Los Angeles Transit Lines:" The majority
of the court, however, held that the issue
had been waived because of defendant's
failure to object at trial. Nevertheless Jus-
,tice Traynor took the opportunity to con-
demn its use as "an artifice of sophistry.i"
In other jurisdictions, the use of the per
diem argument has evoked divergent re-
sponses. At one end of the spectrum, the
per diem formula approach has been' clear-
ly prohibited." Several jurisdictions hold
that the matter rests in the sound discre-
tion of the trial judge." At least two jurisdic-
tions have reached a compromise position
and permit counsel's use of the formula for
"illustrative purposes.?" At the other end
of the spectrum are those jurisdictions
which unequivocally permit an attorney to
make the per diem argument. 0
The chief opposition to the per diem ar-
gument stems from the 1958 case of Botta
v. Brunner.t? In that case, the Supreme
Court of New Jersey upheld the trial court's
, refusal to permit plaintiff's counsel to use
the per diem formula. It was held that to
allow counsel to suggest .the amount of the
award was to 'permit him to transcend the
evidence. The court's reasoning proceeded
on the assumption that since there is no
evidentiary basis for converting pain and
suffering into monetary. terms, argument by
counsel of a fixed amount for a specified
segment of time could have no foundation
in the evidence. '
However, as one critic of Botta v. Brun-
ner has noted, there is a 'logical incon-
sistency in prohibiting counsel from making
a monetary deduction from the evidence."
Plaintiff is suing for money. Defendant is
defending against an award of money. The
jury is limited to expressing its findings
in terms of money. Yet the jury must be
precluded from hearing any reference what-
ever to money.
Proponents of the formula approach con-
LOYOLA DIGEST
tend that the very fact that pain and suf-
fering is recompensed in money furnishes
a basis for argument that pain and suffer-
ing have a monetary value. As pointed out
by the court in Louisville and N.R.R. v.
M attingly/2 "since the jury itself must ar-
rive at a specific figure we see no logical
reason why counsel shall not be permitted
to speak in terms of specific figures. "13
Opponents are quick to counter that no
evaluation of pain and suffering can be
made on a per diem basis because no "mar-
ket value" can be set for human suffering,
and because there are many individual
variations concerning pain.l" In addition,
it is pointed out that there is no satisfac-
tory means of objectively measuring pain
and suffering.l"
Advocates of the formula nevetheless
maintain that the use of a per diem figure
is necessarily based on whatever evidence,
of pain and suffering has been introduced.
Therefore, they argue that such a figure is
neither mere conjecture nor the introduc-
tien of evidence not already before the
court.!" As pointed out by one writer on
the subject:
Those who contend that there can be no
reasonable relation between pain and suf-
fering and any mathematical computa-
tion are unconvincing in a society where
people are constantly choosing between
bearing pain or spending more to assuage
itP .
Argument is not evidence anq a jury should
not be deemed to lack sufficient mentality
to distinguish between the twO.18Further-
more, it is the duty and practice of trial '
judges, when necessary, to point out to the
jury that counsel is not introducing evi-
dence.!"
It should also be noted that a verdict
must be consistent with the evidence. If
there is no evidentiary basis for the amount
of a verdict, it is the duty of the trial court
to reduce it. There remains also the control
exercised by the appellate courts. The ap-
pellate courts have authority to review a
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verdict and will upset it if it is so excessive
as to shock the conscience of the court. 20
II. The Need For Guidance
. A second principle on which the opposi-
tion is predicated is that suggestions of a
per diem allowance constitute an unwar-
ranted intrusion into the domain of the
jury.21 The court, in the Botta case, states
that "the law has provided no better yard-
stick for their guidance than their enlight-
ened conscience. "22
On the contrary, supporters of the for-
mula approach contend that the very ab-
sence of a yardstick to measure pain and
suffering, the very absence of a standard
'relative to pain and suffering argue loudly
in favor of sanctioning the per diem argu-
ment. It is their position that it is not an
intrusion into the domain of the jury when
that domain comprises the weighing of
arguments of counsel. They argue that it is
necessarily within the domain of the jury
to accept, reject or modify arguments by
counsel.23
The amount awarded by a jury for pain
and suffering is usually the most specula-
tive portion of the aggregate award and is
often determinative of the gross size of the
final award. The prime importance that this
figure plays in the final verdict prompted
one court to remark:
In determining the amount of an award
for pain and suffering a juror or judge
should necessarily be guided by some rea-
sonable and practical considerations, It
should not be a blind guess or the pulling
of a figure out of the air.2·1
Indeed, one court has remarked that the
"enlightened conscience" 'of the jurors
could not hope to do more than pull a
figure out of the air without additional
guidance by counsel.i" This utter necessity
of the jury making nothing more than a
stab in the dark at "just compensation"
evoked the following comment from the
well-known trial strategist, Melvil Belli:
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It is unfair to give an absolute figure
to a trial judge or a trial jury, saying
'$50,000 should be given this man for pain
and suffering' or '$60,000 should be given
this man for pain and suffering.' It is
plaintiff's lawyer's duty to tell why and
how an absolute figure in dollars and cents
should be given for general damages, 'why
it is fair, why it is factua1.26
Such calculations, kept within reasonable
bounds by the trial judge, would remove to
a great extent the sheer confusion resulting
from jury instructions couched in terms' of
"reasonableness' or "just compensation. "27
III. The Fear of the Credulous Jury
Opponents of the per deim approach
argue that its use results in higher ver-
dicts. " They attribute such higher verdicts
to the readiness of some juries to believe
that the figures used in counsel's mathe-
matical computations are necessarily the
correct figures. Its advocates counter that
the whole thrust of tort law is to afford
adequate compensation to injured plaintiffs
and therefore, it is of no consequence that
higher verdicts are returned if they meet
the test of reasonableness and do,' in fact,
afford adequate compensarion.i" Further-
more, they point out that there have been
cases where the use of the per diem ap-
proach has resulted in greatly reduced
verdicts. One such case, Arnold v. Ellis,30
$57,860 was suggested as compensation
for pain and suffering alone, and yet the
jury returned a total verdict of only
$15,000.
Adversaries of the formula approach
nevertheless express the fear that a credu-
lous jury may be moved to' passion, emo-
tion, prejudice, or unreasonableness when
f aced with the catastrophe of personal in-
jury. They therefore maintain that the use
of the approach may lead to excessive and
even monstrous verdicts.i" Supporters of
the approach emphatically deny that there
is any evidence of any correlation, other
than in isolated instances, between the 'use
. of the per diem formula and excessive
verdicts. In fact, it is pointed out that there
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are many examples of excessive verdicts
where no formulation at all was used.32
Courts which permit the use of the per
diem argument do not share this fear of
excessive verdicts. Higher verdicts may in-
deed result from the use of the formula but
not excessive verdicts." At any rate, as one
commentator points out, one principle
emerges clearly in the squabble over Jury
price tags:
The underlying fear that juries will be
too liberal in an area of compensation
which has no definable limit will not be
dispelled by denying counsel the use or
methods which cause the jury to think in
terms of true compensation rather than
to guess at an arbitrary rigure.e-
There is also the fear that juries may re-
turn verdicts which exactly correspond to
the figures used by counsel. It is true that
this has happened in isolated instances. In
Ratner v. Arrington,35 counsel asked for
damages in the total sum of $248,439 and
the jury duly returned a verdict in that
amount. Also, in Serffert v. Los Angeles
Transit Lines,36 a verdict of $187,903 co-
incided with the aggregate demands made
by counsel. Proponents of the argument are
quick to reply that these amounts, though
suggested by counsel, could still be based
on the evidence and meet the test of rea-
sonableness. In' this respect, it is worthy of
note that both of these cases were affirmed
on appeal. Surely, it is argued, such ver-
dicts should not have been reversed simply
because they correspond to' what counsel
demanded.
Here again, proponents would stress the
discretion lodged in 'the trial judge to limit
per diem argument if it is leading to prej-
udice. The court may also do this in the
form of instructions to the jury. He may
instruct them, if necessary, that counsel's
calculations are not evidence and that they
are not bound by any method of calcui a-
tion.""
Opponents contend that if the per diem
argument were permitted, defense counsel
would be placed in the. dilemma of either
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(a) utilizing some other method of com-
puting damages on a unit of time basis in
order to reach a lower or different figure,
thereby tacitly approving of this type of
argument, or (b) criticizing his adversary's
argument as being without any evidentiary
basis and yet remain without any substitu-
tionary theory himself.38
Its adherents, on the other hand, contend
that the use of such a trial technique has
its own built-in safeguards. First, because
the use of the per diem argument places
the risk of "over persuasion" on plaintiff's
counsel. If counsel's calculations are not
consistent with the evidence, the jury may
choose to disregard them altogether. That
this can and does happen has already been
illustrated.f" Secondly, the formula ap-
proach is a double-edged sword."? It may
be used by defendant's counsel to point out
how exaggerated or ludicrous plaintiff's
claims are.
Opponents nevertheless maintain that any
speculation on this matter should be left
entirely with the jury and should not be
compounded by more conjecture on the
part of one or both attorneys." One some-
what cynical commentator on the subject
has remarked that in permitting the use of
a formula approach, the court has abro-
gated the jury's privilege of basing an
award upon its own knowledge and ex-
perience in favor of speculation on the
part of. one having a definite pecuniary
interest in the size of plaintiff's reco·very.42
In any event, defense counsel, as well
as that of plaintiff, should not desire a
verdict ..which reflects caprice and confu ..
sion. Mr. Belli summed the matter up as
follows:
A personal injury suit is not a contest of
misrepresentations, or abstractions but a
method of computing compensation for
ascertained in] uries. 43 •
He concludes:
I believe the jury wants to know both from
plaintIff's lawyer and defendant's counsel
MAY, 1967
what they, as trained evaluators, believe
the award should be, and in dollars and
cents.«
IV. Conclusion
With commendable forthrightness the
California Supreme Court has chosen to
take a stand on an issue of considerable
controversy: the use of a mathematical for-
mula in counsel's argument to the jury. In
doing so, it has aligned this jurisdiction
with the majority of other jurisdictions that
have considered the question.
~he per diem argument can be of great
assIstance, to bot~ counsel and the jury.
Cou~sel, lIke ~he Jury, often needs help in
makmg a tangible argument in reference to
the intangible elements of pain and suf-
fering. Neither strict adherence to evidenti-
ary ~equirem~nts nor th~ remote possibility
o~ ~I~propo~tlOnate ver~lCts call for its pro-
hI,bItlOn. It IS ~n e~f~ctive tool of analysis,
WIth equal availability and utility in argu-
ment to both counsel. It is a suggestion as
to one method of reaching "just compensa-
tion," not a substitute for it. The minimal
risks of misuse and prejudice are problems
of the sort which trial judges, and event-
ually courts of review, are asked to cope
with every day.
A serious personal injury case is only
once before a jury for one lump sum. The
jury cannot return years later to re-evaluate.
It is for this reason that effective trial tech-
niques which aid the jury in arrivinz at
their goal of adequate compensation should .
not fall prey to "judicial straight-jacketing
of the advocate's role. "4G
R.F.L.S.
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HABEAS CORPUS;
EVIDENCE:
Coercion and Adequacy of Representation
of Counsel affecting Plea: In re Poe,'
On habeas corpus petition to the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court, facts were alleged
which, if true, would have warranted peti-
tioner's release from custody. Petitioner
pleaded guilty at his arraignment to a
charge of kidnapping for the purpose of
robbery and was convicted. In his pe-
tition, he' alleged that his confession
and plea were elicited from him by
means of police coercion. In support of his
allegation he made the following charges:
(1) that he was beaten when apprehended
in his apartment; (2) that he heard a police
order given to hold him incommunicado;
(3) that he was continually interrogated
for long periods; (4) that he was not fed
regularly; and (5) that he was alternately
threatened with the gas chamber and the
arrest of his friends if he did not confess
and then refrain from repeating these inci-
dents in court. These charges were denied
by the arresting and interrogating officers.
The only corroborration of petitioner's al-
legations was his co-defendant's sketchy
testimony.
Petitioner further alleged that he was
denied his constitutional right to counsel
because. of the inadequacy of his court-ap-
pointed counsel. 2 He charged that he had
intended to question the voluntariness of
his confession and to plead not guilty but
was advised by counsel that to do so would
be futile. The witnesses for the people testi-
fied that the advice of counsel was consis-
tent with sound legal procedure.
'An order to show cause was issued by
the Supreme Court, counsel was appointed
for petitioner and a referee" was appointed
to make factual findings.
After a full evidentiary hearing, the
referee made the following findings: (1)
that petitioner's confession was freely and
voluntarily made after confrontation with
Ihe evidence against him ;" (2) that pe-
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titi~ner's gu~lty plea was not induced by
polIce. coercron ; and (,3) that the repre-
sentation afforded by his court-appointed
counsel at the trial level was not so inade-
quate as to amount to a denial of his con-
stitutional right to counsel.
The Supreme Court adopted the find-
ings of the referee, holding that the find-
ings were supported by the weight of the
evidence. The court stated that there was
ample evidence from which a proper moti-
vation for the confession could be inferred.
Thus, they found that no marks of violence
were found on petitioner, that he was not
in fact held incommunicado," and that the
officers made no threats of reprisal. Both
the interrogation officers and the deputy
public defenders testified that petitioner
was anxious to plead guilty, to waive any
probationary hearing, and to commence
serving his sentence. fl This, coupled with the
foregoing evidence, strongly supported the
finding of a voluntary confession.
Petitioner's counsel vigorously cross-ex-
amined the prosecution's witness at the pre-
liminary hearing. He advised petitioner not
to deny that his confession was voluntary in
view of the nature of the, proceeding, and
most important, obtained a dismissal of one
of the two counts against petitioner. 7 The
court stated that these efforts were as favor-
able as could be expected by petitioner in
view of the evidence against him. There-
fore, the court held that petitioner was ade-
quately represented. .
The first issue faced by the court wac;
how much weight was to be given to the
referee's findings and what degree of proof
was needed to overcome those findings.
. The court held that the referee's find-
ings, though not binding on the court, were
entitled to great weight. This holding con-
forms with previous decisions on this point.
Thus, it has been held that a reference hear-
ing may be ordered in habeas corpus pro-
ceedings when disputed questions of fact
exist. 8 Where reference is ordered in habeas
corpus proceedings, the findings of fact
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made by the referee are entitled to impor-
tant consideration, since the referee had the
opportunity to observe the demeanor of
those who appeared before him andi.o
weigh what was said in connection with
their manner on the witness stand." How-
ever, they are not binding on the reviewing
court."? On the contrary, the court is re-
quired to exercise independent judgment on
the facts.ll Only then maya referee's find-
ings on conflicting evidence be approved
and affirmed by the court. 12 The burden
of proof is upon the petitioner in a habeas
corpus proceeding.i" and petitioner did not
meet his burden in the case at bar. Thus,
the findings of the referee were adopted.
The second issue presented for discuss-
ion was whether the petitioner's confession
and guilty plea were involuntarily obtained
by police coercion. Where the conflict in
evidence as to the voluntariness of a con-
fession is insubstantial, inquiry -into the
issue of voluntariness may not even be
justified.!" In the case at bar, a prima facie
case was established by the petitioner so
that an inquiry was justified but the court
_ found that there was ample evidence to sup-
port the finding that the confession and
plea were voluntary. At the trial the burden
is on the prosecution to show that the con-
fession sought to be proved was the volun-
tary act of a defendant, not induced by
promise or threat. 15 But, in a habeas corpus
proceeding where a petitioner contends that
his confession has been coerced, the burden
rests with the petitioner and the prep onder-
.ance of the evidence may be sufficient to
warrant a finding that a confession was
voluntarily made.l" as was true in the in-
stant case.
The third significant issue raised in-
volved the degree of adequacy required of
counsel in defending the petitioner in order
to assure that he has not been deprived of
effective assistance of counsel. Petitioner
maintained that the Public Defender's of-
fice had been negligent in their advice and
in their handling of his case. In a trial on
a serious charge, if an appointed attorney
or even one chosen by the defendant ne-
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glects his preparation of the case, the effect
is to deny defendant to his right to counseL]"
Therefore, defense counsel has a duty to
pursue fully all defenses of fact and law
available to the defendant, and a defendant
has not had the assistance to which .he is
entitled if defense counsel's failure to do
so results in withdrawing a crucial de-
fense.18 But, an extreme case must. be dis-
closed before defense counsel's lack of
knowledge of law will constitute a denial of
defendant's' constitutional right to effective
aid in preparation and trial of his case. It
must appear that counsel's lack of diligence.
or competance reduced the trial to a farce.
or sham, whether counsel be ohosen" or
appointed by the court. 20 As to alleged in-
competence of counsel, the burden of proof
is on the defendant to sustain charges of
denial of his constitutional right.21 Thus,
the California Supreme Court has held that
a court-appointed counsel was not guilty of
incompetence in advising his client to enter
a plea of guilty to first degree murder,
when the evidence of defendant's guilt was
overwhelming and the attorney knew at the
time the advice was given that the psy,
chiatrist for the prosecution would testify
to defendant's sanity.i" Finally, it is largely
within the province of the trial court to de-
cide whether a defendant was given proper
representation by counsel and before a re-
viewing court can override that decision the
record must show beyond a doubt that the
trial court was in grievous error in such
respect.i"
Collateral issues raised by. the court
were: whether the failure of the police to
advise the petitioner of his right to counsel
and his right to remain silent, and whether
the presence of policemen in the room when
the accused conferred with his counsel were.
themselves grounds for releasing the pe-
titioner from custody.
Regarding the former issue, the court
reaffirmed its ruling in In re Lopez.": In
that case they held that the United States
Supreme Court decision, extending the right
to counsel and the right to be informed of
the privilege of remaining silent, to the
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preindictment accusatory interrogation
stage,25 may not be applied to cases which
have become final prior to the date the
decision was rendered.f"
On the latter issue, the court specifically
disapproved. of such procedure but noted
that none of the policemen actually over-
heard petitioner's conversation with his at-
torney.
This case shows that an appellate court,
in a habeas corpus proceeding, will give
great weight to the referee's findings. There- .
fore, where these findings are supported by
the weight of evidence, the court will adopt
them.
The actual operation of the voluntary-
involuntary test, as pertains to confessions,
where the only testimony is by the accused
rebutted by that of the interrogator, con-
tinues to trouble the courts. That the pe-
tition in the instant case was not summarily
dismissed, shows the court is inclined to
grant a full evidentiary hearing on issues
raised in this area. Even with the admoni-
tions as to right of counsel and right to re-
main silent, now required by Miranda v.
Arizona,27 we may continue to see judicial
distaste for pretrial confessions obtained
during custodial interrogation.
No fixed standard has emerged from this
case by which a defense counsel may mea-
sure the degree of diligence required of
him. Nor may we expect such _a standard
in the future. Further, it would appear that
a flexible standard will be maintained by
which error in judgment on the part of a
defense counsel will be tolerated unless the
error has resulted in a miscarriage of jus-
lice. Both the interests of the public and the
bar are well served by permitting exposi-
tion of this question on collateral attack.A.F.
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-Notes-
SURETIES-RIGHTS OF
MULTn~LE SURETIES
AGAINST EACH OTHER:
Contractor's Bond-relation to contract
with regard to surety liability. In Conti-
nental Casualty- Co. v. Hartford Ace. and
lndem: CO.,l plaintiff Continental Casualty
Co. was surety to a prime contract between
Hal B. Hayes and Associates, Inc., and the
United States. Pursuant to Federal statute''
and the terms of its bond, Continental was
bound with its principal, Hal. B. Hayes,
to pay for all labor and materials furnished
for work included in the prime contract.
This obligation included any claims of un-
paid laborers or materialmen of subcon-
tractors.
Hal B. Hayes assigned its entire contract
to Hayes-Cal Builders, Inc., WhO subcon-
tracted certain plumbing work to Country
Boys Builders Supply. Defendant Hartford
was surety under the subcontract. Its bond
to Country Bays designated Hayes-Cal as
obligee, but incorporated by reference the
subcontract between Hayes-Cal and Country
Boys. The subcontract expressly recognized
the contractual arrangement between Hal B.
Hayes and Hayes-Cal.
Country Boys failed to pay for materials
furnished by its suppliers, and Continental,
under its statutory obligation, paid the in-
debtedness then brought this action against
Hartford.
In its complaint, Continental alleged that
it was subrogated as a matter of law to the
right,,; of Hal B. Hayes and thereby sue-
ceeded to a cause of action against Hart-
10rJ all its bond to Country Boys. Hartford
demurred, contending that Continental
could not be subrogated to the rights of the
prime contractor, Hal B. Hayes, on the sub-
contractor's bond, became that bond was
limited in scope to Hayes-Cal, the stated
obligee.
The Superior Court entered -a judgment
of dismissal, sustaining Hartford's general
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demurrer without leave to amend. On ap-
peal by Continental, the lower court'sjudg-
ment was reversed, The District Court of
Appeal held (1) that although Hartford's
bond designated Hayes-Cal as obligee, by
its incorporating by reference the subcon-
tract between Hayes-Cal and Country Boys
-which subcontract expressly recognized
the assignment by Hal B. Hayes to Hayes-
Cal-the bond impliedly recognized Hal Eo
Hayes, as well as Hayes-Cal, as obligee,
and (2) that Continental was entitled to
reimbursement by Hartford; the two stood
in the position of successive sureties, and
as such Continental, having been forced to
pay the debt, was subrogated to the credit-
or's rights upon the bond and could enforce
them against Hartford.,
The trial court sustained Hartford's de-
murrer on the proposition that its bond was
limited in scope to Hayes-Cal, the stated
obligee and, assignee of the prime contrac-
tor, Hal B. Hayes. The District Court of
Appeal's reversal Was based upon an im-
plied recognition by Hartford of Hal B.
Hayes as obligee, because of the bond's
incorporation by reference of a contract
which expressly recognized the assignment
of the prime contract.
The weight of California case authority
supports the reversal. It was held in a 1912
, decision that "a bond may incorporate, by
reference expressly made thereto, other con-
tracts or written instruments .: .. in which
case the bond and papers referred to should
be read together and construed as a whole.?"
And it was held in a more recent case, that
"a bond which is given or the faithful per-
formance of a contract, to which it refers,
binds the surety for labor performed and ma-
terials furnished thereunder as completley ilti
though the surety were a party to the con-
tract"." This doctrine of incorporation by
reference was extended further than here
required in a 1966 District Court of Appeal
decision'' wherein it was assumed without
discussion that a performance bond incor-
porated not only the express terms of the
contract referred to, but also included such
terms as could be implied from the "fore-
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seeable scope" of rhe contract. (emphasis
added)
In its complaint, Continental alleged that
it was subrogated as a matter of law to the
rights of Hal B. Hayes and had thus suc-
ceeded to a cause of action against Hart-
fort. In reaching its conclusion-that the
ultimate loss resulting from Country Boys'
default should be borne by Hartford rather
than by Continental-the court looked to a
1938 New York decision," and bolstered its
rationale with some textbook suretyship
principles.
In the New York case, the issue was stated
thus: '
"Whether the surety of a subcontractor is
liable on its bond to the general contrac-
. tor for an unpaid bill for materials in-
corporated in the work under the sub-
contract made with a general contractor
doing building work for the United States
Government where the subcontractor has
failed to complete the work or pay for the
material furnished."7
It was resolved in the affirmative, al-
though there the major point in controversy
seemed to be whether the surety's promise
to indemnify the general contractor con-
templated not only the subcontractor's ac-
tual performance but, impliedly, his obli-
gation as well to pay for materials fur-
nished for that performance."
Quoting Williston, the court then said
that where in equity one of two sureties
.rather than the other should bear the ulti-
mate burden, they s.tand in the position of
successive sureties. If the first of two .such
sureties is forced to pay the debt, he is
subrogated to the creditor's rights upon the
h,ond and may enforce it against the second
surety." The court concluded that here Con-
tinental and Hartford should be regarded
a:; successive sureties, and that the loss in
equity should fall upon Hartford, whose
principal's default occasioned it.
The general rule that a surety, upon
satisfying the. obligation of the principal,
is entitled to enforce the creditor's rights
against the principal and against co-sureties,
is established by California statute."? The
noted Civil Code sections have been cited
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in support of the specific proposinons,
inter alia, (l) that a surety, upon payment
of the principal's obligation, succeeds to
all rights of the principal in and to such
obligation.P and (2) that an original con-
tractor's surety, repaying a creditor under
the original contract, is subrogated to the
contractor's rights and may bring action
against the subcontractor and his sure.y for
breach of the suhcontract.l''
The major questions presented by the
Continental case were (1) whether, where
. a subcontractor's bond by its terms desig-
nates a particular obligee, but incorporates
by reference an instrument which recog-
nizes the stated obligee as assignee of an-
other, the bond will be construed as im-
pliedly recognizing both assignor and as-
signee as obligees, and (2) whether, where
two persons stand surety for the same debt,
arrd one is forced to pay for a loss occasion-
ed by the default of the other's principal,
the first surety may be subrogated to the
creditor's rights and thereby receiver his
loss from the second surety.
In hol'ding that the bond impliedly recog-
nized the assignor as well as the stated
obligee, the court merely applied the well
settled rule that the bond and instrument
incorporated by reference thereto are to be
construed as a whole; no extension of or
departure from existing doctrine was in-
volved. But by its classification of Hartford
as a successive surety, the Continental de-
cision may be of significance. No prior
California cases were found which men-
tioned successive sureties as such-ye~ Con-
tinental defined the relationship and made
an important distinction between [he lia-
bility interrelationships among successive
sureties and co-sureties: while co-sure tie,;
may be required to share a loss, among
successive sureties he who in equity should
bear the ultimate burden is liable for it ill
its entirety. Thus in cases following Con-
tinental it would seem that, asbeween mul-
tiple sureties for the same obligation, total
ultimate liability-rather than an appor-
tionment of it-must result in any situation
in which on equitable principles the ingre-
dients of successive suretyship appear.
D.R.W.
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-Notes-
CRIMINAL LAW:
VOLUNTARY INTOXICATION
AS A PARTIAL DEFENSE IN
HOMICIDE CASES IN
CALIFORNIA
People v. Conley. 1
Defendant shot' and killed two people.
He had been consuming large amounts of.
intoxicating liquors throughout the three
days preceding the shooting. He was found
unconscious in a nearby field two hours
after the shooting. He pleaded not guilty to
two counts of first degree murder. His de-
fense was based on a theory of unconscious-
ness. At the trial expert testimony was of-
fered of his intoxicated condition and of his
abnormal mental condition at the time of
the shooting. Both sides requested man-
slaughter instructions, suggesting diminish-
ed capacity and intoxication as theories
justifying the instructions .. The court re-
fused to give the instructions. Defendant
was found guilty on both counts, and judg-
ment was entered with the penalty fixed at
life imprisonment for each count.
Or appeal, held, reversed, The Supreme
Court, in opinion by Traynor, C.]., held
that it was prejudicial error to refuse to
give manslaughter instructions to the jury
where there was evidence to support a
theory of defendant's incapacity to form a
specific mental state (malice aforethought)
essential to the crime ofmurder, The lower
court had, in fact; not even instructed the
jury that malice was an essential element
of the crime of murder. The court held that
diminished capacity due to voluntary in-
toxication, mental disease, or illness could
negate the existence of malice, although
voluntary intoxication could not be a com-
pl~te defense to homicide.
"The determination of an individual's ca-
pacity can be used as a sword with which
to attack him, or as a shield with which
to protect him."»
In the area of diminished mental ca-
pacity by reason of intoxication, both Coke
and Blackstone took the position that drunk-
enness at the time of the commission of a
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crime was a matter of aggravation,? but
Perkins" and Clark and Marshall" deny
that this was ever the law. Early common
law, however, made no concession because
of intoxication. r, The earliest relevant Eng-
lish report, dated 1551, approved the death
sentence for a homicide committed in ex-
treme intoxication." Until the early part of
the nineteenth century the general rule was
that drunkenness was no defense to a charge
of crime."
Mitigation of this harsh rule seems to
have been first attempted by Justice Hol-
royd in a murder casein 1819 where he
suggested that the drunkenness of the de-
fendant should be considered on the issue
of premeditation." He is said to have later
retracted his statementj '" at any rate, we
see that the defendant was executed."! In
1838, however, in a case of assault with
intent to murder, the jury was instructed
that gross intoxication might disprove the
intention required for the aggravated of-
fense.P This exception, slow to take root,
was stated by 1ustice Stephen in language
which has become accepted as the major
exclupatory doctrine: 13
"Although you cannot take drunkenness
as any excuse for crime, yet when the
crime is such that the intention of the
party committing it is one of its constitu-
ent elements, you may look at the fact
that the man was in drink in considering
whether he formed the intention necessary
to constitute the crime."14
That ,this partial exclupation could have
undermined the more general rule is not
unlikely considering the importance of
"mens rea" in criminal l.aw>'This modifica-
tion of the general rule, however, was soon
limited to the element of "specific intent"
of the crime charged and was not allowed
to negate the existence of "general intent.:"
Thus, proof of voluntary intoxication is
admissible, and may constitute a complete
defense when the accused is charged with
an offense of which some specific intent is
an essential element.l" -Except for three
states, this is the rule in the United States."?
As reflected in Section 22 of the Penal
Code, California follows "the majority
rule.l" Before the Gorschen case.l" Califor-
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nia also followed the majority application
of the rule in homicide cases.i" That is, in-
toxication could only reduce the criminal
homicide conviction to second degree mur-
der.21 The way the rule was generally
stated, evidence of intoxication 'in homicide
cases could only be considered with respect
to the issue of the degree of the offense.i"
The courts would not let the jury consider
the effect of intoxication on the element of
malice aforethought" Malice was not con-
sidered to be a particular "motive, pur-
pose, or intent," within Section 22 of the
California Penal Code. Other states reached
the same result of foreclosing the issue of
malice aforethought from the jury by stick-
ing to the dichotomy between specific intent
and general intent, with malice afore-
thought classified under the heading of
general intent. 24
This was the situation in California until
the Wells case.25 There, in an attempt to
show that a legally sane person could intro-
duce evidence of mental illness to negate
the existence of an essential mental element
of a crime, the court analogized to the ad-
missibility .of evidence of intoxication.F"
-- Malice was the element in dispute.:" The
court there assumed that malice afore-
thought was a specific intent.r"
In People v. Corshen.i" the court again
relied on an analogy to intoxication as a
defense to homicide to overcome certain
obstacles in admitting evidence on intent.
There, the main issue was the effect of the
defendant's mental illness.f" although there
was evidence that he was intoxicated at the
time of the shooting.
The first obstacle was a number of stat-
utes strictly limiting the admission of evi-
dence on the issue of criminal intent.P!
But Wells32 had concluded that Section 22
of the Penal Code, allowing evidence of
voluntary intoxication to negate an essen-
tial state of mind, was declaratory of what
the rule would be were there no statute,
and that the reasons for admitting evidence
of partial insanity were fundamentally the
same reasons as those that applied in the
intoxication situations. Gorshen held that
Section 22 of the Penal Code controlled
the contrary statutes on the admissibility
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of evidence of criminal intent. But the anal-
ogy to the admissibility of evidence of vol-
untary intoxication was inadequate in the
respect that it could not reduce murder to
manslaughter. The question of guilt of mur-
der or manslaughter was previously decided
solely on the basis of the reasonable man
objective standard of provocation, and vol-
untary intoxication was not a factor in that
standard.P" The Gorshen court solved that
problem by overruling the line of cases
which limited the admissibility of evidence
solely to the issue of the degree of the
crime.P"
Relying on Wells, 35 and another case.i"
the court in Corshen found no difficulty
in holding that malice aforethought is a
type of specific intent. 37 Thus, anew species
of manslaughter in California was added
to the previous statutory definition i'" for,
in the absence of.malice, a homicide cannot
be an offense higher than manslaughter.:"
Prior to the Conley case, on the basis of
Wells-Gorshen, it can be stated that where
a defendant is charged with a crime which
requires that a certain specific intent or
mental state be established in order to con-
stitute the crime or degree of crime charged,
and the defendant has offered evidence of
diminished mental capacity because of men-
tal illness or intoxication, that evidence
must be considered in determining whether
the defendant had the requisite mental
state."? It can also be stated that Corsheti
concluded that malice aforethought 'is a
requisite specific mental state for murder. 41
The problem remains, however, that both
the Wells and the Gorshen cases affirmed
their lower court's judgments, and therefore
their discussions on diminished capacity
could be possibly regarded as dicta. This
is unlikely in view of its reception by later
courts.t" The distinction between dictum
and holding might also have effect on the
ability of voluntary intoxication to reduce
a crime of murder to manslaughter, consid-
ering the fact that the main issue in both
Wells and Gorshen was that of the effect of
partial insanity. The following of Wells-
, Corshen on the facts in Conley solves that
problem. In Conley, the prime fact, and
focal point of the court's discussion, was
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the effect of the defendant's intoxicated con-
dition. In view of the fact that the W-ells-
Gorshen rule was always stated in terms of
diminished capacity by mental illness or
voluntary intoxication, the result in Conley
was not to be unexpected.
It is now the law in California that in
a prosecution for murder, where the de-
fendant has offered evidence of mental ill-
ness, intoxication or any other cause of
diminished capacity, and where the question
is whether nis mental capacity was thereby
so diminished that he could not deliberate,
premeditate, intend to kill, or harbor mal-
ice aforethought, the effect of that evidence
must be considered with respect to the de-
fendant's ability to form the requisite speci-
fic mental state for the crime.t"
The right to a jury instruction on dimin-
ished capacity does not have to be based
on substantial evidence of intoxication:
" 'any evidence deserving of any considera-
tion whatever,' " is sufficient.v' The defense
of diminished capacity due to voluntary in-
toxication can be raised without the testi-
mony of expert witnesses, either as to the
extent of the person's intoxicated condition,
or with regard to the effect of the intoxica-
tion on the defendant's ability to achieve a
specific. state of mind.t" Thus, it seems
that a plea of "not guilty" to a charge of
murder will put into issue the existence
of the mental state of malice aforethought. 46
Whereas some authorities'" state that the
defense of intoxication is considered to be
an affirmative one,. and therefore puts the
burden of proof on the defendanr;" in Cali-
fornia malice aforethought is a specific in-
tent now'" and therefore must be proved
beyond any reasonable doubt. 50
Since the slightest evidence of intoxica-
tion will allow a defendant to demand a
jury instruction on diminished capacity to
form malice aforethought, and since the
prosecution must prove beyond a reasonable
doubt the existence of a requisite specific'
intent, then can it not be said that the prose-
cution now has the burden of disproving
beyond a reasonable doubt the operative
effect of the intoxication of the defendant
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on his capacity to form malice afore-
thought? If so, then the burden of the pros-
ecution in homicide cases where intoxica-
tion is a factor has been materially in-
creased, and to some extent the chances
for convictions in these cases will decrease.
The minutiae of evidence required for
demanding a jury instruction would seem
to remove the issue of such instructions
completely out of the trial judge's discre-
tion. Just what constitutes "any evidence
deserving of any consideration whateve-r,"
will be a major point in the development of
future case law in this area of diminished
capacity caused by voluntary intoxication.
The holding in Conley'" that expert testi-
mony is not necessary to support a defense
of intoxication is not totally impractical.
Whereas mental illness is a more prolonged
state which renders itself amenable to de-
tailed analysis long. after the occurrence
of a homicidal act, drunkenness is a transi-
tory state often only supportable by eye-
witness testimony, alcoholic consumption
and resultant behavior. However, it seems
anomalous in two respects. The Wells-
Gorshen rule was the result of an eHort to
"ameliorate the law . . . prescribed by
the McNaughten rule,"52 and to bring the
expert knowledge of psychiatry into court
on. the complex issue of criminal responsi-
bility.l" The offspring of that rule, Conley,
slights the role of experts by making no'
provision for them, even though the issue,
diminished mental capacity to form a spe-
cific intent, is the same in both situations.
Considering the fact that tlie intoxication
rule' in Conley derives its increased effect
from a ruling in the Gorsh~n case, and
viewing the Wells and Gorshen cases as be-
ing of one purpose.?" the Conley. case ap-
pears to give a misdirection in the devel-
opment of that purpose. Very possibly the
role of expe-rt testimony could De modified
in succeeding cases. .
The lack of necessity for expert testi-
mony does not necessarily mean thata trial
of an intoxicated defendant will be devoid
of expert testimony. In the recent case of
Schmerber v. California, the Supreme
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Court of the United States held that a
compulsory blood test did not violate a
defendant's s-elf-incrimination privilege.?"
Certainly trial counsel will need expert
testimony to debate the interpretation of
information gathered by such tests.P"
The most profund change in California
law wrought by People v. Conley is the
attempt by the court to define malice afore-
thought. After previous disclaimers of abili-
ty to define the term.P" the court in Conley
disregards three statutes "defining" malice,
as inapplicable and uncomprehensive.i" and
labels as incomplete, general statements in
prior case law of the meaning of, the terrn.?"
before announcing its own definition. Mal-
ice aforethought, according to Conley, is
evidenced by an intentional act that is
highly dangerous to human life, "done in
disregard of the actor's awareness that so-
ciety requires him to conform his conduct
to the law. "60 The other specific intents of
murder in the first degree (intent, wilful-
ness, deliberation and premeditation) can
be present, but if the defendant is unable
because of mental disease, defect, or in-
- toxication to comprehend his duty to govern
his actions in accord with the duty imposed
by law, he does not act with malice afore-
thought.
The presence of malice is not negated
when a person does not know that his speci-
fic conduct is unlawful, for all persons are
presumed to know the law.ell Lack of "an
awareness of the obligation to act within
the general body of laws regulating so-
ciety,"62 will prevent an intentional homi-
cide from being characterized as committed
with malice aforethought.
The difficulty with the definition is, that
malice aforethought is a state of mind re-
quired by the law before a defendant will
be convicted of murder, and this defini-
tion seemingly takes away another one of
the manifestations of his state of mind-
that is, a showing ,of an intent to kill.
Anglo-American law desires to be satisfied
that there is a guilty mind behind the crim-
inal hand. This desire, where previously
frustrated by difficulties of proof, has been
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met by "implications" of malice from the
acts of the defendant. Now it seems that the
mental state of the defendant must be con-
sidered solely in the light of its subjective
content; that is, did, or did not, the de-
fendant know of society's obligation to
conform to its orders, when that defendant
acted.
Neither the layman nor the lawyer is
capable' of fathoming the depths of a per-
son's consciousness; especially when' the
person is partially insane or intoxicated
to an indeterminate extent. It seems that the
court, in an attempt to match the crime,
with the subjective culpability of the indi-
vidual defendant, ventured in search of eth-
ical certainty without the ability to conduct
the search, and with the possibility that
the goal is unattainable. This problem
again leads us to the necessity of expert
testimony.
One application of the Wells-Gorshen
rule as applied by Conley, which is not
discussed in the case, is that intoxication by
drugs is included within the term "intoxica-
tion" in Section 22 of the Penal Code.P"
The rule in Conley, however, will not be
the subject of such widespread use by
drugged defendants as it will by intoxicated
defendants. Crimes by drug addicts are
generally committed when they are not
drugged, and therefore, when the defense
will not be available to them. The reason
for their crimes is not the_drugs taken, but
the need for money to get the drugs. When
they are drugged they are generally either
physically incapable of committing crimes
(or doing anything, for that matter) or they
are unmotivated to attempt to get money be-
cause of the effect of the drug,M or because
of the lack of need for money at that time.
An exception to the general statements
above exists when certain drugs are taken.
Drugs like "marijuana" and "LSD" cause
hallucinations and release inhibitions so
that impulsive acts, frequently of a violent,
criminal nature, result. 65 The problem is
compounded by the fact that these are the
types of drugs that "thrill-seekers" and'
young people generally first come into con-
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tact with. The behavior of these inexperi-
enced drug users is unpredictable, and often
tragic. Proof of a state of mind clouded
by hallucinatory drugs like these would
seem to be an extraordinarily complex prob-
lem.
Perhaps the key to the problem is that
the decision on the existence of a requisite
state of mind will be entirely left to the
jury's discretion. Conflicting expert wit-
nesses will destroy any chance for a di-
rected verdict or reversed verdict. Thus the
ethics and common sense of the jury will in
reality be their sole guideline in appraising
the defendant's culpability.
D. P. C.
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-Notes-
DISQUALIFICATION OF AN
EXECUTOR
In re Estate of Dulion' Ernie I. Dulfon
petitioned the court for issuance of letters
testamentary pursuant to his appointment as
executor by the will of his deceased wife.
His stepdaughter, Mary, asked the court to
deny the petition on the grounds that pe-
titioner:
1. was the surviving partner of a busi-
ness with decedent, and was thus
barred from appointment by Califor-
nia Probate Code § 4212;
2. was indebted to the estate (amount
owed in dispute) and was living rent- -
free in an apartment owned by the
estate:
3. had entered his deceased wife's safety
deposit box immediately after her
death without witnesses present ex-
cept an official of the bank who did
not know of the wife's death; and
had not accounted to his stepdaughter
for what the box contained;
4. had on several occasions threatened
his stepdaughter concerning her prop-
erty rights, and had previously beaten
her while she was living with Petition-
er and deceased;
5. had waived his right to act as executor
of the estate by a previous agreement.
The trial court denied Ernie's petition.
. On appeal, this decision was reversed. The
court held that Ernie could not be disquali-
fied by any or all of the grounds stated.
At common law, the selection of the ex-
ecutor of an estate was totally delegated to
the testator. Except for the complete insan-
ity of the nominee, there were no grounds
upon which the court could refuse to ap-
point the person chosen by the testator. 3
Today, however, the common law has
been modified by statutes in all American
jurisdictions." California's statute provides:'
"No person is competent to serve as an
executor or executrix who is under the age
of majority, convicted of an infamous
crime, or adjudged by the court incompe-
tent to execute the duties of the trust by
reason of drunkenness, improvidence, or
want of understanding or integrtty.':e
Except for these specific statutory grounds,
the courts of California, and indeed the
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United States in general, have not been
willing to disqualify an executor. The selec-
tion of an executor by the testator is a
"solemn act"5 and it has been repeatedly
held that "It is the universal rule that a
testator may name the person who shall
be the executor of his will, and such per-
son has a right to act in absence of 11 spe-
cific statutory disqualification ... In the
absence of some statute, the power to name
an executor is coextensive with the power
to bequeath or devise the estate itself. "7
Under California law, a man has the
right to make such disposition of his prop-
erty as he chooses, subject only to such
limitations as are expressly declared by
law; and within the same limitations he has
the absolute right to select the executor to
carry out the provisions of the will. 8 Thus,
any executor named in a will has the right
to act, unless there is some provision of
law which declares that he shall not; and
the testator may lawfully select any person
for this trust who is not within a class pro-
hibited."
The paramount rule in the law of wills,
to which all other rules must yield, is that
the court has a duty to give the utmost ef-
fect to the wishes of the testator, consistent
with the interests of the estate and bene-
Iiciaries.!" Following this rule, the courts
have consistently construed the statutory
disqualifications as narrowly as possihle.l '
In Cohen's Estate/2 the New York courts,
under a statute. similar to California's, re-
fused to disqualify a nominee even though
he had been convicted of a Federal crime.
The court held such convictions were not
Within the scope of the New York law.
The California courts have refused to dis-
qualify executors on the grounds of un-
friendliness of the executor toward the
heirs; 13 the friendliness of the executor to-
ward those holding interests adverse to the
estate;14 fraudulently obtaining money from
the testator during his life; 15 and claiming
an interest adverse to the estate.!" The fact
that the nominee has been known to drink
in the past is not grounds for disqualifica-
tion,"? nor is being a gambler, a profes-
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sional baseball player, and an ernhezzler.r"
Charges of those challenging the appoint-
ment that the nominee had conspired in the
murder of the testator were. also held to be
insufficient.l"
It is thus clear that, except for the most
extraordinary circumstances, the California
courts will not disqualify an executor on
other than statutory grounds, and they are
not overly anxious to apply the statutory
grounds.
The court in the instant case never refers
to Probate Code Section 401.20 However,
the decision was consistent with the statute
and the case law on the statute.
Probate Code § 42121 refers to adminis-
trators, not executors. The court in the in-
stant case thus refused to extend this statute
to cover executors. This is in line with the
general policy of narrow construction of
wills statutes. Thus, \$ 421 did not apply in
this case. -.
In further examining the facts, the court
decided that Ernie had acted in good faith
in entering his wife's safety deposit box (he
had immediately turned the contents over; to
his attorney). They also decided that he
had not waived his right to act as an exec-
utor, since this was part of an agreement
made subject to the approval of the court,
and the court had not approved it. This
also follows the general rule that waiver to
act as executor may be withdrawn at any
time before it is acted on by the court.i"
It is clear that indebtedness to the estate
is not a statutory ground for disqualifica-
tion and no California court has ever dis-
qualified an executor on this ground.23
This leaves for consideration whether
threatening and striking a beneficiary to the
will is sufficient grounds for disqualifica-
tion. In the instant case, the court said that
inasmuch as the striking took place during
deceased's lifetime, this fact must have been
known to her, and that she must not have
believed that the act rendered Ernie unfit
to act as an executor. It appeal-s to this
writer that in view of the cases on this sub-
ject, even if decedent had not known of
these acts, the court ruling would have
been the same. The acts were singular, no
evidence appears of past acts of the same
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or similar nature, and they were not acts
which would be indicative of a tendency
to mismanage the estate.
While the case was in the main decided
on the general policies associated with the
law of wills, it is clear that it accurately
follo.:ved the established rules regarding
executors,
R. E. T.
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CALIFORNIA'S OBSCENITY
STATUTE
The requirement of intent to distribute
or exhibit: In re Klor.l On September 4,
1964 two police officers entered the home
Robert Klor under authority of a warrant
charging him with an overdue parking
ticket. After making the arrest, the officers
informed Klor they had received complaints
he was making obscene motion pictures.
Klor replied he did not make obscene mo-
tion pictures and offered to show the films
to the officers. In warning the officers some
of the reels might contain objectionable
scenes Klor said: "'These are not ready
for 'distribution through the mail. They need
to be edited.'''2 After viewing the films
the officers requested permission to take
two of the films to the City Attorney's of-
fice for viewing by the City Attorney. Klor
consented on the condition the City Attorney
be advised the films were not intended for
distribution in their present form.
Klor was convicted in the Municipal
Court for violation of Cal. Pen. Code. sec-
tion 311.2 which provides: "Every person
who knowingly: sends or causes to be sent,
or brings or causes to be brought, into this
State Ior sale or distribution, or in this
State prepares, publishes, prints, exhibits,
distributes or offers to distribute or has in
his possession with intent to distribute or
to exhibit or offer to distribute any obscene
matter is guilty of a misdemeanor." His
conviction was affirmed by the Appellate
Division' of the Superior Court and he pe-
titioned for a Writ of Habeas Corpus to the
California Supreme Court.
In re Klor is the first case put before the
California Supreme' Court challenging a
conviction under Cal. Pen. Code section
311.2 since its enactment in 1961.3_4 Klor
claimed error in the trial court's jury in-
struction which stated the Jury should find
the petitioner guilty if they found the ma-
terial obscene" and the petitioner "either
prepared the material or possessed it with
intent to distribute or exhibit it". (Emphasis
by court}."
In granting Klor's petition the California
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Supreme Court held: "The statutory words
'prepares; publishes, prints, exhibits, dis-
tributes, or offers to distribute or has in his
possession' must all be read in connection
with the following words 'with intent to dis-
tribute or to exhibit or offer to distribute' "
(Emphasis by court). 7 A conviction under
section 311.2 of any of the acts described
therein without the intent to distribute the
material would be a violation of the legis-
lative intent, sensible construction of the
statute, and petitioner's rights under the
First and Fourteenth Amendments.
In negatively answering the question of
whether a person can be convicted under
section 311.2 for the preparation of obscene
material without the intent to distribute or
exhibit it, the court relies on two arguments.
The first argument is based on the legisla-
tive intent and reasonable construction of
the statute. The Court said, "the legislature
did not attach the language of such intent
[the intent to distribute or exhibit] to each
verb in the statutory series because' to do
so would have been to adopt an awkward
construction.?" The Court then goes on to
say that to read the words in piecemeal
fashion would be to assume legislative in-
consistency. If possession of finished matter
without intent to distribute or exhibit it
does not violate the statute, the mere prepa-
ration or possession of unfinished matter
without the intent could not violate the
statute.
The second argument rests on the con-
stitutionality of trial court's intetpretation
of the statute. The court reasoned that to
convict a person for the preparation of
obsecene material maintained solely for his
own personal use and satisfaction would be
a VIolation of his rights under the First
and Fourteenth Amendments. Relying on
Chief Justice Warren's concurring opinion
in Roth v. United States? the Court said the
key to an obscenity trial is the punishable
conduct of the party, not theohscenity of
the material. There is no punishable con-
duct present when a person maintains ob-
scene material for his own use and satis-
faction, or when he intends to purge the
material of its obscene elements before dis-
tribution.
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Relying on the rule set down in Bantam
Books, Inc. c. Sulliuan'" that "regulation
by the states of obscenity must conform to
procedures which will insure against the
curtailment of constitutionally protected
expression . . .»r i and citing Griswold 1).
Connecticut'? the court reasoned, "Such a
statute would approach an interdiction of
individual expression in violation of the
First and Fourteenth Amendments.V'" The
Court then argues, a statute which would
convict a person of creating obscene rna-
terial when he did not intend to distribute
or exhibit it, or intended to purge it of its
objectionable content before distribution
would pose grave technical difficulties to
the artist and tend to suppress experimental
communication which in the finished form
might become constitutionally protected.
Justice Burke's dissent argues a proced-
ural point in the Habeas Corpus proceed-
ing. He states, citing In re Bell, l4 -that a
judgment which is collaterally attacked car-
ries with it a presumption of regularity. '.5
If, then, a petitioner is convicted under one
of two alternative jury instructions, one of
_which is valid, he has the burden of proving
he was convicted under the invalid instruc-
tion. Justice Burke then argues that the
petitioner has not affirmatively proved he
was not convicted under the valid portion
of the instruction, or possessed it with the
intent to distribute it. He bases his opinion
on the testimony introduced at the trial,
which was not rebutted, by the models
whom Klor photographed. The models testi-
fied he intentionally filmed their sex or-
gans, and explained his actions by saying
he was using a special lens. This testimony
coupled with the fact that the petitioner was
engaged in the business of making and sell-
ing films of nude women could have re-
sulted in a conviction under the valid por-
tion of the instruction.
The majority answered the argument
raised by Justice Burke's dissent by saying:
"So strong was the evidence tending to
establish the petitioner's guilt under the
erroneous portion of the charge and so weak
the evidence which would ground a convic-
tion under the valid portion that we de-
76
termine that petitioner can discharge his
'burden ' " 16
The question of whether a person can be
convicted under California Penal Code sec-
tion 311.2 for mere creation of obscene
material, without the intent to exhibit or
distribute the material, was answered in the
negative by the California Supreme Court.
The Court held that the stautory words "in-
tent to distribute or exhibit" must be read
with the words "prepares, publishes, prints,
exhibits, distributes or offers to distribute
or has in his possession."
In the face of In re Klor it is now ap-
parent that any conviction under California
Penal Code section 311,2 must, in addition
to proving the prohibited act, prove the in-
tent to distribute or exhibit the material.
No conviction can stand when a person pro-
duces material, brings it into the state, or
possesses it, unless it can also be shown
that he did so with the intent to distribute
or exhibit the material.
J.F.S.
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TORTS: NEGLIGENCE:
DUTY OF PROPRIETOR OF
BUSINESS ESTABLISHMENT
TO BUSINESS INVITEE
Taylor v. Centennial Bowl, Inc. While
an invitee in the defendant's cocktaill
lounge, plaintiff was propositioned by an-
other patron several times. The bouncer
was in close proximity and later was in-
formed by the plaintiff of .the confronta-
tions. Subsequently, as the plaintiff was
about to leave, the bouncer warned her that
the propositioner was outside. She, however,
insisted that she had to go home. The bouncer
then walked the plaintiff to the doorway
and again cautioned her. Upon reaching
her car, the plantiff was attacked and
severely lacerated.
The Superior Court granted motion for
directed verdict forthe defendant. The trial
court, utilizing Restatement § 348 and
Hunter v. Mohawk Petroleum Corp.2 as its
rule for duty, found no evidence that de-
fendant had breached any duty. The Dis-
trict Court of Appeal affirmed, citing Port-
er v. California Jockey Club as its authori-
ty."
On appeal to the Supreme Court of Cali-
fornia, the appellate court's decree was
reversed. The court concluded that Restate-
ment § 348 had been repudiated by Re-
statement § 344 and that the Hunter case
was distinguishable on its facts. It was held,
as a matter of law', that a mere warning of
impending danger, was not sufficient to ful-
fill defendant's duty to the plaintiff. Where
defendant has good reason to anticipate in-
jury to a patron from a third person, he has
an affirmative duty to control the acts of
that third person. In this case, such control
could have been accomplished by escorting
the plaintiff to her car or notifying the
police. The defendant did not do so and,
therefore, it is a question of fact for the
jury to determine if defendant acted reason-
ably under the' circumstances. With five
iudges concurring and one dissenting, the
Supreme Court reversed the Court of Ap-
peal decision and ordered a retrial.
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In 1866, an English court set down the
rule that a proprietor of a business estab-
lishment is under an affirmative duty to
protect business visitors.f-" The rule event-
ually became the common law and, in all
such jurisdictions, invitees were placed on
a higher footing then licensees. The theory
behind the duty was propounded by Pro-
fessor Bohlen." Identified as the economic
benefit theory, it stated that an affirmative
duty to make the premises safe was imposed
upon the proprietor; it was the price he
must pay for the economic benefit that he
obtains from the presence of the business
guest. Accepted by the Restatement of
Torts," the theory of economic benefit has
not restricted recovery to visitors of busi-
ness establishments but has been extended
to include visitors of such non-pecuniary
institutions as churches and municipal
parks. Coverage also has been extended to
members of the family and friends of such
visitors."
This duty to make the premises safe for
the invitee was' not an absolute duty; the
proprietor was not an insurer of the safety.
of the visitors. His duty was to use reason-
able care. Nonetheless, the obligation of
reasonable care was entire, and included
everything that resulted in an unreasonable
risk of harm to the visitor. The proprietor
had to be not only prudent in his affirma-
tive actions and warn the visitor of known
hidden dangers, but also had to take reason-
able precautions in order to make the prem-
ises safe for the invitee; he had 'to take
reasonable precautions to protect the in-
vitee from dangers which are foreseeable
from the arrangement or use.8•
Nevertheless, the rule did not extend to
situations where the dangers were known
to the visitor, nor was there a duty to pro-
tect against obvious dangers which one rea-
sonably should be expected to discover. As
stated by Keeton, "As to these, it should
be expected that the invitee will protect
himself.l'" For this reason, it has been held
that reasonable care only requires the duty
to warn the person of unknown, impend-
ing dangers."? An exception was made to
public utilities, however, since the members
of the public were entitled to the utility
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irrespective of consent. As for the public
utility, it had a duty to do more than mere-
ly warn, if the warning would have been
inadequate so as to permit the visitor to
avoid the harrn.l '
Gradually the exception concerning pub-
lic utilities began to be extended to re-
coveries for business visitors against private
establishments. Nonetheless, the Restate-
ment of Torts steadfastly maintained the
distinction. The Restatement's position, af-
ter being thoroughly criticized by Profes-
sors'J ames '" . and. Prosser 1~ as not being
truly indicative of the law, was reassessed
by the committee. With § 344, the drafters
of the Restatement reaffirmed their posi-
tion on the public utility's greater duty. To
a greater extent, however, they amplified
and accentuated the duty of a business
establishment. The exception engulfed the
rule, and proprietors were taxed with the
duty to do more than merely warn their
invitees of known, impending danger.
Although Supreme Court Justice Peters
concluded that this case did not turn on the
distinction between the two sections of the
- Restatement, it is valuable to note the possi-
ble changes in the law when Restatement
§ 344 is adopted by a state. In the first
draft of the restatement, the possessor was
to use reasonable care:
(1.) In discovering harmful acts being
done or about to be done, and
(2). In protecting patrons by con trolling
the acts of third parties or giving
a warning adequate enough 80' that
the invitees could avoid harm with-
out relinquishing any of the patron's
rights to services from the public
utility. (In this respect, the court
should be criticized for misquoting
and misapplying this SUbsection of
§ 348.)
The revised draft stated that the duty was
to use reasonable care:
(1.) In discovering harmful acts being
done or likeIy to be done, and
(2.) In giving a warning adequate
enough so that the invitee could
avoid harm or otherwise to protect
them against it.
Thus the second draft (Restatement § 344)
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was an apparent broadening of the rule in
the first draft (Restatement §348.)
The question then is, to what extent was
the original draft extended? Comparing
subsections (1.) of each restatement, it ap-
pears that the intent of the committee was
to extend the proprietor's duty. He not only
has a duty to use reasonable care to dis-
cover harmful acts, but also he has the duty
to foresee harmful acts which are likely to
occur in the future. As for subsection (2.),
the original Restatement § 348 title '" could
have misled- one to interpret, as the court in
this case did, that the special duty in § 348
applied to business proprietors, as well as;'
public utilities. (The misinterpretation by
the court is evident after reading comment
(b) of § 348 and noting the. black letter
law of the original Restatement § 340).
Thus, it is concluded that the Restatement,
prior to § 344, required merely a duty to
warn to visitors of unknown dangers.?" It
was only after the adoption of § 344 that
the proprietor had a duty to do more than
warn the invitee of known impending dan-
gers.
Dilty to Wam
It is generally accepted that the owner of
land owes a duty to invitees to exercise
reasonable care in protecting the invitee
from injury. The question is whether the de-
fendant has fulfilled this duty. In order to
answer this question it is necessary to de-
termine exactly what duty the proprietor
of a business establishment owes to his
business invitees. The lower courts con-
eluded, based on Restatement § .348, that,
defendant's duty was one of merely warn-
ing the visitor of impending danger. Never-
theless, warning the visitor does not always
fulfill the owner's obligations. The owner's
duty to act may be dependent on the specific
circumstances of the case:
1.) If defendant has had several hun-
dred disturbances in the past six months, in-
cluding some stabbings, and if the business
in located in a criminal like locale, his duty
of care in protecting his patrons would
seemingly be much greater than if he were
a proprietor of a exclusive neighborhood
business with no record of criminal activi-
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ty. Hence, the jury might find a breach of
defendant's duty, if he fails to have some-
one guarding his parking lot for a pro·
longed period on a weekend night. The jury
also might find a breach of duty if de-
fendant has not been able to maintain ade-
quate security and protection for its pa-
trons because it has reduced its police pro-
tection and number of bouncers.l" Circum-
stances may be such that a prudent person
could say that the owner is liable for negli-
gently failing to control the conduct of third
persons.?"
(2.) So also, the proprietor of any place
of entertainment owes a duty to those who
come on his premises to protect them from
of case required fluctuates with the facts
and circumstances. Thus it has been stated
that a saloon keeper and proprietors of res-
taurants and other establishments which
serve alcoholic beverages have a duty to ex-
ercise greater care for the safety of their
guests than a plaoe which doesn't serve al-
cohol.l"
(3.) The owner's duty also becomes
greater than mere warmng of danger, if
the warning is insufficient to enable the
visitor to avoid the harm. Varying with the
circumstances, the owner's obligation ex-
tends to the entrance of his property, as well
as, to a safe exit after the invitee desires
to, depart.l'' As in Morris v. Atlantic &
Pacific' 'Tea CO.,20 the parking lot may be
included in this "area of invitation."
In this case, the court applied a greater
duty on the proprietor because of the situ-
ation (3.) above: It held that a mere warn-
ing by the proprietor did not help the pa-
tron to avoid the harm of the third person
and therefore the bouncer had a duty to
escort the plantiff to the car. Nonetheless,
it appears that the court could have found
that the proprietor had not fulfilled his
duty by using anyone or a combination of
the above.
The law 'in California, prior to this case,
was in accordance with Restatement § 340,
that an occupier having learned of a danger-
ous condition on his premises, as a matter
of law, may discharge all duty to his in-
vitees by merely giving them a warning of
impending dang~r.21 Some jurisdictions and
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authorities were also in accord.f" Never-
theless, this proposition was held to be a
very doubtful one in other jurisdictions. If
the danger was obvious and could be
avoided safely by the ordinary person, mere
warning of much danger generally would
fulfill the owner's duty. If, however, the
condition of danger was such that it could
not be encountered with reasonable safety,
even if the danger was known and ap-
preciated, then the proprietor would inherit
a greater duty. An icy highway.i" a slippery
floor/2 a defective orosswalk. " or a walk-
way near an exposed high tension wire?"
are examples. A less inherently dangerous
situation also may impose a greater duty,
if the invitee's knowledge is not likely to
protect him against the danger. 27
Notice of Dangerous Condition
The rule has been stated in California
that, where there is no evidence of any facts
which would reasonably put the owner on
notice that one spectator will harm another,
the owner has, no greater duty" Nonethe-
less, in this case, the court could find that
reasonable men could differ as to whether
or not there was notice:
(1.) Notice could be rationalized on the
ground that the owner has superior knowl-
edge of existing dangers of which his in-
vitees are unaware. If he is ignorant both
actually and constructively of the danger,
he is not Iiable.f" If, however, the defend-
ant has superior knowledge and apprecia-
tion 0.£ impending harm, he has ~ duty to
do more than merely warn; he must pro-
vide against injury to the patron.P"
(2.) So also, where there- is reasonable
cause to anticipate negligent or wrongful
acts and the probability of harm therefrom,
the proprietor must use reasonable ,care to
protect the invitee against injuries.i" If
there is evidence to show that the assailant
made improper advances and the bouncer
knew of it and that the business -had numer-
ous disturbances in the prior six' months,
such reasonable cause to anticipate harm
may be present. If so, the company is un-
der a duty to protect the visitor by taking
appropriate steps to restrain the conduct of
persons of which he should have been aware
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and of which he should have realized as
dangerous.32
(.3.) The jury could also find constructive
notice to do more than merely warn, if
there has not been a guard in the parking
lot for forty-five minutes and the parking
lot is normally- patrolled every ten min-
utes'" if it was a Sunday night when the
majority of the incidents occurred.:" and
if there had been prior stabbings on the de-
fendant's premises within the last few
months.i" As in Samples v. Eaton,36 where
the patron was injured when struck by a
bottle at a wrestling match, wherein the
court held that the owner is put on con-
structive notice and is under a duty to pro-
tect his invitees by taking the necessary ac-
tion to restrain conduct by a .third person
of which he should have been aware and of
which he should have realized as dangerous.
Even though the assailant was unknown, the
conduct of the patrons at a wrestling match
was foreseeable and, therefore, if was a
question of fact to determine whether there
was negligence.
The question confronting the court was:
Did the business establishment fulfill its
_ duty to the business invitee by merely warn-
ing her of impending danger? Answering
in the negative, the court appears to have
placed the business proprietor on a sliding
scale depending on the environment of the
business and the immediate fact situation.
If the circumstances are such that the visi-
tor may be harmed if not protected, the
owner is put on notice and must use reason-
able care to protect him. Like the public
utility, the proprietor inherits a greater
duty of care.
"When a human life is at stake, the rule
of care and. diligence requires that, with-
out regard to difficulties or expense, every
precaution be taken reasonably to assure
the safety and security of any persons law-
fully coming into the immediate proximity
of the dangerous agency ... "37
R.M.L.
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RIGHTS OF LICENSEE-
DAMAGESFOR LOST
PROFITS-EXEMPLARY
DAMAGES-ATTORNEY'S
FEES:
Lucky Auto Supply v. Turner+
In 1954, plantiff and defendant entered
into a ten year lease which included a pro-
vision that defendant (lessor) would make
available to plantiff (lessee) a parking lot
immediately behind the leased premises.
This parking lot was to be 'for the use of
the lessee and its customers for the term of
the lease. Lessee was in the auto parts busi-
ness and its service, installation depart-
ments, and rear entrance, were directly
across an alley from the parking lot. It was
necessary for the efficient operation of
lessee's business to have the use of the
parking lot for ease in delivering bulky
parts to customers' cars, ease in identifica-
tion of customers' cars without leaving the
store and for customer parking. On-street
parking was restricted ~m both major
thoroughfares adjacent to the leased store
during normal business hours.
In July, .1955 defendant approached
plaintiff requesting permission to erect an
office building on the parking-lot. Plaintiff
refused. Defendant, on Sept. 1, 1958, pro-
ceeded to erect .the building thereby de-
priving plaintiff of the use of the parking
lot for the remainder of the lease period.
Plantiff instituted this suit for damages
:based 01) three counts:
1) Defendant wilfully and intentionally
entered and trespassed on the' lot by
erecting a building thereon, thereby
depriving plaintiff of its use and
causing a loss of profit and good wil]
in the amount of $25,000,
2) Defendant wrongfully deprived plain-
tiff and its customers of their right
to use the property, such deprivation
of use amounting to $17,000 and $500
per month for the duration of the
lease period,
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3) Reasonable attorney's fees, which
were allowable under the terms of
the lease.
The trial court rendered a decision in
favor of plantiff in the amount of $7,000
for loss of profit and good will, $500 ex-
emplary damages and $2,500 as reason-
able attorney's fees. This decision was af-
firmed on appeal, the court holding that
damages for loss of profit are recoverable
provided that evidence of such damage is
reasonably reliable.
Cal. Civ. Code § 3333 provides that the
measure of damages in tort is that amount
which will compensate for all detriment
proximately caused by the defendant's
wrong. A long line of California cases has
established the principle that damages for
loss of profits are recoverable where there
has been an established business since there
is then a basis for estimating probable prof-
it with reasonable certainty." Thus, the trial
judge did not .err in admitting evidence as
to the income of other stores owned by
plaintiff and operated under similar cir-
cumstances as the store in question.
In Natural Soda Products Co. v. City of
Los Angeles.' damages for lost profits were
allowed in a situation where there had been
no profit at all in the years immediately
preceding the tort. Plaintiff in that case,
was in the business of extracting chemicals
from the subsurface of a lake. For several'
years prior to the tort, plantiff had been in-
vesting in a new plant and new equipment
in order to increase production. Before this
new plant could be put into operation, how-
ever; defendant flooded the lake making it
impossible for the plant to function. Dam-
ages for lost profits were awarded since
there was an operating experience sufficient
to permit a reasonable estimate of prob-
able income and expense. In the instant
case there had been a profit in the years
following the tort, but there was strong
evidence, based on data obtained from the
accounts of five of plaintiff's other stores,
which were operated under comparable con-
ditions, that the amount of profit should
have been greater. These five stores showed
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a 48% average increase in sales between
1958 and 1962, while the store in question
showed only a 26% increase in sales.
Defendant generally denied liability for
lostprofits, because plaintiff's store showed
a profit in the years following the tort. This
claim does not stand analysis. To uphold
this argument would be to decide that darn-
ages for lost profits are only to be allowed
in a situation where there was no profit be-
fore and after the tort, as in Natural Soda,
or in a situation where there was a profit
before the tort which was totally extin-
guished by the tort. The only difference be-
tween these cases and the instant case is in
the absolute level of profit before and after
the tort. The only factor that is relevant and
should be considered is the relative level of
profit before and after the tort. Plaintiff
should be allowed to recover in any situa-
tion where his profit after the tort is less
than his profit before the tort, as long as his
loss is provable by evidence of reasonable
certainty.
The contract between the parties stated
__that " ... if lessee shall bring any action
for any relief against lessor, declaratory or
otherwise, arising out of this lease, and
lessor shall prevail in such action, lessee
agrees to pay lessor a reasonable attorney's
fee". The court allowed $2,500 for at-
torney's fees to plaintiff. Defendant claimed
that since plaintiff had been unsuccessful
in a previous action seeking injunctive re-
lief, and defendant successfully demurred
to three of the six counts of plaintiff's sec-
ond amended complaint in this action, de-
fendant should be entitled to attorney's fees.
The court held, in effect, that there was
a single cause of action, plaintiff eventually
prevailing so that $2,500 was not unreason-
able. This seems to be the only reasonable
way to construe the agrement. To allow
defendant attorney's fees for successfully
defending the injunction action and defeat-
ing three of the six counts and giving plain-
tiff attorney's fees for the three counts that
succeeded would be a step backward in
history to the time when the form of the
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pleading was given great weight. In mod-
ern jurisdictions such as California, where
the importance of the form of the pleadings
is minimal. it would be an anchronism to
sustain defendant's argument on this point.
To do so would be to require that causes
be pled with undue particularity to insure
that all counts are successful.
In this case, plaintiff was allowed to sue
in tort on an action similar to a common
law action on the case. Since plaintiff did
not have a lease on the parking lot, he had
no property interest in it and therefore did
not have the possession necessary to allow
him to sue the owner in trespass or eject-
merit." Here plaintiff was allowed to sue in
tort for the intentional interference with his
right to exercise the license. It has been held
that where a license is coupled with an in-
terest, the licensee can sue in tort for acts
depriving him of his right to exercise the
license." Plaintiff's right to su~ in tort, in
this case; arose out of the contract giving
him an interest in the use of the parking lot.
Defendant's conduct in depriving plantiff
of this right under the license amounted to
a tort, for which defendant was liable.
Plaintiff in this case, had the option of
framing his cause of action in contract, but
by framing it in tort, advantage was taken
of the possibility (indeed the reality) of
obtaining a judgment for exemplary dam-
ages. The question arises as to whether a .
plaintiff should be :allowed any greater
remedy in tort than he would have had in
contract It seems obvious that a licensee
should be allowed to recover exemplary
damages against a third party who inter-
feres with his right to exercise his license,
since in such a case there is no contract
cause of action available. However, when
the licensor interferes with the licensee's
right by breaching his contract, the licensee
should only be allowed contract damages.
To allow more, as this court did, is to ap-
proach the end of allowing exemplary dam-
ages for any wilfull breach of contract. This
case is no more an example of an inten-
tional tort than -is any other intentional
breach of contract.
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Cal. Civ. Code § 3294 defines the in-
stances where exemplary damages are re-
coverable and limits those instances to obli-
gations "not arising from contract, where
the defendant has been guilty of oppression,
fraud, or malice, express or implied." Ex-
emplary damages are to be awarded for the
"sake of example and by way of punishing
the defendant". It has been said that "puni-
tive damages are not favorite of the law
and should be allowed only with greatest
caution and in the clearest of cases", 6 and
"exemplary damages may not be recovered
in an action based on contract, even though
the breach is wilfull or malicious, but when
the action is in tort such damages may be
recovered upon a proper showing of malice,
fraud or oppression, even though the tort
incidentally involves a breach of contract."?
There is certainly nothing in the facts of
this case to indicate the presence of the
"malice, fraud or oppression" necessary for
the award of exemplary damages. More-
over, as has been shown, the tort cause of
action in this case was one "arising from
contract" within the meaning of ~ 3294.
This case is a departure from the California
policy of strictly limiting the instances
wherein exemplary damages are to be
awarded.
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Barrister Publishing Co. is in need
of several sharp law school students
to evaluate the market potential of
our new law review book series
(Bar-Notes) just published. These
law review books are comprehen-
sive case book outlines keyed to
every major law text and cover
point-by-point every important case
covered in the texts being used in
your law school. Written by top
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as a new dimension in study help
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easy to understand manner all the
relevant aspects of the case in ques-
tion. In addition, at the end of each
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ysis prepared by eminently qualified
legal experts. Here the nature, im-
portance, significance and meaning
of the case is thoroughly discussed.
There is a Bar-Notes title for each
and every course subject taught in
your law school. Within each title
can be found all the cases encoun-
tered by the student in that particu-
lar subject.
If you are interested in represent-
ing our company at your school,
please reply to Barrister Publishing
Co., Inc., 50 Broadway, New York,
N.Y. 10004 for a free information kit
which will include a FREE sample
of a $7.95 book (please check below
for the book and text you wish it
to be keyed to) and other informa-
tion about the representation of our
company at your school. An hourly
fee of $7.50 will be paid and during
the school year the representative
will average about 5-10 hours per
week.
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